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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This work systematically reviews the extant academic management literature 
on supply networks. It specifically examines how network configurations and network 
governance mechanisms influence each other in supply networks.   
Design: 125 analytical and empirical studies were identified using an evidence-based 
approach to review the literature mainly published between 1985 and 2012.  
Synthesis: Drawing on a multi-disciplinary theoretical foundation, this work develops 
an integrative framework to identify three distinct yet interdependent themes that 
characterize the study of supply networks: a) Network Configurations (structures and 
relationships); b) Network Governance Mechanisms (formal and informal); and c) The 
Interplay between Network Configurations and Network Governance Mechanisms. 
Findings: Network configurations and network governance mechanisms mutually 
influence each other and cannot be considered in isolation. Formal and informal 
governance mechanisms provide better control when used as complements rather than 
as substitutes. The choice of governance mechanism depends on the nature of exchange; 
role of management; desired level of control; level of flexibility in formal contracts; and 
complementary role of formal and informal governance mechanism. 
Research implications: This nascent field has thematic and methodological research 
opportunities for academics. Comparative network analysis using longitudinal case 
studies offers a rich area for further study. 
Practical Implications: The complexity surrounding the conflicting roles of managers 
at the organisation and network levels poses a significant challenge during the 
development and implementation stage of strategic network policies. 
Originality/value: This review reveals that formal and informal governance 
mechanisms provide better control when used as complements rather than as substitutes. 
Keywords:  Systematic literature review; supply chain management, trust, power, 
structures, relationships  
Paper type: Literature review  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This dissertation presents a systematic review of literature aimed at discovering the 
ways in which network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence 
each other in supply networks. The method employed in the dissertation — the 
systematic review — is a method of gathering, selecting and analyzing evidence that 
aims to be transparent and reproducible, thus increasing the rigour of the review 
process. 
This dissertation in general and the systematic review in particular are the first step 
towards a full-scale doctoral research project. Therefore, the aim of the dissertation 
is not only to review and synthesize the available evidence, but also to sketch the possible 
directions for subsequent doctoral research. 
The systematic review works best when the review question is sharp and focused. 
The degree to which arriving at such a question is possible is often influenced by the 
nature of the field. The research issue explored in this review is located at the 
intersection of five major fields of management knowledge: a) General Management; 
b) Operations Management; c) Supply Chain Management, d) Strategic 
Management; and e) Marketing (industrial). It is clear that a complete review of 
these vast fields is impractical and hardly plausible. Therefore, in this dissertation, 
the literature in these fields was used as a general context which informed the design of 
the review. 
1.2 Contextualizing the Systematic Review – The Business Problem 
Organisations in industrialized nations are shifting away from their traditional approach 
of seeking competitive advantage through either product or process innovation 
(Dickson, 1992; Baines et al., 2007). Instead, now the focus is on integrating value-
added services (Wise and Baumgartner 1999; Johnson and Mena 2008) with their core 
product offering (Slack et al., 2004; Davies, 2006). Consequently, organisations are 
now outsourcing their strategically relevant activities (e.g. customer support service, 
logistics etc.) as shown in Figure 1. This is because these organisations either lack the 
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in-house capability (e.g. financial constraint; complex technology); or they do not want 
to perform these activities themselves (Christopher, 2011).  
 
Figure 1: Using Service to Augment Core Product (Christopher 2011) 
 However, “though they are different, services and products are intimately and 
symbiotically linked” (Shostack, 1982:49). For instance, many organisations outsource 
logistics (which is a service) to deliver their products to the customers. In this case the 
supplier (logistics provider) comes in direct contact with the customer and hence a triad 
is formed.  Thus, supply chains are becoming supply networks (Christopher, 2011). A 
supply network is defined as:  
“A network of interconnected and interdependent organisations mutually and 
cooperatively working together to control, manage, and improve the flow of materials 
and information from suppliers to end users” (Aitken , 1998:45). 
The success of these supply networks depends on the success of each network member 
(Villena et al., 2011). However, key decision makers and network managers have little 
guidance on how to select and employ a suitable network governance mechanism to 
match a particular network configuration in order to achieve the desired network 
performance target beyond the traditional dyadic approach (Li and Choi 2009). 
This is evident from the: a) frequently observed opportunistic behaviour by 
organisations in a supply network – e.g. aerospace industry (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 
Rossetti and Choi, 2008; Wu et al., 2010); b) inability of organisations to visualize 
technology developments and manufacturing advances – e.g. Nokia (Choi and Linton, 
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2011); and b) failures in service outsourcing – e.g. Dell (Aubert and Croteau, 2005). It 
is this implication of the interplay between network configuration and network 
governance mechanism that this review will focus upon. 
1.3 Motivation for Research 
As a business practioner in a food supply chain (1995-2010), while dealing with 
outsourcing decisions in supply chain networks, I observed that most organisations took 
their supply chain decisions without considering their impact on the supply chain as a 
whole. Most of these decisions were taken at the enterprise level instead of the network 
level. The primary aim for each organisation was to its own performance target rather 
than that for the whole network.  
Consequently, different types of governance mechanisms were employed by the 
organisations to achieve their own individual performance objectives. For instance, 
buyers (manufacturers) regularly monitored the inventory levels of the customers 
(retailers) as well as the daily dispatches of the suppliers (distributors) to identify any 
unusual patterns pointing towards opportunistic business practices. Little concern was 
shown by participating organisations to formulate joint targets at the network level. 
Similarly, organisations took various measures to either maintain or strengthen their 
position in supply networks. For instance, buyers often sacrificed long-term gains by 
focusing on short-term profits thereby damaging buyer-supplier relationship 
irretrievably. Conversely, disillusioned suppliers, driven by the two unfulfilled promises 
of strategic sourcing leading to lack of close working relationship with buyers and 
diminishing profit margins) refused to tolerate broken long-term contracts and 
established direct relationship with the customers.  From a personal perspective, the 
main goal of my research is to address these challenges faced by practioners. 
1.4 Aim of the Review and Review Question 
The aim of this systematic review was to examine the academic management 
literature regarding the interplay between network configuration and network 
governance mechanisms in supply networks. For this purpose, the following review 
question was employed:  
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How do network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each 
other in supply networks? 
This review focused on goal directed supply networks that evolve as a result of service 
outsourcing or servitization based strategies. Since both outsourcing and servitization 
involve services, so this review focused on how services are managed in the wider 
context of supply networks.  
1.5 The Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation builds on the scoping study recently conducted by the author. The 
remaining part of the dissertation is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents a shorter version of the scoping study. The aim of the scoping 
study was to sketch the landscape of the relevant bodies of academic literature and use 
their respective arguments to: a) position the research issue; b)  arrive at the 
appropriate review question; and c) inform the design of the systematic review. 
Chapter 3 outlines the method used for conducting the literature review and provides a 
clear record of the decisions taken during the review process. Chapter 4 presents the 
descriptive findings of the review based on the range of data gathered from the 
selected studies. Chapter 5 highlights the thematic findings of the review. The major 
ideas and arguments encountered in the studies are reported separately. Chapter 6 is 
regarding the discussion about the key findings. This discussion aims to draw a coherent 
picture of the reviewed fields and to provide the answer to the review question by 
synthesizing the evidence encountered during this review.  Chapter 7 concludes the 
dissertation with a review of the major findings and their limitations, and a brief 
discussion of the learning points regarding the content and the process of the review. .A 
set of possible research questions are presented.  
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2 POSITIONING THE INQUIRY – The Narrative Review  
2.1 Overview 
This review aims to identify structural patterns of relationship between network 
configurations and network governance mechanisms in context of ‘goal directed’ 
networks.  These are formal mechanisms for problem solving based on joint action by 
the network members (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan, Isett, and Milward 2004). 
This review will follow the definition of goal directed networks provided by Kilduff and 
Tsai (2003). Goal-directed networks are those interorganisational networks that “are set 
up with a specific purpose, either by those who participate in the network or through 
mandate, and evolve largely through conscious efforts to build coordination” (Provan 
and Kenis, 2008:231). 
An example of a publication that is clearly within the scope of this review is that of 
Provan and Kenis (2008) in which the authors clarify the concepts of network 
configuration (Li and Choi, 2009) and network governance mechanism (Rossetti and 
Choi, 2005) in supply networks (Kilduff and Tisai, 2003). 
Thus, by focusing on goal directed supply networks, this review aims to position the 
research in the literature domain of Supply Chain Management because both 
outsourcing (e.g. Rossetti and Choi, 2008) and servitization (e.g. Bastl et al., 2012) are 
topics situated in the Supply Chain Management literature. 
2.2 Mapping the Field 
The two constructs of research interest are: a) network configurations; and b) network 
governance mechanisms. The phenomenon of research interest is the interplay between 
network configurations and network governance mechanisms in ‘goal directed’ supply 
networks (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Constructs and Phenomenon of Research Interest 
The two constructs of research interest are discussed below. 
2.3 Network Configurations 
Network configurations consist of nodes and possible (direct and/or indirect) 
relationships between organisations participating in a network (Wu and Choi, 2009). 
Network configurations are compared and contrasted across different network structures 
and various states of relationships between the organisations. 
Levels of Analysis: Interorganisational scholars have studied interorganisation 
networks at multiple levels of analysis, including the dyad (Gulati, 1995), the 
ego network (Gomes and Casseres, 1996), and the overall network (Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999).  The main emphasis in a dyadic relationship is to determine how two 
organisations impact each other (e.g. how one supplier affects another supplier) and on 
the relations (e.g. cooperative vs. competitive) (Choi and Wu, 2009).  However, in order 
to determine the behaviour of an organisation in a network, it is important to look 
beyond a dyadic relationship and use triads as the fundamental building block of a 
network (Choi and Wu, 2008). 
Contexts for Studies on Triads: Triads have been studied in different contexts 
(e.g. manufacturing, services etc.). A buyer-supplier relationship, based on a 
triadic framework, displays different dynamics in manufacturing outsourcing as 
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compared to services outsourcing (Li and Choi, 2009). These differences are 
discussed below: 
Manufacturing Context: In this context, the bridge position between the 
customer and the supplier is retained by buyer before, during, and after the 
outsourcing strategy is operationalized. A bridge is the actor that is positioned on a 
structural hole (Li and Choi, 2009).  A structural hole is defined as the lack of 
connections between agents or groups that are not directly linked together (Burt 1992, 
2000a; Li and Choi, 2009). The buyer controls the flow of information between 
the supplier and its customer during these three stages of outsourcing.  
Services Context: In this context, the relationship is more dynamic and 
undergoes transformation during the various stages of outsourcing. For instance, 
the buyer holds the bridge position between the customer and the supplier 
during the contract finalization stage. During the contract execution stage, the 
customer comes in direct contact with the supplier. It is now the supplier that 
assumes the bridge position from the buyer. (van der Walk and van Iwaarden, 
2011). This phenomenon where one organisation starts losing its bridge position 
is called bridge decay (Li and Choi, 2009).  After the outsourcing strategy has 
been implemented, the supplier might assume the position of bridge instead of 
the buyer. This phenomenon where the bridge position changes from one 
organisation to another is called bridge transfer (Li and Choi, 2009). 
2.4 Governance 
Governance is the science, theory, or study of good order and workable arrangements 
that is primarily concerned with the means aspect of the means – end relationship 
(Williamson, 1996). Governance is also an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternate 
modes (means) of organisations (Provan and Kenis , 2008). 
Governance in business organisations has traditionally focused on the role of the 
board of directors in representing and protecting the interests of their shareholders 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). Governance has also been studied in the non-profit context, 
although the focus here has generally been on the role of boards of trustees, as 
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representing and protecting the interests of community members or other politically 
important constituencies (Provan 1980; Poppo and Schepker, 2010). 
In public management, governance refers not to the activities of boards, but mainly, to the 
funding and oversight roles of government agencies, especially regarding the activities of 
private organisations that have been contracted to provide public services (Provan and 
Skinner, 1989; Hill and Lynn 2005; Provan et al., 2007). A critical role for governance 
in all these sectors, and consistent with principal-agent theory, is to monitor and 
control the behaviour of management, who are hired to preside over the day-to-day 
activities of running the organisation (Fama and Jensen 1983; Eisenhardt 1989). 
The overarching aim of governance is to bring about adherence to desired outcomes 
through the exercise of influence, authority, power or legitimacy (Williamson, 
1996; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Thus, in its broadest meaning, governance is the 
regulation of social activities utilizing a variety of modes and mechanisms of societal 
regulation (Provan et al, 2007; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). These range from 
collectively binding decisions to uncoordinated individual action guided by social 
norms and rationality principles (Kilduff and Brass 2010; Lin et al., 2011). 
2.5 Governance Mechanisms 
Governance mechanisms are the means by which order is accomplished in an 
interorganisational relationship (IOR) in which potential conflict threatens to undo or 
upset opportunities to realize mutual gains (Williamson, 1996). Governance 
mechanisms are the means through which organisations manage the content flows and 
coordinate their relationship (Ebers, 1997). 
IOR literature has highlighted a wide variety of governance mechanism (Jones et al., 
1997). Attributes of governance mechanisms that have been widely studied include: a) 
trust (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011); b) reciprocity and equity as well as other forms of 
norm-based social exchange (Ouchi, 1981; Uzzi, 1997); c) incentive structures and 
administrative controls (Nootboom, 1996); and d) various forms of contracts (Ring, 
2008). 
Governance mechanisms are described along different dimensions, including: a) control 
agent; b) the subject of control; c) mechanism of control; d) degree of control; e) the 
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focus or degrees of control, f) the legitimacy of control; and g) methods or tools of 
control (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Governance mechanisms for various types of 
transactions are presented in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Forms of Governance Mechanisms 
From Figure 3 it is evident that the terms of exchange have an influence on the 
suitability of a governance mechanism. For instance, in case of discrete exchange 
context, formal contracts are considered more affective. On the other hand, informal 
(relational contracts) governance mechanisms are more suitable in case of long-term 
inter-connected exchange relations (Macneil, 1980).  
Governance mechanisms affect good order by enabling and constraining actors’ 
behaviour. Different governance mechanisms regulate in different ways (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012). For instance, by providing (dis) incentives for action 
or by directly regulating behaviour through a formal contract (Williamson, 1996; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). Research examining individual governance mechanisms has 
developed along distinct lines of inquiry as discussed below. 
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Risk and Control: Research in this stream has examined governance mechanisms 
and their ability to provide the necessary: a) safeguards against the risks inherent in 
exchange relationships (Williamson, 1985; 1991; Das and Teng, 1998; 2000); and b) 
efficiency in the co-ordination and administration of IOR to reduce transaction costs, 
including the costs of search, monitoring and enforcement (Das and Teng, 1996; 
Williamson, 1996). 
Control and Formal Contracts: Formal contracts represent promises or obligations 
to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978). Work in this line of inquiry 
has appraised long-term buyer-supplier contracts and control, alliance contracts and 
control, and incompleteness of contracts (Arvind 1993; Doz, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 
2002; Lin et al., 2011).  
Trust and Risk Management: This research stream analyzes the role of trust in 
governing IOR. This research stream emphasizes, in particular, on the relationship 
between trust and risk (Das and Teng, 1998; 2000; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; 
Inkpen and Curral, 2004).  
Trust and Control: Studies in this line of inquiry highlight the role of trust as: a) a 
control mechanism; b) an organizing principle; and c) a moderator of the 
relationship between hazards and control mechanisms (Nooteboom, 1996; Doney 
and Cannon, 1997; Poppo and Schepker, 2010). 
Relational Governance and Formal Contracts: Relational governance refers to a 
social institution that governs and guides exchange partners on the bases of 
cooperative norms and collaborative activities (Heide and John, 1992; Macneil, 1980; 
Zaheer and Venkataraman, 1995). Formal contracts represent promises or obligations 
to perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978). 
Work in this area explicates the relationship between formal and informal 
governance mechanisms (including debates of compliments and substitutes). This 
research can be further grouped as follows: a) the effects of contractual governance 
on the  development of trust (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012); b) “legal remedies” as 
substitutes for trust (Ring, 2008); c) the relationship between formal legal contracts 
(control) and psychological contracts (trust) (Poppo and Schepker, 2010); d) how 
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transaction hazards (and other determinants) impact the way contracts are drawn 
(contract complexity) (Williamson, 1996); e) the role that trust plays as a moderator of 
the relationship between contractual governance and performance (Poppo and Zenger 
et al., 2008) ; e) the effects of pre-existing trust on the nature of contractual governance 
that is adopted in an IOR (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011); and f) the interplay between 
contracts and trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Gulati, 
1995a). 
Characteristics of Transactions and Contextual Factors: This line of inquiry 
investigates the internal relationships within the formal and informal governance 
mechanisms and the contextual factors and characteristics of transactions: a) trust 
and asset specificity (Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005); b) contracts and asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1996); c) contracts and technological uncertainty (Poppo et 
al., 2008); and d) trust and technological complexity (Poppo an Zenger, 2002). 
Post-formation developments in governance mechanisms: Change in governance 
mechanisms, including initial conditions and post- formation changes have been 
examined by the work done in this line of inquiry (Reuer and Arino, 2000; Ahuja et 
al., 2012). 
Interactions between governance mechanisms and agent characteristics: The 
outcomes based on the relationship between governance mechanisms and agent 
characteristics are examined by this line of inquiry. The arguments in this stream of 
research are that agent characteristics or personnel turnover in boundary-spanning 
functions can influence the choice and deployment of governance mechanisms and 
ultimately IOR outcomes. Boundary spanners in IORs act as decision making agents. 
They engage in processes such as information sharing, joint problem solving, and 
conflict resolution that can be categorized as varying degrees of co-operative 
behaviours (Williamson, 1996). A governance structure is thus usefully thought of as 
an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of 
transactions, is decided. 
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2.6 Network Governance  
Network governance is widely acknowledged and is seen as producing important 
economic benefits. However, the mechanisms that produce these benefits are vaguely 
specified and empirically still incipient (Uzzi, 1996).  For instance, Powell (1990) 
defines network governance as a form of coordinating economic activity which 
contrasts (and competes) with markets and hierarchies.  This vague specification lacks 
clarity on what network governance is, when it is likely to occur, and how it helps 
organisations (and non-profit agencies) resolve problems of adapting, coordinating, 
and safeguarding exchanges.  
With some exceptions (Park 1996; Jones et al, 1997; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), 
most literature on organisational networks does not explicitly address network 
governance. The most obvious reason is that since networks are not legal entities 
therefore the legal imperative for governance is simply not present as it is for 
organisations (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Bastl et al., 2012; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). 
Researchers have defined in Network Governance in a variety of ways. These are 
presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Definitions of Network Governance 
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For goal-directed organisational networks with a distinct identity, however, some form 
of governance is necessary to ensure that participants engage in collective and mutually 
supportive action, that conflict is addressed, and that network resources are acquired and 
utilized efficiently and effectively (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Humpharies and 
Wilding, 2004; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012)).  Ring and Van de Ven 
(1992) provide an overarching look at network governance comprising informal social 
systems within organisations and formal contractual relationships between them to 
coordinate complex products or services in uncertain and competitive environments. 
However, this perspective does not address the interplay between formal and informal 
network governance mechanisms. 
Grandori and Soda (1995) define network governance as a set of instruments that 
coordinate network participating organisations to deliver network outcomes. However, 
these authors do not address the circumstances in which a certain set of governance 
instruments is more effective than the others.  
In contrast, Jones et al. (1997) provide a different take on network governance by 
stating that it involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous 
organisations (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services 
based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies 
and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges. Thus, for this research, the following 
definition of network governance will be focused upon: 
“Network governance involves a use of institutions and structures of authority and 
collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint action across 
the network as a whole” (Provan and Kenis, 2008:231) 
The rationale behind focusing on this particular definition is because it highlights the 
importance of the interplay between configurations and governance mechanisms in a 
network context. The network perspective of this approach attempts to address the 
limitations of the extant work in this field of inquiry. For instance, governance 
mechanisms are generally examined in terms of particular activities conducted in a 
specific network (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Consequently, there is a lack of theory 
on: a) the various forms of governance that exist; b) the rationale for adopting one form 
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versus another; and c) the impact of each form on network outcomes (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008). 
2.7 Network Governance Mechanisms 
A suitable network governance mechanism is required for amicable resolution of 
conflicts and effective utilization of network resources (Provan and Kenis, 2008). To 
achieve this, it is important to understand the strengths and limitations of each 
type as discussed below 
Governance mechanisms are generally examined in terms of particular activities 
conducted in a specific network. Consequently, there is a lack of theory on: a) the 
various forms of governance that exist; b) the rationale for adopting one form versus 
another; and c) the impact of each form on network outcomes (Provan and Kenis, 
2008). 
There are three main types of governance mechanisms. These are: a) Outcome-based vs. 
Behaviour-based contracts; b) Third party (or formal contracts) vs. Self-enforcing 
safeguards (informal contracts); and c) External vs. Internal governance mechanisms. 
Details are as following:  
2.7.1 Outcome Vs Behaviour Based Network Governance Mechanisms  
Agency theorists put forward the two types of network governance mechanisms. 
Outcome-based contracts are designed to promote the business interest of the buyer 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). They focus on measurable performance variables that encourage 
suppliers to achieve performance targets set by the buyer (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). 
Behaviour-based contracts depend upon the activities and processes, required to achieve 
the performance variables based outcomes (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). They are more 
effective if a buyer can monitor the performance of a supplier cost effectively 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
2.7.2 Third Party vs. Self Enforcing Network Governance Mechanisms 
A comparison across the Economics and Sociology literature shows that there are two 
categories of network governance mechanisms. Third party safeguards rely on formal 
contracts between exchanging organisations. Dispute resolution is through enforcement of 
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these formal contracts by a third party (e.g. state) (Williamson, 1991). Self enforcing 
safeguards rely on self-enforcing informal agreements between the exchanging 
organisations. Dispute resolution is through mutual negotiation without any third party 
intervention (Telser, 1980). 
Self enforcing safeguards are further subdivided into two types of informal safeguards. 
Formal self-enforcing safeguards are based on a formal collateral bond that links 
the cooperation of the exchanging partners with economic incentive. For instance, 
a buyer and supplier could make symmetric investments in co-specialized assets 
(Williamson, 1983). Their main purpose is to discourage opportunistic behaviour 
and encourage the organisations to engage in value creation activities based on 
mutual trust (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). 
Informal self-enforcing safeguards are based on informal agreements and often 
rely on mutual trust built on past experience. They are frequently used to 
supplement formal controls (Granovetter, 1985) and are effective because they: a) 
facilitate complex exchange of and information and capabilities between 
organisations; and b) lower transaction cost since they do not require investment in 
elaborate procedures to monitor and control exchanging organisations (Uzzi, 1997). 
2.7.3 External vs Internal Network Governance Mechanisms 
To encourage network level relationship based on collaboration and coordination at the 
network level, it is important to have some form of formal governance mechanism 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008). These formal network governance mechanisms may either be 
external or internal (Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007) (see Figure 5).   
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Figure 5: Network Governance Dimensions (Provan and Kenis, 2008) 
The choice of the network governance mechanism influences the network structure as 
explicated below. 
External Governance Mechanisms:  These comprise an external (independent) 
network administrative organisation created with the sole purpose of governing the 
network activities. It is created either by the network member organisations or through a 
government mandate. This organisation does not participate as a member in the 
operational activities of the network. The key objective of this organisation is to 
coordinate sustainable network activities to ensure that network level performance 
objectives are met (Human and Provan, 2000). 
Internal Governance Mechanisms: These mechanisms can take three different forms: 
a) Highly brokered governance mechanisms are suitable where network members 
interact infrequently with each other. Network governance is conducted through a lead 
organisation/organisation. This organisation is responsible for all the strategic decisions 
made at the network level; b) Shared brokering is suitable where network members 
interact with a moderate frequency. Decision making is shared between the lead 
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organisations/organisation and other network members; and c) Decentralized brokering 
is suitable where interactions between network members are highly frequent. 
Responsibility and decision making authority is divided amongst subgroups of network 
members (Provan and Kenis, 2008). 
In general, informal governance mechanisms are most effective when based on mutual 
trust; and formal governance mechanisms are required for the sustainable cooperation 
between network members.  
In the following two sections, the role of interorganisational “trust” and “power” as 
informal governance mechanism within the contest of supply networks is discussed. 
2.7.4 Role of Trust as a Governance Mechanism 
Considerable theoretical debates remain about the role and value of trust in relationships 
between business organisations participating in a network(Sako, 1992). Most of these 
controversies are due to the sometimes conflicting assumption and premises of different 
disciplinary approaches within the business and management literature. These 
theoretical debates evoke strong feelings among scholars with economic backgrounds 
on the one hand, and sociologists on the other. Comparing and contrasting extant 
literature on inter-organisational trust indicates that the concept of “trust” has been 
conceptualised in multiple ways. 
First, trust may be regarded as a meta preference (which is based on a belief in certain 
values) rather than mere preference (which is based on a commitment to the content of 
the normative value). (Etzioni, 1988). Second, trust may be considered as a renewable 
source or augmentable skill (Gambetta, 1988). The assumption here is that trust 
multiplies with use i.e. organisations engage in ‘learning by interacting’ to enhance trust 
(Arrow, 1962). Third, disagreeing with this assumption, Williamson (1985) stated that 
trust may be treated as a scarce resource, but with a different degree of scarcity or 
abundance from country to country. In this discourse, the supply of trust is fixed and 
therefore ultimately depletable. Fourth, trust may be conceptualized as an intangible 
capital asset jointly owned by organisations involved in a business relationship. Thus 
trust is considered as bilateral and specific to a particular relationship based on mutual 
confidence building activities (Asanuma, 1989). Fifth, trust may be treated as a 
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commodity for which no market exists. According to this aspect, trust cannot be readily 
bought or sold because the instrument exchange orientation destroys the very basis of 
trust (Leibenstein, 1966). Based on the predictability in behaviour, trust can be 
distinguished into the following types:  
Contractual Trust: This is embodied in social norms and ethical codes – the pre-
contractual base of contracts (Durkheim, 1947). Thus, promises to be kept may not 
always be with reference to bilaterally agreed rules but with respect to rules more 
generally based on universalistic ethical standards. For instance, in relationships based 
on contractual trust, the reliance is more on oral agreements rather than written ones 
(Sako, 1992).  
Competence Trust: This is built upon the mutual performance expectations of 
organisations. The required competencies maybe attained either by acquiring existing 
competencies in the market place or by investing in creating competencies. For instance, 
technical and managerial competencies could be enhanced through training programs or 
by hiring suitable personnel. Similarly, technical competence could be strengthened by 
investing in new technology (Sako, 1992). 
Goodwill Trust: This is based upon the mutual performance expectations that go 
beyond the formal contractual obligations. This is based on discretionary initiatives 
taken by organisations to avoid exploitation. (Akerlof, 1982). 
The role of trust, as a governance mechanism, also depends on the way power is used 
(or misused) in an IOR (Zerbini and Castaldo, 2007).  The role of power as a 
governance mechanism is discussed as follows. 
2.7.5 Role of Power as a Governance Mechanism  
A comparison and integration of extant research on inter-organisational power as an 
informal network governance mechanism paints the following similarities. First, power 
is required to influence joint objectives within supply networks (Medcof, 2001). 
Second, studies that examine the role of power within IORs (Inkpen and Bemaish, 
1997) in a network context (Agarnoff and McGuire, 2001) generally considered the 
relationship as the units of analysis; c) issue related to the use of power are primarily 
focused at the strategic choice of organisations to influence network performance 
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outcomes through acquisition of control (Hardy et al., 1998); and d) there is an 
imbalance of power in all inter-organisation relationships including collaborative 
relationships within supply networks (Grimshaw et al, 2002). 
Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) is commonly thought of as providing the earliest 
perspective on inter-organisation relationship power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Drawing on theoretical models of power, including Emesron’s (1962) notion of power 
dependence and exchange, RDT focused on the “interdependence” of an organisation 
with other organisations in its environment. 
Because power enables organisations to realize their goals, the Figure 6 (Knoke and 
Chen, 2008) conceptualizes the dynamic patterns of power generation and distribution 
among organisations. The solid arrows indicate the main dynamic mechanisms in the 
generation and distribution of power among organisations. The dashed arrows indicate 
the reciprocal influence of power on its main sources. The dotted arrows represent 
mutual influences among the three power sources (Huxham and Beech, 2008). 
 
Figure 6: Dynamic Patterns of power generation and distribution among organisations 
(Knoke and Chen, 2008) 
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This discussion indicates that the network configurations and network governance 
mechanism have been extensively discussed by researcher scholars as two separate 
constructs. However, there seems to be a dearth of studies that talk about the interplay 
between configurations and governance mechanisms in a supply network context.  
The methodology employed to systematically review the extant literature is discussed in 
the next section. 
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3 METHOD 
3.1 The Systematic Review 
A systematic review of literature is a structured and transparent way of analysing the 
available evidence in order to inform the decision making process. It has been 
employed in medical research (Mulrow, 1994) and has migrated to the field of 
management (Tranfield et al., 2003a). It has been argued that the advantage of 
systematic reviews lies in their transparency and replicability, as they make 
researchers' decisions and biases explicit (Tranfield et al., 2003a). 
Transparency and replicability in turn make literature reviews stronger and more 
rigorous than traditional narrative reviews, thus providing a solid basis for informing 
theory and practice. 
This chapter is essentially a protocol of the systematic review that adheres to the 
general principles outlined in the literature and follows the structure advocated by 
Cranfield School of Management
1
: 
Phase I: Planning the Review 
1. Forming a review panel 
2. Mapping the fields 
3. Producing a review protocol 
Phase II: Identifying and evaluating studies 
1. Conducting a systematic search 
2. Evaluating studies 
Phase III: Extracting and Synthesising Data 
1. Conducting data extraction 
2. Conducting data synthesis 
  
                                                 
1
 Source: Cranfield School of Management (www.cranfieldonline.com 
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Phase IV: Reporting 
1. Reporting the findings 
Phase V: Utilising the Findings 
The narrative review presented earlier contains the maps of the fields that were used in 
this systematic review. It is also necessary to say that the process of this review stops at 
the stage of informing research. This is partly caused by the highly academic nature of 
the main concept of the review and partly by the time limitations of the project. 
3.2 Consultation Panel 
A literature review, especially if it is cross-disciplinary in nature, cannot be performed 
in isolation. A researcher will receive valuable input from outside sources at different 
stages of the review process. To guide the author in conducting my systematic literature 
review, a panel of experts in the area of research interest was assembled. The panel 
members were consulted in the selection of relevant sources and in the development of 
inclusion and inclusion criteria. Panel members were from both inside and outside 
Cranfield University School of Management. 
3.2.1 Internal Review Panel 
The internal review panel provided their expert guidance on: a) developing the research 
protocol for this systematic literature review; and b) determining the appropriateness of 
the literature selected. Members of the internal review panel are as follows. 
Dr. Collin Pilbeam  
Dr. Pilbeam is a Senior Research Fellow within the Centre for Management Knowledge 
and Strategic Change at Cranfield School of Management. He is a subject expert in the 
area of governance mechanisms in supply networks. His wider research interest lies in 
addressing questions surrounding the evolution, management and performance of 
networks found in the not-for-profit sector, particularly those delivering International 
Development/Humanitarian Aid and Research. He is an expert on the systematic review 
methodology. Dr. Pilbeam is the chair of this internal review panel.   
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Dr. Mark Johnson 
Dr. Johnson is a Principal Research Fellow within the Supply Chain Research Centre at 
the Cranfield School of Management. He is a subject expert in the area of IORs within 
service networks. He is an expert on the systematic review methodology. Dr. Johnson is 
also on the Editorial Boards of the Journal of Operations Management and the 
International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management. Dr. Johnson 
is a member of this internal review panel. 
Dr. Marko Bastl 
Dr. Bastl is a Senior Research Fellow within the Supply Chain Research Centre at the 
Cranfield School of Management. He is a subject expert in the area of management of 
inter-organisation relationships as networks, designing networks and relational 
strategies for provision of integrated solutions and managing information exchange in 
complex inter-organisation relationships. He is an expert on the systematic review 
methodology. He also acts as a reviewer for Journal of Operations Management.  Dr. 
Bastl is the PhD supervisor of the author. 
Ms Heather Woodfield 
Ms. Heather Woodfield an information specialist and was approached at the stage of 
designing search strings that were most appropriate for selected databases. 
3.2.2 External Advisory Panel 
External advisory panel members represented academic as well as practioner 
knowledge. Members were contacted via email to provide input on the articles selected. 
This was an informal panel and hence provided assistance upon the request of the 
author. 
Professor Thomas Choi 
Professor Choi is the Bob Herberger Arizona Heritage Chair and the Director of the 
Centre for Supply Networks at Arizona State University. He is world class scholar in 
the area of supply chain design and network structures, supply base management, 
supplier-supplier relationships, triads in supply networks, total quality management and 
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continuous improvement involving suppliers. Professor Choi is also the Co-Editor-in-
Chief of Journal of Operations Management.  
Professor Keith Provan 
Professor Provan is the McClelland Professor of Management in the Eller College of 
Management at the University of Arizona. He is a world class scholar in the area of 
inter-organisational and network relationships, including network structure, evolution, 
governance and effectiveness. Professor Provan is also a Senior Research Fellow at 
Tilburg University, in the Netherlands. 
3.3 Search Strategy 
The aim of the systematic search strategy was to identify the publications that are 
relevant for the review question. In this section, the process of the database search is 
explained. Though the decision process used throughout the review is shown here as 
linear and smooth flowing, there were many decisions reviewed and revisited at each 
stage, as more clarity emerged about the topic of interest. The experience was more 
messy and iterative than linear. The flow chart for the systematic review process is 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Flow Chart of the Systematic Literature Review Process 
In an effort to identify recent research work done on the interplay between network 
configurations and network governance mechanisms, an extensive review of the 
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literature was undertaken. This systematic review considered only secondary data in printed 
publications and only academic literature. Two main sources of material were used: 
electronic databases and the recommendations of the consultation panel.  
3.3.1 Defining Search Terms 
Informed by the review question, three search terms were identified. The rationale 
behind the selection of these search terms is shown in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8: Search Terms and the rationale 
3.3.2 Broad Search String 
Initially a broad search string was constructed with Boolean Connectors (AND, OR, 
AND NOT) using the three main search terms: network; configuration and governance. 
As the focus of this research was towards networks therefore at this stage the term dyad 
was considered irrelevant for the search. This initial or broad search string is shown 
below. 
 
The purpose of employing this search string was to run it through different databases to 
see how many hits were achieved? Clearly those databases with the most number of hits 
were considered to be the most important to this study since they provided the 
maximum coverage. Based on this criterion, a total of six databases were identified as 
being the most relevant for this systematic literature review. Figure 9 summarizes the 
total number of records generated from these databases using the broad search string. 
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Figure 9: Number of records generated by the broad search string 
The initial search showed a high number of hits (13,847). Initial abstracts were 
reviewed to identify opportunities for refinement and to devise a subsequent string after 
excluding irrelevant content. 
On reviewing the first two hundred abstracts generated by the broad search string, it 
became apparent that specific words were surfacing unintended and irrelevant articles. 
For instance, the term “govern*” introduced a significant number of articles on the role 
of government agencies in handling various types of illegal networks.  Similarly a large 
number of records were generated that included irrelevant terms such as networks 
infrastructure networks, computer networks, telecommunication networks, intermodal 
networks and biological networks. Informed by these initial research results, the broad 
search string was further refined to remove these anomalies. The steps taken to revise 
the search strategy are discussed as follows.  
3.3.3 Tight Search String  
The objective of developing the revised or tight search string was to further sharpen the 
research focus towards the phenomenon of interest. Consistent with the range of 
definitions of networks provided in the literature, search terms were modified to include 
the terms: clusters, consortia, alliances and chains. Similarly, structures, formations, and 
triads were found as alternate terms for configurations. The term "govern*" was replaced 
by the term governance to target the alternative terms for governance including: 
coordination, monitor, control and regulate. A list of the terms included for the tight 
search string is presented in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10: List of terms used to construct tight search string 
These selected key words were used to construct the tight search string with Boolean 
Connectors (AND, OR, AND NOT) as shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Construction of tight search string using Boolean connectors 
A list of terms that were captured unintentionally by the initial search but were 
deemed irrelevant for this research are also shown in Figure 11. These were 
subsequently excluded from the tight search. Based on the combination of the above 
mentioned keywords, the following search string was used for this systematic literature 
review: 
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Figure 12 summarizes the total number of records generated using the tight search 
string. 
 
Figure 12: Number of records generated by the initial search string 
The number of records identified by the broad search string were 13, 847 while those by 
the tight search string were 5,895 indicating a significant decline of nearly 57%. This 
showed that that each of the six databases indexed different number of articles because 
each data base uses a different combination of sources for obtaining information.”  
3.3.4 Sequence of Database Search  
“Aiming to examine the overlap of very broad issues, the research question was not 
constrained (or particularly well informed) by any specific sector. This general nature of 
the research question was used as a guideline while selecting the databases for the 
search. The database search was divided into three main categories. First, preference was 
given to a general-focus database with wide coverage i.e. Google Scholar. Second, 
Web of Knowledge and Scopus - two bibliographic databases (i.e. Web of Knowledge 
and Scopus) that do not provide content were used to for inter-disciplinary search. 
Third, three content databases (i.e. EBSCO; Pro Quest and Willey Black Well) were 
engaged for a more refined search to gain direct access to papers. 
The relative hierarchical location of the databases used to explore the relevant literature 
is shown in Figure 13. The hierarchical location indicates the sequence in which these 
databases were used. 
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Figure 13: Hierarchical Location of Data Bases 
3.3.5 Relevance of Data Bases 
Based on the most number of records identified by the broad search string, the 
following 6 databases were shortlisted as being the most relevant for this research.  
Google Scholar: This database was employed for first cut research. It was searched as 
an avenue to gain access to comprehensive selected academic publishers and 
unpublished documents not available in other databases. The total number of articles 
identified by engaging this database was 4,180. 
Web of Knowledge: This is a bibliographic data base. Web of knowledge was engaged 
because it covered an extensive range of subjects related to social sciences. The ability 
to carry out citation searching was a key feature as well. It comprised different 
databases containing information gathered from scholarly journals, books, book series, 
reports, conferences etc. This data base was utilized for inter-disciplinary search to 
select articles from specific subject areas including economics, sociology, and social 
sciences. Subject areas relating to technology, medicine or natural sciences were 
excluded. The total number of hits was 657. 
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Scopus: It is a bibliographic data base and was utilized since it was one of the largest 
abstract and citation databases of peer-reviewed literature covering all areas of science, 
technology and medicine. It had several functions that allowed the search to be 
personalised according to the requirements. This data base was searched for selecting 
articles beyond the scope of management literature including peer-reviewed studies in 
Psychology and Sociology. Categories excluded from the search were life sciences, health 
sciences and physical sciences. The total number of records identified from the search of 
this database was 451.  
ABI (Pro Quest): This database was utilized because it was a comprehensive content 
database for articles related to business in general. It spanned more than 3,000 
periodical with coverage of virtually all the aspects relating to business and economic 
systems. This database provided access to the full text of over 2,000 academic journals 
and was utilized as the primary search engine for this literature review. A total of 212 
records were identified from the search of this database.  
EBSCO: It is a content database, was employed because it had subject coverage 
spanning a spectrum of management disciplines including full text of journal articles on 
strategic management; industrial marketing; operations and supply chain management.  
This database provided access to more than 8,000 electronic journals containing more 
than 4 million full text articles. This database was drawn upon to refine the search on 
areas associated with management such as organisational theory and organisational 
behaviour.  This major source for business and management was used as a secondary 
source alongside ABI (Pro Quest) to gain direct access to specific articles. The search of 
this database generated a total number of 219 records.  
Willey Black Well: This publisher-owned content data base was used because it 
provides full text access to more than 350 online peer-reviewed journals for researchers 
and professionals. This database was found useful in searching for the publications in 
the subject areas of business and economics. The categories excluded during the search 
were: chemistry, computer science, earth and environmental science, education, 
electrical engineering, engineering, life sciences, mathematics and statistics, medicine, 
polymers and materials science, physics and astronomy, psychology, and 
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telecommunications. The total number of records generated from the search of this 
database was 176. 
3.4 Screening Process 
Considering the high number of records identified from the tight search string, first all 
2,004 duplicates were removed from this list. This accounted for 34% of the initial pool 
of 5,895 articles. The screening process of the remaining pool of 3,891 articles 
identified by the tight search string was conducted in two stages summarized below in 
Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14: Summarizing the Screening Process 
Figure 14 illustrates that 65% (2,522) of the initial articles (3,891) were rejected after 
the title and abstract based screening process while another 23% (890) articles were 
rejected after the full text based screening process. The remaining 12% (479) articles 
were subjected to quality appraisal process. The details of the screening process are 
discussed as follows. 
3.4.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for the Screening Process  
The screening process was restricted to include only peer reviewed journal articles. This 
choice was influenced by the expected higher quality from journal articles due to a more 
rigorous review process. Conference papers were excluded due to limited academic 
transparency because their publication was not systematic and they lacked rigour in the 
review process. Working papers were not included because in general they were not the final 
version and were rarely peer reviewed, hence lacking academic rigour. 
The selection of the articles was initially limited to the post 1985 period. This choice was 
made keeping in mind that most research work on networks has been done after 1985.  
However, seminal papers (e.g. Granovetter, 1973, 1985) were later added through forward 
and back ward search and upon recommendations of the panel members. The selection 
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was confined to publications in English language keeping in view the language 
proficiency of the author. Articles -that examined inter-organisational networks were 
selected. This choice was aligned with the review question.  Articles that investigated 
intra-organisational networks, physical infrastructure (e.g. road and rail), computer 
networks, telecommunication networks (e.g. wires and cables); intermodal and 
biological networks were considered irrelevant for this field of inquiry. 
Aligned with the review question, the screening process focused on those articles that 
addressed IORs embedded in a network rather than simple dyadic relationships, intra-
organisational relationships or interpersonal relationships. This choice was motivated by 
the network level focus of the research. 
Articles belonging to Natural Sciences, Computer Sciences, and Engineering were 
deemed irrelevant for the present area of enquiry. The phenomenon of interest, that is 
the interplay between network configurations and network governances, was primarily 
discussed in articles originating from the literature domains of: a) Operations Research; 
b) Supply Chain Management; c) Strategic Management; d) Industrial Marketing; and 
e) General Management. The selection process indicated the wider implications of the 
phenomenon of interest went beyond just the operational perspective. Articles that 
focused on corporate governance or financial governance were also rejected because 
coordination aspect within networks was the main focus. 
A summary of the inclusion and exclusion criteria employed to conduct the full paper 
screening process is presented in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria for the Screening Process 
Overall a total 3,412 articles were rejected during the screening process of the full 
articles. This accounted for 58% of the initial pool of 5,895 articles identified by the 
tight search string. Further details about the rejected articles are provided in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Detail of Rejected Articles 
Figure 16 indicates that the rejection of the majority (1,924 articles) of the articles 
during the screening process was due to: a) organisation level perspective instead of 
network level perspective (809 articles); b) non business networks (709 articles); and c) 
irrelevant governance perspective (409). This indicated that extant work on interplay 
between configuration and governance mechanism from a business network perspective 
is still an under-researched area.  
3.4.2 Incorporating Additional Sources 
Before undertaking the quality appraisal process, 354 articles were added from four 
different sources which qualified according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
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described above. The inclusion of 354 articles from the four sources along with the 479 
articles from the search string search brought the total number of articles selected for 
quality appraisal to 833 as shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Break up of articles selected for quality appraisal 
3.4.3 Sources Considered but Not Selected  
There were four other sources of information that were considered but not selected 
during the review process. These are discussed as follows. 
Books: It is worth mentioning here that books were excluded for this review. This was 
because books were usually less academically rigorous than journal articles. 
Information provided in the books in terms of methodology was not complete or 
satisfactory. In some cases the substantial contribution was nonetheless included 
because the book section was developed starting from an academic study published 
elsewhere that was located and passed the quality threshold. 
Reports: Reports from institutions, public bodies, agencies, etc. were excluded from 
this review. This was due to the reason that usually these sources were not directly 
searchable. 
Dissertations: These were not included as a possible source of information for this 
review because of their lack of transparency. This is because the dissertations were not 
systematically published and usually lacked academic rigour as compared to journal 
articles. 
Documents on the internet: These were not included because this review looked for 
evidence in printed publications only. Internet sources were considered as questionable 
or temporary”. 
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Next, the procedure followed to operationalize forward and backward search is 
discussed below. 
3.4.4 Operationalizing Backward Search 
The procedure for operationalizing ‘backward search’ is explicated using an example 
based on the search conducted using the Web of Knowledge database. The main page 
for the Web of Knowledge is shown in Figure 18:  
 
Figure 18: Main menu for Web of Knowledge 
On the main page, menus were used to select the item being searched (e.g. Author). The 
search was further refined by restricting it to Social Sciences (selected from the General 
Categories menu). This search brought up a list of articles from the selected author as 
shown in Figure 19: 
 
Figure 19: List of articles by selected author 
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For illustrative purposes, the article shown in Figure 19 was selected. However, this 
format did not provide links to the references. By clicking on the title of the article, the 
following format appeared that provided links to ‘Time Cited’ and ‘Cited References’ 
for this selected article as shown in Figure 20: 
 
Figure 20: Links to ‘Time Cited’ and ‘Cited References’ for the selected article 
This format had links (‘live’ buttons shown in blue colour) for ‘Time Cited’ and ‘Cited 
References’. By clicking on the link for ‘Cited References’ link, a list of the articles that 
have been cited in this selected article appears as shown in Figure 21: 
 
Figure 21: List of articles cited by the selected article 
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In the case of this example, there are a total of 90 articles that cited this particular 
article. A list of these articles was provided for further search.   
3.4.5 Operationalizing Forward Search 
The procedure for ‘Forward Search’ was the same as the ‘Backward Search’ till the 
format shown in Figure 20 was accessed. At this point, by clicking on the link for 
‘Times Cited’ (instead of the link for ‘Cited References’), a list of the articles that cited 
this selected article appeared as shown in Figure 22: 
 
Figure 22: List of articles that cited the selected article 
For instance, there were a total of 99 articles that cited this particular article out of 
which 95 articles were indexed in ‘Web of Science’ database. A list of these articles was 
provided for further search.  This search approach allowed for a more efficient and 
targeted searches than using a macro search tactic using Google Scholar. 
A total of 161 articles were selected by using the backward search technique while a 
total of 155 articles was selected using the forward search technique. All the articles 
(354) selected from sources other than the search string were subjected to the full text 
screening process. These articles qualified according to the inclusion/exclusion criteria 
defined in Section 3.3.1.5. 
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3.5 Quality Appraisal Process 
The total number of articles that qualified for the quality appraisal process was 833. A 
summary of these articles along with their sources is shown in Figure 17. During this 
process, each article was rated on the scale of 0-3 based on quality appraisal criteria 
shown in Figure 23. Based on these criteria, the quality appraisal process relevant to 
the different types of articles is explicated as follows. 
3.5.1 Quality Appraisal Criteria for Conceptual/Theoretical Papers 
The quality appraisal process for the conceptual/theoretical papers consisted of 
the following four steps. First, the comprehensiveness of the relevant review of 
literature with the indication of key authors, themes and contributions was analyzed. 
Second, the clarity of the reference to the theoretical base, model or framework that 
formed the basis of the discussion was examined. For instance, the explicit 
theoretical links between network configurations and network governance 
mechanisms were studied. Third, the adequacy of the research to fill an existing 
gap in theoretical knowledge was studied. Fourth, the clarity of the explanation 
for further research opportunities presented in the article was analyzed. 
3.5.2 Quality Appraisal Criteria for Empirical Papers 
The quality appraisal process for the empirical papers comprised the following eight 
steps. First, the comprehensiveness of the relevant review of literature with the indication 
of key authors, themes and contributions was analyzed. Second, the clarity of the 
reference to the theoretical base, model or framework that formed the basis of the 
discussion was examined. Third, the methodological rigour (e.g. details regarding 
the target population, sample size, and data collection methods) and the adequacy of 
the research design in examining the theoretical argument and in using well defined 
proxies to execute the research idea was investigated. Fourth, the transparency of 
data analysis, including the clarity of research results and the limitations analysis, 
was analyzed.  Fifth, the integration between the research results and the theoretical 
underpinning was examined. Sixth, the significance of the contribution of the 
research to practice was investigated. Seventh, the adequacy of the research to fill an 
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existing gap in theoretical knowledge was studied. Finally, the clarity of the 
explanation for further research opportunities presented in the article was analyzed. 
3.5.3 Quality Appraisal Criteria for Methodological Papers 
The quality appraisal process for the methodological papers consisted of the 
following three steps. First, the clarity of the reference to the theoretical base, model 
or framework that formed the basis of the discussion was examined. Second, the 
comprehensiveness of the discussion on the proposed method or the improvement 
of the method was analyzed. Third, the adequacy of the research to address the 
issues characterizing the interplay between network configurations and network 
governance mechanisms was evaluated.  
An article was accepted if it achieved the average score of 2.0 based on the respective 
quality appraisal criteria. Exceptions were made for five articles that received the 
score of 1.5 on the basis of high relevance and centrality to the arguments in their 
respective fields.  
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Figure 23: Quality Appraisal Criteria 
The details of the articles rejected during the quality appraisal process are presented in 
the Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: Summary of the Quality Appraisal Process 
Figure 24 indicates that 55% of the total articles finally selected for this systematic 
literature review came from the search string search. The forward and backward search 
made a combined contribution of 19% towards the 125 articles selected. The remaining 
26% of the articles originated from the search based on panel advice.  This shows that 
the inclusion of four additional sources of references beyond the records obtained from 
the search strings proved important for this review because it allowed the inclusion of 
certain articles that were extremely relevant to this research. For instance, a more 
precise definition of the two research constructs i.e. network configurations and network 
governance mechanisms was determined by remaining more flexible in de-limiting the 
scope of the review beyond the search strings. 
3.6 Data Extraction Process 
Each article that fulfilled the quality appraisal criteria was then indexed. A summary was 
produced for each article using a data extraction template shown in Appendix A. This 
template listed the: 1) author of the article; 2) title of the article; 3) document name; 4) 
journal title; 5) date of publication; 6) volume; 7) number; 8) page number; 9) paper type: 
a) empirical (statistical sampling; mixed methods; mathematical); b) analytical (model 
development; mathematical; conceptual) and c) literature review; 10) geographical 
location; 11) context/industry; 12) sample size; 13) data collection method; 14) method of 
analysis; 15) study characteristics; 16) key findings; 17) abstract; 18) key words); 19) 
organisation field; 20) theoretical lens; 21) mode of governance; 22) configuration 
elements; 23) relationship directionality; 24) unit of analysis; 25) unit of data collection; 
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26) research perspective; and 27) quality appraisal score. A separate data extraction form 
for each of the reviewed article is shown in Appendix C.  
3.7 Summary of the Entire Selection Process 
Following the process outlined in this chapter, 125 articles were selected for 
further review.  A list of these articles is shown in Appendix B. The summary of the 
entire selection process is presented in Figure 25 and the summary diagram as 
Figure 26.  
 
Figure 25: Summarizing the Entire Selection Process
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Figure 26: Summary Diagram of the Selection Process 
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4 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
This section summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the reviewed sources, 
which help to draw a rich picture of the field of inquiry. 
4.1 Academic Sources 
The articles shortlisted for this review were sourced from 44 different types of 
journal. The top five journals from which the highest numbers of articles were 
selected are shown below. The number of articles selected from each journal is also 
shown in the bracket: 
a) Strategic Management Journal (16 articles) 
b) Journal of Marketing (13 articles) 
c) Academy of Management Review (8 articles) 
d) Academy of Management Journal (8 articles) 
e) Administrative Science Quarterly (7 articles) 
The majority of the articles used in this systematic literature review were published 
in top quality journals (see Figure 27): 
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Figure 27: List of Reviewed Articles  
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The analysis of academic sources suggested that the primary roots of the review 
question originated from the literary fields of: a) Strategic Management (49); b) 
Marketing (Industrial) (23); c) Supply Chain Management (23); d) General 
Management (19); and e) Operations Management (11). This indicated that the issues 
regarding network configurations and network governance mechanisms had wider 
implications that went beyond just the operational perspective. A distribution of the 
selected articles is presented in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: Classification of Articles by Organisational Field 
4.2 Distribution of Articles over Time 
The distribution of articles over time showed that: a) 31% of the selected articles were 
published after the year 2005; b) 19% of the articles reviewed were published between 
the years 2001-2005; c) 24% of the short listed articles were published between the 
years 1996-2000; d) 15% of the articles were published between the years 1991-1995; 
and e) only 10% of the articles were published before 1991. The trend line shown in 
Figure 29 reflected the increase in the research focus on business networks since the 
year 2000 as earlier observed by Burgess et al., (2006) and Giunipero et al., (2008) and 
recently reported by Pilbeam et al., (2012).  
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Figure 29: Chronological Distribution of Articles over time 
4.3 Classification by Paper Type 
The selected articles were classified according to 3 main types: a) Empirical (60%); b) 
Analytical (32%); and c) Literature Review (8%). Empirical studies were further 
divided in five main categories including: i) statistical sampling, ii) case studies, iii) 
mixed methods; iv) longitudinal studies; and v) mathematical studies. Similarly, 
analytical studies were further subdivided in three main categories: i) conceptual, ii) 
model based; and iii) mathematical/statistical. The break up (in percentage terms) for 
each of the 9 categories is shown in Figure 30: 
 
Figure 30: Classification by Paper Type 
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Figure 31 indicates that there were significant methodological opportunities for further 
research in this nascent field of inquiry. For instance, there was a dearth of empirical 
and analytical studies based on mathematical modelling.  
 
Figure 31: Classification by Paper Type 
4.4 Classification by Geographic Location 
The distribution of reviewed studies indicated that the majority of the 75 empirical 
studies were dominated by the USA (41) followed by Europe (20) and Asia (8). There 
were only 6 studies based on the data from the rest of the world. This highlighted a 
significant opportunity to conduct further research on networks outside USA and 
Europe. The distribution (in percentage) of studies on the basis of geographical location 
is shown in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32: Classification by Geographical Location 
4.5 Classification by Industry Type 
The reviewed data when classified according to the various type of industry 
indicted a fragmented and diverse field of inquiry leaving a clear opportunity for 
empirical studies to clarify the relationships between the network classification and 
network governance mechanisms. Studies based on the automotive, aerospace, 
electrical and electronics industry account for 36% of the total empirical studies. 
The remaining 64% of the studies are fragmented into14 different types of 
industries as shown in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33: Classification of Articles by Industry Type 
4.6 Classification by Sector Type 
The classification of the reviewed data indicated that 58 out of the 75 empirical studies 
were base on the manufacturing sector while the remaining 17 studies utilized data from 
the service sector. This indicated a shortage of extant research on service networks. The 
distribution (in percentage terms) of the empirical studies is shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34: Classification by Sector Type 
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4.7 Classification by the Type of Theoretical Lens 
The classification of the literature based on the theoretical underpinnings is shown in 
Figure 35:  
 
Figure 35: Range of Theoretical Underpinnings 
This classification revealed that extant research on supply networks was dominated 
(82%) mainly by three main theories: a) Social Exchange Theory (51); b) Social 
Network Theory; and c) Transaction Cost Economics.  
There were some recent attempts to use other theoretical lenses to analyze business 
networks, for instance Coalition Theory (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012). However, the 
number of studies employing alternate theoretical lenses was quite fragmented as shown 
in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Classification by Theoretical Underpinnings 
4.8 Classification by the Type of Mode of Governance 
Classification of the reviewed data on the basis of the modes of governance discussed 
either explicitly or implicitly in the article is indicated in Figure 37: 
 
Figure 37: Type of Modes of Governance 
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The analysis of data regarding how various modes of governance have been discussed 
indicated that: a) 47% of the studies selected for the review discussed both the formal 
and informal governance mechanisms; b) 40% of the studies focused on the informal 
governance mechanisms; and c) only 9 percent of the studies focused on formal 
governance mechanism as shown in Figure 38.  
 
Figure 38: Classification by Mode of Governance 
4.9 Classification by Unit of Analysis 
A comparison of the data across the unit of analysis employed revealed that: a) 60 
studies considered the network as the unit of analysis; b) 48 studies considered 
organisation as the unit of analysis; while c) 10 studies employed the dyadic 
relationship as their unit of analysis. This result was influenced by the fact that dyadic 
studies were not the focus of this review. The distribution (in percentage) of the studies 
based on the unit of analysis is indicated in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39: Classification by the Unit of Analysis 
4.10 Classification by Research Perspective 
Analyzing the data from the research perspective illustrated that almost all (98%) of the 
studies on supply networks to-date used a cross-sectional approach to gather data for 
their research as shown in Figure 40. Only a handful (2%) of studies was longitudinal. 
Hence there was a significant opportunity for further research using longitudinal 
studies.  
 
Figure 40: Classification by Research Perspective 
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4.11 Key Descriptive Findings 
The key descriptive findings of the reviewed data are as follows. 
First, the papers selected for this review were mainly from the organisational field of 
strategic management; published after the year 2005 and were either analytical 
(conceptual) or empirical (statistical sampling).  
Second, the classification of the reviewed data portrayed that a large proportion of the 
empirical studies were based on the USA and European manufacturing sector 
(automotive, aerospace, electrical and electronics industry). 
Third, the extant research on supply networks was dominated mainly by three main 
theories: a) Social Exchange Theory; b) Social Network Theory; and c) Transaction 
Cost Economics. 
Finally, majority of the studies: a) discussed informal network governance mechanisms 
either exclusively or in tandem with formal governance mechanisms; b) used the 
network as the unit of analysis.; and c) incorporated a cross sectional approach for data 
collection. 
4.12 Reflections on Descriptive Findings 
The descriptive findings demonstrate that the field of inquiry is immature with the focus 
on exploratory and theory building works. Aligned with the work presented by 
Edmondson and McManus (2007), the large number (36) of conceptual papers (36) and 
case-based empirical studies (32) indicate that the extant research is in the nascent state 
of theory development primarily influenced: a) by the unexpected findings in the field; 
b) by questioning assumptions in the extant literature; and c) from identifying and 
addressing gaps in existing theory. In studies where theory is nascent or immature, 
researchers do not know what issues may emerge from the data and so avoid 
hypothesizing specific relationships between variables (Edmondson and McManus, 
2007). 
The focus of the extant research on the interplay between network configurations and 
network governance is still quite narrow since: a) 81% of the reviewed studies are on 
organisations based in the USA and Europe; and b) 78% of the studies are regarding 
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manufacturing organisations. This demonstrates that scholars are in the early stages of 
developing rich and detailed data to add to the little knowledge that exists regarding the 
phenomenon of interest. This limited geographical and industrial perspective illustrates 
that the research focus is primarily towards homogenous networks.  However, given the 
varied nature of influencing factors and decision variables, the heterogeneous nature of 
the networks needs further investigation through comparative studies.  
There is a glaring lack of studies that investigate the role of various influencing factors 
on network evolution (e.g. formation, development, and break down) over time. The 
existence of only 2 empirical papers based on longitudinal studies indicates that there is 
still considerable gap research work required before generalizeable results can be 
achieved.  
Recent attempts to introduce new constructs and to investigate mutual relationships 
between them are mainly influenced by the micro level (e.g. individual organisation) 
approach rather than macro (network level) level focus. The hypothesized links between 
network configurations and network governance mechanisms are still at a conceptual 
level. This is evidenced by the existence of only four analytical papers that employ 
modelling techniques to investigate the complexity of the relationship between network 
configurations and network governance. 
A comparison of the theoretical lenses employed by the researchers depicts a historical 
divide in the ontological perspectives of network researchers. For instance, 81% of the 
studies on networks influenced by the concepts developed either from the field of 
Sociology (e.g. Granovetter, 1973; 1985) or Economics (e.g. Williamson, 1981; 1991). 
The emergence of recent work by Bastl et al., 2012 represents the broadening of 
research perspectives to examine the issues related to network configurations and 
network governance mechanism. For instance, the remaining 19% of the reviewed 
studies are divided along ten different categories of theoretical lenses/perspectives. This 
is also reminiscent of the fragmented nature of the field of inquiry.  
Finally, the analysis of the descriptive findings shows that that although research on the 
configurations and governance mechanisms from a network perspective is a growing 
field of interest, yet there is a significant amount of research still required to establish a 
coherent body of literary work. This argument is supported by the fact that the majority 
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of the published work in the past three decades came from multi-disciplinary journals 
instead of those belonging to inter-disciplines. 
 
Till this point in this work, the following aspects have been discussed:  
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Chapter 2: Mapping the Field of Inquiry 
 Chapter 4: Methodology  
 Chapter 5: Descriptive findings of the review 
The remaining part of this dissertation is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 6: Thematic findings 
 Chapter 7: Discussion 
 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
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5 THEMATIC FINDINGS 
This section presents the thematic findings encountered during the review of the 
selected studies. These thematic findings are divided into three main classifications: a) 
network configurations; b) network governance mechanisms; and c) the interplay 
between network configurations and network governance mechanisms. 
5.1 Network Configurations 
The two foundation blocks of any network configuration are: a) the network 
participating organisations that are termed as nodes or actors; and b) the possible direct 
and indirect relationships that exit between these nodes (Ahuja et al., 2012). 
Traditionally, the focus of the supply chain management literature has been on a dyad 
(Rowley, 1997; Li et al., 2010). A dyad is made up of two nodes (e.g. a buyer and a 
supplier) and the link that connects them (e.g. a buyer– supplier relationship) (Choi and 
Wu, 2009).At the dyadic level the relationship between a buyer and its supplier has 
been characterized as either cooperative or adversarial (Anderson and Narus,, 1984; 
Dwyer et al, 1987; Ganesan, 1994).  However, as compared to dyadic relationships, the 
relationships in networks are different. For instance, a dyad has only one direct 
relationship between the two nodes whereas a network can have multiple direct and 
indirect relationships between nodes. 
Thus in order to capture the essence of a network, two things must be examined: how a 
node affects another node and how a link affects another link. Thus the smallest unit of 
network arrangement where this occurs is a triad (Choi and Wu, 2009). A triad is: “a 
subset of three nodes and the (possible) tie(s) among them” (Wasserman and Faust 1994 
p.19). 
Network configurations can therefore be associated with: a) network structures 
comprising the number, identity, and characteristics of nodes; and b) network 
relationships consisting of the location, content, strength, and the pattern of 
interconnections or relationships among these nodes (Ahuja et al., 2012). These two 
dimensions of network configurations are explicated below. 
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5.1.1 Network Structures 
It is important to note that, within buyer-supplier relationships, triads can have three 
archetypes. These are: a) two-tier buyer-supplier-supplier triad (2BSS); b) buyer-buyer-
supplier triad (BSS); and c) three-tier buyer-supplier-supplier triad (3BSS) (Bastl et al., 
2012). These are shown in Figure 41:  
 
Figure 41: Archetypes of Triads (Bastl et al., 2012) 
A variation in the existing characteristics of a node or a change in the number of nodes 
can influence a change in network structures. This includes not only the capabilities of 
the nodes to achieve the desired results but also when ties between nodes are created, 
dissolved, or modified in terms of their strength or content (i.e. what flows through 
them) (Ahuja et al., 2012). 
An organisation’s frequency of interactions (with other network participants) increases 
the strength of its relationships with these participants over time. However, developing 
these strong relationships consumes a lot of time and resources of the organisation 
involved in the relationship (Rowley et al., 2000).   
Findings suggest that structural holes have attracted considerable interest because they 
are considered a form of valuable social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002, Zaheer and 
Soda, 2009). Structural hole can be viewed as the gap between two non redundant 
organisations or networks (Burt, 1992; Li and Choi, 2009). The structural position 
within a network determines the dynamics among network participants (Burt 1992). The 
position of an organisation within a network confers certain advantages. First, an 
organisation assumes a stronger negotiating position by occupying a central position in 
a network. Second, the central organisation in a network benefits from the additional 
 71 
information collected from non redundant source (Burt 2000a; Zaheer and Bell 2005). 
Third, the central or focal organisation can be forewarned about a potential threat or 
opportunity by gaining access to the information provided by various network 
participants (Zaheer and Bell 2005). An organisation’s bridge position is not a 
permanent state and is subject to change (Burt 2000b, 2002; Soda, Usai and Zaheer 
2004, Choi and Wu, 2009).  An organisation faces the danger of losing the advantage of 
central position including: a) strong negotiating position; and b) access to classified 
information conveyed through the network (Lipparini and Lomi, 1999). 
Centralization facilitates integration and coordination in a network (Provan et al., 1997; 
Rowley, 1997). However, density and centralization cannot simultaneously be 
maximized (Rowley, 1997). Some trade-off between the two must occur, and the 
existence of a large number of ties does not necessarily mean that the network is 
centralized. High differentiation occurs with low centralization, suggesting that 
attempting a broad scope of activity is difficult to centrally coordinate (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008). High differentiation in networks proves to be important for the 
identification of unique clusters of organisations within networks (Provan et al. 2007). 
Clusters can be created out of convenience, as in cases of geographic clustering but they 
also can be created based on the provision of a certain set of services (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008). Findings suggest that buyers’ preference for intensive buyer-vendor ties 
and intensive vendor-supplier ties in supply networks is depressed when vendors have 
ties to many suppliers (Wuyts et al., 2004). 
Network nodes exploit opportunities arising from past patterns of behaviour, which lead 
to experiences and knowledge that in turn motivate and enable nodes to recreate and 
reconfigure past network positions into future beneficial ones. Positions in past 
networks can provide focal nodes with opportunities that shape future networks 
independent of nodes’ ability or intention to strategically exploit past positions.  
5.1.2 Network Relationships 
In the supply networks context, there are two broad categories of buyer supplier 
relationships: a) cooperative relationships; and b) competitive relationships (Cannon 
and Perrault Jr., 1999; Choi et al., 2002). Conversely, supplier-supplier relationships are 
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considered as coopetitive relationships. These three types of relationships are discussed 
below: 
Cooperative Relationship: The two organisations engaged in this relationship are 
highly committed towards achieving a common goal (Liker and Choi, 1994) based on a 
long term relationship. The mutual level of trust is high. This promotes a culture of 
information sharing (Uzzi, 1997) and conflict resolution through dialogues (Cannon and 
Perreault, 1999). In this relationship, it is win-win situation for both organisations (Jap, 
1999; Jap and Anderson, 2003). This relationship is dyadic in nature. 
Competitive Relationships: This relationship is adversarial in nature where the two 
organisations are engaged in a short-term relationship. The mutual level of trust is low. 
This promotes a culture where both organisations, fearing potential exploitation, 
compete for the same resources (Axelrod, 1997). It is a win-loss situation where one 
organisation gains advantage at the expense of loss for the other organisation. (Jap, 
1999). Conflict resolution is through third party mediation based on formal contracts 
(Cannon and Perreault, 1999). This relationship is dyadic in nature. 
Coopetitive Relationship: In this relationship, the two suppliers compete with each 
other for a certain project while cooperate with each other for another project. The role 
of the buyer is critical in this triadic relationship. For instance, the buyer, through its 
sourcing strategy, can encourage the two suppliers to cooperate with each other during 
the designing stage of a product (Asanuma, 1994). At a later stage the buyer can 
pressurize the two suppliers to compete with each other for potential production order 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). This relationship is indicative of a situation where 
an organisation (buyer) can affect an indirect relationship between the two suppliers 
(Wu and Choi; 2005). Buyers recognize how upstream suppliers’ operations affect their 
downstream customers (Wu et al., 2009). In particular, the way suppliers work with 
each other (e.g., supplier–supplier relationships) in a supply network has strategic 
importance for the buying organisations (Choi et al., 2002).  
Establishing direct relationships with suppliers is a source of benefit for the focal 
company in a network. Lower-tier suppliers can provide valuable information about the 
latest manufacturing advances and technological innovations. Companies that lack such 
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access have found themselves reacting to competitors' innovations and struggling to 
match their features and prices (Choi and Wu, 2009).  
A growing number of studies and evidence from industries suggest that, besides 
managing the relationship with its suppliers, a buyer needs to proactively manage the 
relationships between those suppliers. In a buyer–supplier–supplier relationship triad, 
the buyer, as the contracting entity, influences the suppliers’ behaviours and the 
relationship between them (Wu et al., 2010). 
Recent studies also suggest that buying organisations within supply networks are 
proactively creating coopetition among suppliers to elicit both collaborative synergy 
and market efficiency (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Sako, 2004; Wu and Choi, 2005). In a 
supply network involving one buyer and two suppliers, the buyer’s  influence has a 
direct and positive effect on supplier–supplier coopetition such that stronger buyer 
influence is associated with more intense supplier–supplier coopetition (Wu and Choi, 
2005; Wu et al., 2010).  
The state of dependency of a company on its immediate as well as distant business 
partners in supply networks signifies the impact a network has on the company's 
business decisions, actions, and outcomes for both positive and negative performance. 
This state of dependency, termed as structural embeddedness offers a number of 
advantages to the network members. 
First, the state of dependency affects how a supplier's performance is influenced by the 
other companies it is connected to, directly or indirectly, in its supply network (Choi 
and Kim, 2008). Second, embedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that enable 
actors to coordinate functions and work out problems proactively (Uzzi, 1997). These 
arrangements typically consist of routines of negotiation and mutual adjustment that 
flexibly resolve problem. Third, embeddedness promotes economies of time (the ability 
to capitalize quickly on market opportunities), because the transactional details protect 
against opportunism (contracts, price negotiations, scheduling) in arm's-length 
relationships prior to production are negotiated “on the fly” or after production is 
completed (Uzzi, 1997).  
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Repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking and successful fulfilment of expectations 
strengthen willingness of network participants to rely upon each other and expand the 
relationship, producing a virtuous circle that can be developed and promoted (Wilding 
and Humphries, 2006). 
5.2 Network Governance Mechanisms  
Network governance mechanisms are institutional instruments and tools that the 
network participants put in place as safeguards to enable them to establish, structure, 
and govern inter-organisation exchanges within the network (Fulmer and Gelfand, 
2012). They provide the means and processes by which a social system can be held 
within a range of “desired states” and by which undesirable situations may be avoided. 
Governance mechanisms also include monitoring and feedback mechanisms through 
which the difference between a desired state and the status quo can be detected in order 
to enable the social system to be kept within the desired range (Fulmer and Gelfand, 
2012; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). 
Network governance mechanisms can be either be formal (e.g. formalized agreements 
or contracts); or informal (trust-based norms of reciprocity) (Notebook, 1996; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002; Poppo et al, 2008; Lin et al., 2011). A discussion on the functions of 
network governance mechanisms is as follows. 
5.2.1 The Functions of Network Governance Mechanisms  
The reviewed literature indicates that the co-ordination function and the control function 
of network governance mechanism have been discussed extensively (Notebook, 1996; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and 
Inkpen, 2011; Lin et al., 2011). These two functions are discussed below.  
5.2.1.1 The Co-ordination Function  
Coordination is an enabling process which contributes to the attainment of desired 
outcomes (Inkpen and Corral, 2004). It is the process of aligning the goals, priorities, 
and programmes for the future, to manage expectations between or among the 
transacting parties (Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). Parties engaged in 
an IOR, at times, encounter difficulties in integrating or aligning each other’s activities. 
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This may have a negative effect on performance outcomes. To overcome this issue, the 
parties engaged in the IOR need co-ordination mechanisms to enable them to 
breakdown the tasks and to communicate plans (Notebook, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). 
In supply networks, co-ordination and alignment of partner activities is a challenge for 
network managers (Liker and Choi, 2004; Li et al., 2010). One way through which 
organisations handle heightened co-ordination concerns in an IOR is to include various 
types of coordination mechanisms in contracts and agreements (Bachman and Inkpen, 
2011). Formal contract clauses are employed to precisely: specify and enumerate the 
tasks to be accomplished; b) define procedures to be used; c) lay out quality standards to 
be fulfilled; d) specify the decision rights of the parties within the IOR; and e) to 
structure communication flows.  
5.2.1.2 The Control Function  
In economic exchanges within networks, parties involved in an IOR generally want to 
ensure that the other parties engaged in the relationship will perform in accordance with 
the stated desires or expectations (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman 
and Inkpen, 2011). Formal governance mechanisms are put in place to determine and 
influence the roles of each network participant. Task reliability is established through 
the design and specification of actors work and the enforcement of compliance with the 
prescribed standards (Notebook, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) 
In order to formally specify expectations, it is necessary to be able define tasks and 
behaviours, and to be able to measure outcomes (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 
2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). This implies that the activities in a transaction or in 
a relationship need to be predictable and explicitly specifiable in both their process and 
outcomes (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). It 
is also possible to monitor progress and evaluate actual outcomes and behaviour, to 
determine if parties involved in the IOR perform to the agreed upon rules and standards. 
Authors emphasizing the control function of governance mechanisms have tended to 
use Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory to support their arguments 
(Parched, 1993). 
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5.2.2  Formal Network Governance Mechanisms 
Formal contract provides a legally binding, institutional framework in which each 
party’s rights, duties, and responsibilities are codified; and goals, policies and strategies 
underlying the relationship are specified (Macneil, 1980; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). 
The contract also outlines the promises and obligations to perform particular actions in 
the future (Macneil, 1980). When exchange hazards increase, so must the specification 
of contractual safeguards (Williamson, 1985). 
Classical contract theory, assumes that complete contracts can be drafted (Fulmer and 
Gelfand, 2012). However, most contracts are incomplete since they are designed to 
handle ‘business as usual’ (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). Formal contracts can only 
define remedies for foreseeable contingencies and/or at best specify processes for 
resolving unforeseeable outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The remaining (un-
foreseeable) issues become taken-for-granted assumptions in the “psychological 
contracts” that parties develop in relation to each other through repeated interactions 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Gassenheimer et al., 2007). 
5.2.3 Informal Network Governance Mechanisms 
Informal network governance mechanisms comprise rules based on implicit 
understandings, being in most part socially derived and therefore not accessible through 
written documents or necessarily sanctioned through formal position. (Inkpen and 
Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). They are generally trust 
based, and involve social processes that promote norms, flexibility, solidarity, and 
information exchange (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 
2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). 
5.2.3.1 Role of Commitment as a Governance Mechanism 
In supply networks where there are no formal contractual obligations that stop the buyer 
from switching suppliers, commitment acts as an informal governance mechanism. 
Game theorists suggest that commitment as a governance mechanism is effective in 
discouraging opportunistic behaviour whenever expected payoffs from continued 
exchange surpass short-term gains from defection (Axelrod 1984, 1997). 
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Empirical studies (e.g. Morgan and Hunt; 1994) show that the opportunity costs the 
buyer has to bear (if a relationship with a supplier breaks down permanently) are the 
most important determinant of the level of commitment within a supply network. These 
costs encourage the buyer to continue its relationship with the existing supplier (Morgan 
and Hunts, 1994). 
5.2.3.2 Role of Mutual Hostages as a Governance Mechanism 
Dedicated, mutual investments made by network participants is seen as one way in 
which organisations can control opportunism and signal their commitment (Anderson 
and Weitz, 1992; Barney et al., 2001; Barratt, 2004; Anderson and Jap, 2005). . There 
are strong arguments to support this view in the literature. Many scholars suggest that 
by so doing, the partners create what economists call “self-enforcing contracts”. The 
reviewed literature indicates that researchers view such relationship-specific 
investments as: a) pledges (Anderson and Jap, 2005); b) commitment input (Gundlach 
et al, 2005); and c) control mechanism (Jap and Ganesan 2000). Thus the more 
dedicated the asset is, the higher its loyalty effect on the party making the specific 
investment (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Barratt, 2004; Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
Specific investments are also seen as a strong signal of intent and commitment to a 
relationship (Heide and John, 1988). As such, they contribute to the perception of a 
party’s trustworthiness because the pay-off time and their irreversibility are indicators 
for long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994; Barratt, 2004; Anderson and Jap, 2005). 
5.2.3.3 Role of Trust as a Governance Mechanism 
The reviewed literature indicates that trust is central to the creation of an environment in 
which cooperation can take place (e.g. Notebook, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). The ability to rely on trust permits the parties to get on with 
their day-to-day organisational lives without having to inspect and monitor all the 
uncertainties and vulnerable situations that they cannot control(Inkpen and Corral, 
2004; Poppo et al, 2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). 
The debate regarding the relationship between trust and control is central to the research 
on the interplay between formal and informal governance mechanisms (Bachman and 
Inkpen, 2011; Lin et al., 201). Early works on trust and control assumed an inverse 
relationship between trust and control. Some authors treat trust and control as functional 
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substitutes. (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). The partial explanation is that there 
appears to be a dialectic process between trust and control. When trust between network 
participants is high, there is usually no need to control their behaviour. Control is 
brought in only when adequate trust is not present (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Lin et 
al., 2011). Findings from the reviewed literature indicate that: a) trust involves a 
positive attitude about others’ motivations; and b) conceptually trust is not about 
influencing and affecting others’ behaviour. 
Interorganizational trust within supply networks is based on believing that other 
network participants will perform whatever serves the best interests of the network as a 
whole, even in the absence of control (Das and Teng, 1998; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; 
Lin et al., 2011). From this assessment, trust and control seem to be two completely 
different kinds of approaches to the management of IOR in a supply network.  Das and 
Teng (1998) provide support for this line of argument in their framework which shows 
that “control mechanisms” and “trust building” are two distinct pathways that can lead 
to higher levels of control and trust respectively. Recent network literature portrays that 
there is an indirect relationship between trust and control (and by extension between 
trust and governance) within supply networks (Lin et al., 2011). Trust contributes to the 
increasing predictability and therefore control (Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 
2008; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). 
Interorganizational trust is not a direct governance mechanism. Trust is necessary but 
not sufficient for the attainment of network performance outcomes (Ghosh and 
Fedorowicz, 2008; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). The general assumption is that trust is a 
lower cost governance mechanism than formal contracts. However, reliance on trust 
involves extensive investment; it is reciprocal in nature; and it is constantly evolving 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 2004; Inkpen and Corral, 2004; Poppo et al, 2008).  
5.2.3.4 Role of Power as a Governance Mechanism 
In a supply network context, power is a relational concept as it involves two or more 
network participants. It determines the ability of an organisation to influence, control, or 
resist the activities of other organisations participating in a network (Hardy and Clegg, 
1996). 
 79 
Researchers view the significance of power in supply networks in a variety of ways. For 
instance, power is required: a) to fulfil the need for control in an IOR embedded in a 
network; b) to achieve network level targets more effectively through joint action; or c) 
to develop collaborative IORs through which less powerful members can be supported 
to mitigate the power imbalance (Huxham and Beech, 2008). 
The perspectives on the use of power in the interorganisational literature also vary 
across many other dimensions. These can be divided into three broad categories. 
The power over perspective: This perspective is concerned with the control of an IOR 
embedded within a supply network. The power over perspective is involved with the 
power of an organisation to achieve its own performance objectives by helping it to 
function effectively (Huxham and Beech, 2008).  
The power to perspective: This perspective considers power in the context of strength 
of a collaborative network (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The power to perspective 
deliberately attempts to take the negative connotations of power (Winter and Ray, 
1994). 
The power for perspective: This perspective relates to the involvement of 
organisations that would otherwise not have a voice within a supply network. It is thus 
concerned with using IOR to transfer power to another organisation or organisations 
participating in a supply network (Crosby and Bryson, 2010). 
These three perspectives on the use of power are influenced by one common factor: how 
an organisation with the power in a supply network uses it to influence the other 
network participants (Huxham and Beech, 2008).  
Recent studies have highlighted the influence of power in the formation of triadic 
networks (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012). According to Coalition Theory, a supplier in 
a weaker power position in a buyer-supplier-supplier triad would try to create a 
coalition with another supplier to gain leverage against a common buyer. It does not 
matter whether this new supplier has more or less power compared to the old supplier as 
long as the coalition of the two suppliers (old and new) collectively yields more power 
than the buyer (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012). 
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Similarly two buyers would create a coalition to gain leverage against a common 
supplier if their coalition collectively yields more power than the supplier. Furthermore, 
the buyer would create a coalition with a second-tier supplier if the buyer is in a weaker 
power position compared to the first-tier supplier and their coalition would yield more 
power against the first-tier supplier. (Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012).  
The distribution of resources, regulations concerning rights and duties under inter-
organisational relations beyond specific individual organisations, and positions 
occupied within inter-organisational network facilitate and constrain the generation and 
distribution of power among organisations. 
5.2.4 Formal and Informal Governance Mechanism as substitutes 
The early 1990s ushered in a new take on the interplay between formal and informal 
governance mechanisms. According to this perspective, relational norms, such as trust, 
are viewed as functional substitutes for complex, explicit contracts or vertical 
integration (Granovetter, 1985; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven 
(1994); Gulati, 1995b; Uzzi, 1997; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Zaheer et al, 1998; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Das and Teng, 2001; Adler, 2001). 
Trust counteracts fears of opportunistic behaviour and as a result, is likely to limit the 
transaction costs associated with an exchange (Poppo and Zenger; 2008; Fulmer and 
Gelfand; 2012).  The economic efficiency argument is supported by Uzzi (1997) who 
argues that the embeddedness of exchanges within social structures circumvents and 
thus economizes on time otherwise spent in costly contract renegotiations. 
Granovetter (1985) contends that formal mechanisms do not produce trust but instead 
are a functional substitute for it. In his view, social norms support the emergence of 
trust because buyers can hope to get some cooperation even when formal instruments 
are absent. This view finds support in Adler (2001) who talks of replacing formal 
contracts with “handshakes”. The presence of one type of governance mechanism 
(informal network governance mechanisms, in particular) makes the other redundant 
(Larson, 1992; Gulati, 1995b). For instance, informal self-enforcing agreements which 
rely on trust and reputation often replace the controls characteristic of formal network 
governance mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
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The embeddedness of exchanges within social structures economizes on time otherwise 
spent in costly network governance mechanism renegotiations (Uzzi, 1997). A common 
underlying rationale for substitution emerges: if one party trusts the other, there is 
little need for network governance mechanisms specifying actions. 
An additional reason for substituting formal contracts with informal ones is that formal 
network governance mechanisms may actually undermine the formation of informal 
network governance mechanisms. It is argued that the use of rational control signals that 
they are neither trusted nor trustworthy to behave appropriately without such controls 
(Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). These scholars view informal network governance 
mechanisms and formal network governance mechanisms as substitutes, which 
operate through one of two mechanisms. Either informal network governance 
mechanisms eliminate the need for formal network governance mechanisms and vice 
versa, or formal network governance mechanisms directly hinder the formation of 
informal network governance mechanisms. 
In light of this predicted substitution, the net effects of formal network governance 
mechanisms and informal network governance mechanisms on network performance 
are ambiguous. While informal network governance mechanisms and formal network 
governance mechanisms may have positive direct effects on network performance, as 
they function as replacements for one another (or in the case of formal network 
governance mechanisms causally damage the other), the net effect on network 
performance is, at a minimum, reduced and potentially negative. 
5.2.5 Formal and Informal Governance Mechanism as complements 
Recent studies indicate that scholars have observed complimentary characteristics 
between formal and informal governance arrangements (e.g. Bradach and Eccles, 
1989; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Ryall and Sampson, 2004; 
Ferguson et al., 2005; Dekker, 2005). Scholars supporting this view contend that in 
some situations (e.g. where exchange hazards are severe), combining formal and 
informal mechanisms may deliver better outcomes that in the use of either one in 
isolation. The central argument in support of this perspective is as follows. 
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First, rather than hindering or substituting for relational governance, well-specified 
formal contracts promote more cooperative, long term, trusting exchange 
relationships. This is because well-specified contracts, with clearly articulated 
contractual terms, remedies, and processes for dispute resolution, narrow the domain 
and severity of risk to which an exchange is exposed and thereby encourage 
cooperation and trust. 
Second, well-crafted formal contracts may have the effect of extending the expected 
duration of a relationship while at the same time restricting the gains from non 
cooperative behaviour in a relationship (Klein, 1996; Baker et al, 1997; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). In Transaction Cost Economics, formal contracts are seen as providing 
standardized approaches and mutually agreed upon policies and procedures for 
dealing with necessary adaptations in an exchange (Williamson, 1991). 
Third, formal contracts can set the stage for the development of trust within a long-
term interaction (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Based on this view, relational governance 
may increase the likelihood that trust and cooperation will safeguard against hazards 
poorly protected by incomplete contracts. 
Fourth, the continuity and cooperation encouraged by relational governance may also 
help to generate contractual refinements that further support greater cooperation. 
Relational governance may help overcome the adaptive limits of formal contracts: a 
bilateral commitment to “keep-on-with-it” despite the unexpected complications and 
conflicts. 
The interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanism is 
influenced by: a) the role formal contracts; b) the nature of transactions; and c) the 
control and coordination function of the governance mechanisms. A discussion based 
on these elements is as follows. 
5.3 Interplay between Network Configurations and Network 
Governance Mechanisms 
The discussion in this section is divided into the following four segments: a) controlling 
opportunistic behaviours; b) misapplied contracts; c) impact of new business models; 
and d) influence of service outsourcing. 
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5.3.1 Controlling Opportunistic Behaviour 
Competition from their own suppliers poses a major threat to engineering, manufacturing, 
and high-tech companies (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Rossetti and Choi, 2008). This issue 
is illustrated as follows. In a conventional supply network arrangement as shown in 
Figure 42, the buyer sources the components from its supplier, uses its dedicated 
resources to process and assemble the material, and then sell the finished product to the 
customer. After the initial purchase of the finished product, the customer requires spare 
parts for the remaining service life of the product.  This requirement is catered for by 
the buyer. This aftermarket is highly profitable for the buyers operating in certain 
industries (e.g. aerospace industry).  
 
 
Figure 42: Conventional Supply Network before SCD 
However, this highly profitable aftermarket creates a large incentive for the supplier to by-
pass (disintermediate) the buyer’s supply chain and sell directly to the buyers’s aftermarket 
customers (Kumar, 1995; Herndon, 2002; Rossetti and Choi, 2005). This phenomenon, 
when a supplier overtly or surreptitiously sells its parts directly to its buyer’s customers, 
is termed as “Supply Chain Disintermediation” (or SCD) (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 
Rossetti and Choi, 2008) as shown in Figure 43. 
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Framed as an agency problem, SCD is the result of goal incongruence in the buyer–
supplier relationship within a supply network (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). The possible 
occurrence of SCD is influenced by the degree to which the supplier’s goals are satisfied 
by the contractual terms (Jap, 1999). This goal congruence within a contractual 
relationship can be defined as the supplier’s desire to cooperate (Bergen et al., 1992). 
The greater the goal congruence between the supplier and the contract, the more likely 
the supplier will meet the terms of the contract. However, when goals are not satisfied by 
the contract, there is increased risk of opportunistic behaviour (Alfred et al., 2005).  By 
ignoring the risk of SCD, buyers with profitable aftermarkets may find their suppliers 
competing directly against them in their aftermarkets (Kumar, 1995; Herndon, 2002; 
Rossetti and Choi, 2005). 
Buyers that don’t create efficient contracts increase goal incongruence in their buyer–
supplier relationships (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). Goal incongruence leads a supplier to behave 
opportunistically by engaging in SCD and selling its parts directly to the buyer buyer’s 
aftermarket customers (Rossetti and Choi, 2005).  Goal incongruence can be caused by 
three factors: a) contract compensation; b) attractiveness of alternatives; and c) 
contractual flexibility (Harris and Raviv, 1978; Jauch, Osborn, and Terpening, 1980).  
 
Figure 43: Supply Network modified by SCD 
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Role of Formal Contracts in controlling SCD: Formal governance mechanisms can 
employed to prevent the occurrence of SCD through: a) contractual flexibility; b) 
termination of contract; and b) enforcement of legal contracts (Harris and Raviv, 1978; 
Jauch, Osborn, and Terpening, 1980). Formal network governance mechanisms involve 
the strict enforcement of the terms and conditions of the contract. Flexible contracting 
refers to the degree to which the buyer allows renegotiation over the life of the contract 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2003). The supplier continuously compares its 
formal contract to the prospect of entering the aftermarket, and the degree to which the 
contract does not allow for adjustment will increase its perception that goal incongruence 
cannot be resolved (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). 
Researchers have found that in order to satisfy the supplier’s goals, the buyer should 
design a contract specific to the supplier’s risk and reward preferences (Karunaratna and 
Johnson, 1997).  By facilitating adjustment to terms and conditions over the life of the 
relationship, the buyer can better maintain goal congruence in a changing environment 
and hence prevent the occurrence of SCD (Kotabe et al., 2003). Thus the level of 
flexibility of a formal network governance mechanism directly influences the network 
configuration (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The buyer could also threaten the supplier with 
a loss of current business. In this sense the revenue provided by the buyer is used as an 
economic hostage to dissuade the supplier from committing SCD (Williamson, 1983; 
Provan and Gassenheimer, 1994; Wathne and Heide, 2004). Lawsuits between buyers 
and suppliers over the issue of SCD are common (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). Even if the 
buyers do not win the suits, the staggeringly high cost of the defense can act as a 
preventive measure to dissuade the suppliers from committing SCD (Gully, 1998; 
Rossetti and Choi, 2005). 
Role of Informal Governance Mechanisms in controlling SCD: Informal 
governance mechanisms can be employed to prevent the occurrence of SCD through: 
a) monitoring of activities; and b) threat of reputational loss (Rossetti and Choi, 2005). 
These are explicated below: 
When a supplier can hide its activities from the buyer, there is greater probability that the 
supplier will successfully engage in SCD (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). To prevent this 
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practice, buyers typically use monitoring and threat of penalties to decrease the probability 
of opportunistic behaviour (Magrath and Hardy, 1992).  
Another effective method of curbing opportunistic behaviour using informal governance 
mechanisms is to threaten the supplier’s reputation if it commits SCD. The buyer can 
tell the other buyers that this supplier is selling products in the aftermarket, and future 
or current business with other buyers is also in jeopardy (Dahlstrom and Ingram, 2003). 
5.3.2 Misapplied Contracts 
Strategic outsourcing decisions are intended to establish long term business 
relationships by aligning the capabilities of the supply base with the market 
opportunities of the buyer (Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000). However, the 
promises of long-term relationships are not enough. The majority of the cost 
savings are gained through increased efficiencies  caused by better 
communication and trust  (Dyer, 1996; Rossetti and Choi, 2005). This can only 
happen in a close working relationship (Heide and Miner, 1992).  Simply put, 
a close working relationship pays rent because the buyer and the supplier 
reduce the cost of governance mechanism and the cost of transactions (Dyer 
and Nobeoka, 2000). 
However, managers often sacrifice long term strategic benefits for short 
term gains aimed at reducing input costs (Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000). 
As a result the network governance mechanisms are misapplied casing unforeseen 
changes in network configurations as illustrated in Figure 44.  
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Figure 44: Creating Alignment between Network Configurations and Network Governance Mechanisms 
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The analysis of Figure 44 highlights that, in an attempt to decrease the resources 
required to manage the suppliers, buyers misapply the formal contracts too rigidly 
thereby reducing the supply base to the point to the point where supply chain 
competition disappears (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). This results in the buyer facing 
new and more powerful suppliers that assume the position of centrality in the network 
(Bastl, Johnson and Menna, 2012). The buyer loses its bridge position as the suppliers 
create direct relationships with the buyer’s customers (Li and Choi, 2009). In order to 
avoid such a situation, it is important that the supplier should understand the supply 
market and employ flexible formal contracts that encourage capacity building of a wider 
base of suppliers (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Inkpen and Curral, 2004; Wathane and 
Heide, 2004; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). 
Buyers want to share the cost benefits that suppliers achieve through economies of scale 
(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). However, the performance of the supplier is only judged 
across simple profit-oriented matrices that increase the number of participants (Li et al., 
2010; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). This increases the coordination and monitoring cost 
for the buyer (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000)).  To avoid 
this situation the buyer can design formal long term contracts with the buyers that 
incorporate metrics reflecting broader corporate goals (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Wilke 
and Ritter, 2006; Rossetti and Choi, 2008; Revron and Chappuis, 2005).  
To increase their purchasing leverage and to increase their interdependence with their 
suppliers, buyers create highly captive suppliers (Trent et. al, 1998; Carter et al, 2000).  
Faced by minimum profits, suppliers either leave the network or form direct 
relationships with the buyer’s customers causing a change in the network configuration. 
Intellectual property and supplier designs are passed freely taking advantage of 
contractual loopholes (Humphries and Wilding, 2004; Poppo et al., 2008; Lin et al., 
2011). This creates a trust deficit between the supplier and the buyer which hinders 
future knowledge sharing activities such as sharing of designs for new product 
development (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Bachman and Inkpen, 2011). 
To overcome this situation, formal contracts protecting intellectual property and 
suppliers’ designs rights can be designed that respect the supplier’s talents (Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008; Alvarez, et al., 2010). It is important that 
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the buyers: a) have flexible formal contracts to safeguard the financial condition of the 
supplier; and b) take informal confidence building measures targeted towards the 
suppliers to strengthen their long term relationships (Lush and Brown, 1996; Rossetti 
and Choi, 2005; 2008; Alvarez et al., 2010). 
While selecting a sole sourcing partner, network managers employ price driven formal 
contracts that discount the quality and flexibility capabilities and trustworthiness of 
the suppliers (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). This short term focus of the buyers encourages 
suppliers to establish direct contact with the buyer’s customers by committing SCD 
(Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). This problem can be resolved by employing 
relationship building measures that promote mutual benefits of the buyer and the 
supplier in the long term (Rowley et al., 2000; Poppo and Schepker, 2010; Bachman 
and Inkpen, 2011). 
False promises of entering long term contracts with the suppliers are made by 
network managers in an attempt to improve quality, delivery service and lower 
prices (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008). As a 
consequence, trust is destroyed and suppliers are unwilling to engage in future 
business (Gundlach et al, 1995; Moorman, et al, 1993; Poppo and Schepker, 
2010). This issue can be resolved by: a) using long term contracts to reduce 
transaction costs (Inkpen and Corral, 2004); and b) by promoting trust based 
steps that ensure co-prosperity of the buyer and the supplier (Poppo et al., 
2008; Lin et al, 2011; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012).  
Suppliers are forced to absorb financial risks such as holding inventory and cash flow 
management as part of the contractual obligations that focus only on 
inventory reduction at the buyer’s  end (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Bachman and 
Inkpen, 2011). As a consequence, financially weaker suppliers leave industry and 
remaining suppliers mitigate risks by entering the aftermarket or selling intellectual 
property (Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005; Rossetti and Choi, 2005; 2008; Delbufalo, 
2012). This matter can be addressed by creating formal contracts protecting the 
financially weaker supplier from bankruptcy (Poppo and Schepkter, 2010) 
supplemented by informal confidence building steps (Rowley et al., 2000; Rossetti and 
Choi, 2005; 2008).  
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5.3.3 Impact of New Business Models 
Value creation process extends beyond the boundaries of an organisation (Stevens, 
1989). Supply networks are formed when organisations integrate their business 
processes in an effort to achieve excellence in their supply chain management (Villena 
et al., 2011). Thus, the performance of an individual organisation is directly linked with 
that of other network members (Ellram et al., 2002). To ensure that network 
performance objectives are achieved, organisations invest in developing mechanism that 
establish a culture of coordination and collaboration (e.g. Honda and Toyota) across 
supply network member (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Liker and Choi, 2004).  
In traditional supply chains, the relationship between buyer and the supplier is based on 
a one-time contact when the product is sold by the supplier. However, to maintain their 
competitive advantage, organisations are now integrating value-added services in their 
core product offering (Slack, et al., 2004; Defee and Stank, 2005; Choi and Linton, 
2011). This new business model - product service system is a special case of 
servitization (Bastl et al., 2012). Motivated by the intent to achieve network 
performance objectives, this new strategy changes the existing network configuration as 
shown in Figure 45:  
 
Figure 45: Servitization Driven Changes 
As a result of this market-drive transformation in network configuration, a supplier 
enters into long term relationship with the buyer and the customer (Li and Choi, 2009).  
The structural position of the participants determines the relationships dynamics 
amongst them.  This transition from a manufacturing centred focus to a service oriented 
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focus has significant implications for network governance mechanisms (Bachman and 
Inkpen, 2011).  A comparison of the two scenarios is as follows. 
Pre-servitization scenario: In the pre-servitization scenario, cost-based governance 
mechanisms (Transaction Cost Economics perspective) are more suitable to manage the 
one-time transaction between the buyer and the supplier (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). 
Post-servitization scenario: In the post servitization scenario, relational-based 
governance mechanisms (Social Exchange Theory perspective) are more appropriate. 
This is because the buyer and the supplier are involved in an ongoing relationship. Now 
the focus is on the “sale of use” rather than the “sale of product”. The customer only 
pays to use the asset rather than its purchase (Shostack, 1982; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992).  
A change in network configuration influenced by servitization induces the need for 
improved coordination and information exchange (Bastl et al., 2012). Driven by this 
need, network governance mechanisms also evolve from transaction based to 
relationship based mechanism (Alvarez et al., 2010; Fulmer and Gelfand; 2012; 
Pilbeam, et al, 2012). 
5.3.4 Influence of Service Outsourcing 
A change in network outsourcing policy also influences the interplay between network 
configurations and network governance mechanism (Bachman and Inkpen, 2011; Poppo 
et al, 2008; Pilbeam et al., 2012). Prior to service out sourcing the buyer enjoys the 
bridge position between the supplier and the customer.  This bridge decay erodes the 
information and control benefits that the buyer enjoyed prior to service outsourcing 
(Rowley, 1997; Li and Choi, 2009). However, service outsourcing forces the buyer to 
accept the condition of bridge decay rather than to the face the scenario of bridge 
transfer – where the supplier assumes the central position in the network by establishing 
direct contact with the customer (Li and Choi, 2001; Bastl, Johnson and Choi, 2012).  
The buyer now has to rely on informal governance mechanism to establish a 
collaborative relationship with the supplier and the customer (Rowley, 1997; Shurr, 
2007; Bachman an Inkpen, 2011; Bastl et al, 2012; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012).  
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6 DISCUSSION 
Based on the thematic findings of the reviewed literature, a discussion is presented in 
this section to answer the following review question.  
How do network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each 
other in supply networks? 
The thematic findings presented in Chapter 5 portray that network configurations and 
network governance mechanisms can influence each other as explicated below.  
6.1 Inflexible contracts  
Network governance mechanisms like formal contracts put in place to monitor the 
buyer-supplier relationship prove effective to handle “business-as-usual”. Formal 
contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in the future 
(Macneil, 1978). In a conventional supply networks (e.g. buyer-supplier-customer 
triad), the buyer sources the components from its suppliers; employs its dedicated 
resources to process the components, and then sells the finished product to its customer. 
In the entire process, the supplier is not in direct contact with the buyer’s customer. The 
buyer acts as a bridge between the supplier and its customer. Because of the structural 
hole between the supplier and the buyer’s customer, the buyer can strategically control 
the flow of critical information. The buyer enjoys the information and control benefits 
associated with the bridge position i.e. what information to share and how to share it 
with its suppliers and customers. 
Therefore, in a conventional supply network the goal congruence between a buyer and 
supplier is high with low risk of supplier opportunism. The supplier is inclined to meet 
the terms of the formal contract without having the flexibility to adjust the terms and 
conditions of the contract over the life of the relationship.  Consequently the network 
configurations remain unchanged as shown in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46: Change in Network Configuration driven by Inflexible Contracts 
On the contrary, in certain types of industries (e.g. aerospace), the highly profitable after 
market creates a large incentive for the suppliers to bypass the buyer and sell directly to 
the customer. In such cases, the supplier continuously compares its formal contract to 
the prospects of entering the aftermarket. The degree to which the formal contract with 
buyer does not allow for adjustments to accommodate for changes in business 
circumstances (e.g. introduction of new technology by a competitor; change in raw 
material price etc.) will strengthen the perception of the supplier that the issues related 
to goal incongruence between the objectives of the buyer and supplier cannot be solved 
by the formal contract.  The supplier is inclined to take the strategic decision to bypass 
the buyer and establish direct links with the buyer’s customer in order to protect its own 
profitability. Thus inflexible contracts can motivate the supplier to commit SCD by 
altering the existing network configuration. 
 
6.2 Misapplied Contracts 
The misapplication of network governance mechanism (e.g. contracts) by the buyer to 
achieve short term gains, while ignoring the strategic benefits associated with the long 
term relationship with the supplier, leads to unwanted changes in the network 
configuration. This situation is explicated by the following two examples. 
First, while attempting to decrease the resources to govern the relationship with its 
suppliers, the buyer can misapply the formal contract too rigidly thereby reducing its 
supplier-base to the point where the competition between the suppliers disappears.   
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Second, in order to increase their purchasing leverage and to increase their 
interdependence with their suppliers, the buyer rigidly applies formal contracts to create 
highly captive suppliers. Faced by minimum profits, suppliers are forced to leave the 
network to avoid going bankrupt. 
The net result in both these situations is that the buyer faces fewer and more powerful 
suppliers that assume the position of centrality in the network. The buyer loses its 
bridge position as the suppliers create direct relationship with the buyer’s customer. In 
an attempt to strengthen its newly formed relationship with the buyer’s customer, the 
supplier can further violate its contractual obligation by selling the intellectual property 
to the buyer’s customer.  This will result in creating a trust deficit between the buyer 
and the supplier that will further damage their long term relationship. 
This change in the network configurations as a consequence of the rigidly applying the 
formal contracts is shown in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47: Changes in Network Configuration due to Misapplication of Formal Contracts  
6.3 Power as a Network Governance Mechanism 
Various forms of network governance mechanisms influence network configurations 
differently. In conventional supply networks the buyer monitors the first tier suppliers 
directly while the second tier suppliers are internally monitored by the first tier 
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suppliers. In this scenario, the network participants rely mainly on informal and 
relational governance mechanism with emphasis on “power to” perspective – which 
considers “power” in the context of strength of a collaborative network (Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2001). For instance, second tier suppliers in the football industry in Pakistan 
(Pilbeam et al., 2012) mainly comprise sub-contractors often working from home to 
undertake the more labour intensive processes using child labour. 
Multinational companies operating in such globalized supply networks externally 
impose standards by employing formal network governance mechanisms. These include 
standards and clear production processes. This choice is driven by the need to ensure 
legitimacy and compliance to ethical work standards. The focus is towards “power 
over” perspective which is concerned with the control of the relationship (Huxham and 
Beech, 2008).  
This shift from relational network governance mechanism to a more formal governance 
mechanism initiates a change in the physical arrangement of the sub-contractors as well. 
For instance, new stitching centres are established, where these suppliers relocate to 
continue their operations.  External monitoring agency keeps a check on these 
operations being carried in the stitching centres. The buyer has to deal with one supplier 
(i.e. the stitching centre) instead of multiple suppliers as shown previously. A 
comparison of these two network configurations is shown in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48: Influence of Form of Governance on Network Configurations 
6.4 Impact of New Business Models 
The transition from a manufacturing centred focus to a service oriented focus has 
significant implications for the selection of a suitable network governance mechanism 
to match a particular network configuration. 
For instance, in a conventional supply network with a manufacturing centred focus: a) 
the buyer and the supplier interact with each other only when the product is sold by the 
supplier; and b) the buyer and the customer interact with each other only when the 
product is bought by the customer. The focus in this case is on the ‘sale of the product’ 
where the customer purchases the ‘asset’. In this pre-servitization scenario, formal 
governance mechanisms (e.g. cost based formal contracts between the buyer and the 
supplier) are more suitable to manage the one-time transaction between the buyer and 
the supplier. 
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On the other hand, in an effort to maintain their competitive advantage, organisations 
are adopting new business models (e.g. servitization) by integrating value added 
services to their core product offering.  As a result of this market-drive transformation 
in network configuration, a supplier enters into long term relationship with the buyer 
and the customer.  In the post servitization scenario, relational-based governance 
mechanisms are more appropriate. This is because the buyer and the supplier are now 
involved in an ongoing relationship. The focus in this case is on the ‘sale of the use’ 
where the customer pays to use the ‘asset’. A comparison of the network configurations 
of the two business models is shown in Figure 49. 
 
Figure 49: Comparison of Network Configurations for Two Business Models 
6.5 Influence of Service Outsourcing Policy 
Service outsourcing decisions pose a challenge for the network managers in 
selecting a suitable governance mechanism to coordinate and control the 
emerging network configuration.  
The unique characteristic of services is that the customer interacts with the 
service provider during the process of delivery.  Services outsourcing is typically 
defined as the conscious choice of replacing internal service functions with the 
use of external agents to perform one or more service activities. 
Prior to services outsourcing, the services buyer acts as a bridge between the 
services supplier and the buyer’s customer and therefore enjoys information and 
control benefits associated with the bridge position. In this scenario, formal 
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contracts are more suitable to maintain the control over other network 
participants.  
Services outsourcing causes the buyer to lose its bridge position, leading to the erosion 
of the information and control benefits it used to enjoy. In services outsourcing the 
bridge position is transferred from the buyer to the service supplier. The customer 
now forms an ongoing relationship with the service supplier for which relational 
governance mechanism is more appropriate. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
This discussion illustrates that network configurations and network governance 
mechanism influence each other in a variety of ways. How this happens is explained as 
follows.  The environment in which businesses organisations operate are increasingly 
unpredictable and risky in nature.  Operating in such a complex environment posses its 
own set of challenges for management both the individual organisational level and at 
the supply network level. To remain competitive in such an uncertain environment, 
organisations are constantly revisiting their existing policies and business models. 
Organisational change can either be: a) initiated internally by proactively managing the 
outsourcing policies of the organisation and by adopting new business models; or b) is 
forced upon the organisations due to transformation in external circumstances. For 
instance, global supply networks are required to comply with externally imposed 
international standards related to quality, environment, or business ethics (e.g. 
prevention of child labour). In other cases, supply networks are left with no option but 
to introduce new technology to remain competitive at a global level.  Misapplication 
governance mechanisms at the inter-organisational level due to short-sightedness of 
managers also forces change in relationships at the network level (e.g. SCD).  As a 
consequence of these changes the IORs between the network participants are also 
affected. In order to coordinate and control these dynamic IORs embedded in a 
networks, managers are constantly being challenged to find the right mix between 
network configurations and network governance mechanisms. This research attempts to 
examine the issues surrounding this particular problem faced by the practioners. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
This systematic review portrays that research on the interplay between network 
configurations and network governance mechanisms in supply networks is still in the 
nascent stage of theory development (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  This is 
evidenced by the exploratory nature of the majority of the reviewed studies. The key 
findings of this review are as follows. 
7.1 Key Findings 
First, most of the empirical research on supply networks is based on manufacturing 
companies located either in the USA or Europe. In addition to the narrow geographical 
perspective, the studies also explored a limited number of traditional industries that 
mainly included: a) automotive; b) aerospace; and c) electrical and electronics industry.  
Second, the extant research on supply networks is dominated mainly by three main 
theories: a) Social Exchange Theory; b) Social Network Theory; and c) Transaction 
Cost Economics. There are a few recent attempts at broadening the theoretical base for 
analyzing supply networks.  However, there is a need for network-level theory building.  
Third, majority of the studies: a) discuss informal network governance mechanisms 
either exclusively or in tandem with formal governance mechanisms; b) use the network 
as the unit of analysis.; and c) have used a cross sectional approach for data collection 
Fourth, there are two broad categories of buyer supplier relationships within supply 
networks: a) cooperative relationships; and b) competitive relationships. Conversely, 
supplier-supplier relationships are considered as coopetitive relationships.  
Fifth, Two principal functions of governance mechanism have received much attention 
in the literature and in empirical studies. These are: a) the co-ordination function; and b) 
the control function. 
Sixth, network configurations and network governance mechanisms can influence each 
other either directly or indirectly through a variety of factors. These factors are broadly 
classified as the: a) nature of exchange; b) role of management; c) level of flexibility in 
network governance mechanism; d) complementary role of formal and informal 
governance mechanism; and e) desired level of control and coordination.. 
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Finally, although there are a few recent studies that have used deductive research 
techniques to test the theoretical lessons learned in the past decade, however, there exist 
a number of complex issues regarding the phenomenon of research interest. These 
require a focus on theory building rather than theory testing.   
7.2 Limitations 
This review is a stepping stone on the way to the doctoral programme, and its 
ultimate goal is to determine potential areas of further research that can provide 
the basis for a PhD research project. However, the following limiting factors need to 
be kept in mind. 
First, this inquiry is driven by the author's past experience, spanning over a decade 
and a half, in managing supply networks and the interest in the interplay between 
network configurations and network governance mechanisms. The author is still 
slightly biased, preferring qualitative studies for providing a more rich analysis that is 
valuable for strategic decision making. Although a conscious effort was made by the 
author to avoid making imbalanced decisions on this basis yet this practice driven 
approach influenced by the bias towards qualitative research approach might still 
have influenced the selection and quality appraisal of the articles short listed for the 
review. It should be noted that there were no conflicts of interests that influenced the 
process and the findings of this systematic review. 
Second, the intentionally narrow focus of this review might also have limited the richness 
of the final analysis. The researches constructs lacked clear definitions, were open to 
interpretations (driven by variety of theoretical underpinnings), and were located at the 
intersection of diverse organisational fields. Trying to capture all the aspects of the 
phenomenon of interest in a search string led to an unmanageable number of sources. 
Bringing it down to a reasonable number inevitably reduced the breadth of the 
perspective. All possible effort was made to mitigate this dilemma by consulting the 
panel of experts at the planning and design stages of this review.  
Finally, the findings of this literature review are influenced by the definitions and 
perspectives adopted by the author during the review process. 
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7.3 Reflections and Key Learning Points 
This work was the author’s first experience of systematically reviewing the 
literature. Since the research topic changed completely after joining the MRes 
programme, so all the concepts regarding the phenomenon of interest were 
developed from the grass root level. However, this build up of relevant knowledge 
base proved to be a valuable input for the systematic literature review.  The 
systematic review process was spread over six- month period. This process was 
quite extensive and was found to be exhausting both mentally and physically. The 
learning points resulting from this experience are organized into two main segments. 
These include the key learning points regarding the content and the process of this 
work. 
7.3.1 Content 
The systematic review of the literature signified the procedural difficulties in 
dealing with a complex phenomenon of research interest. First, since this field 
of inquiry is in the nascent stage of theory development so working with 
definitions that describe different aspects of the same concept in different language 
called for substantial "inductive" thinking, and demonstrated the difficulty of 
maintaining rigour in working with rich and diverse literature. Maintaining a record of 
the thought process proved to be a very helpful skill. 
Second, the complexity embedded in the nature of this research also influenced the data 
synthesis and analysis part of the review process. Juxtaposing the results of qualitative 
and quantitative studies was quite challenging that encouraged lateral thinking.  
Third, comparing the view points of researchers based on a variety of theoretical 
underpinnings helped in developing a better understanding of the intricacies involved in 
the interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms. 
For instance, contrasting the research perspective on network governance mechanisms 
influenced by Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory was an 
important learning point regarding the content of this work.  
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Finally, an insight into the process of operationalizing the concepts, of moving from 
abstract descriptions to concrete and observable proxies was another important learning 
point. 
7.3.2 Process 
A number of learning points were related to the process of the systematic review. 
First and the most important one concerned the selection of appropriate studies. The 
search and selection processes in this review were perhaps unnecessarily long and 
complicated. Over 4,000 abstracts across databases were reviewed to come up with 
only 125 studies included in the final pool of sources. This was probably the result of 
the strategy which called for very broad search strings. However, this process could 
have been designed more efficiently. For this work the field is vague and cross-
disciplinary. In such a case it may be better to start with very specific search 
strings and achieve the necessary breadth and interdisciplinary insight later through 
cross-referencing and panel recommendations. Otherwise, many studies that address the 
issue vaguely have to be reviewed and later discarded as irrelevant. 
Second, the detailed recording of each step of the systematic review process is a key 
skill that can be used in future research as well. The meticulous recording of the review 
process, not only enhanced the credibility of this work, but it also ensured the 
repeatability of the process that may be useful for future research fellows. 
Third, the quality appraisal process of the full text required a detailed review of each of 
the short listed papers before final selection. This part of the process took a lot longer 
than planned. This unforeseen delay squeezed the time allotted for data synthesis and 
reporting. The lack of experience of the author may have contributed towards this 
scheduling issue. 
Finally, the output of the data extraction process was a work form developed for each of 
the 125 articles reviewed. This work form was later used to conduct a descriptive 
analysis of the reviewed data and to compare and contrast various aspects of the articles.  
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This output proved to be an invaluable stepping stone to determine the gaps for future 
research. These work forms can also be used as an input for further publications. 
7.4 Further Research Opportunities 
This review highlights that the interplay between network configurations and 
network governance mechanisms offers a rich area for further research. A 
number of questions remain unanswered and can potentially become the basis for the 
doctoral research that will follow this study. These questions are as follows. 
7.4.1 Inflexible Contracts 
The following research question was developed after examining the extant work on the 
role of network governance mechanisms in managing SCD:  
 What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of formal and informal 
governance mechanisms in preventing SCD in supply networks? 
7.4.2 Misapplied Contracts 
An investigation of the work on the issues related to the changes in network 
configurations caused by the misapplication of network governance mechanisms led to 
the following research question:  
 What is the role of the management in the designing and implementation of 
formal contracts in supply networks? 
7.4.3 Power as a Network Governance Mechanism 
A review of the existing research work related to the changes in network configurations 
influenced by various forms of network governance mechanisms formed the basis for 
the following research question. 
 How does power imbalance influence the adoption of “power over” and “power 
to” perspective in supply networks? 
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7.4.4 Impact of New Business Models 
The discussion around the impact of new business models on the two constructs of 
research interest i.e. network configurations and network governance mechanisms led to 
the following research question: 
 When and under what conditions does a particular choice of a network 
governance mechanism become (in) effective regarding manufacturing/service 
oriented business models? 
 
7.4.5 Influence of Service Outsourcing Policy 
Two research questions was developed from the review of the extant research on the 
impact of service outsourcing policy on network configurations and network 
governance mechanisms in supply networks. These are as follows:  
 How does the nature of a relationship between the buyer and its customer prior 
to service outsourcing influence choice of a governance mechanism after the 
outsourcing decision is taken in supply networks?  
 What are the managerial implications in implementing network governance 
mechanisms before, during, and after taking a service outsourcing decision in a 
supply network? 
From a methodological point of view, there is need to conduct comparative network 
research based on longitudinal studies. There is a significant shortage of conceptual and 
empirical studies in the service sector context. Similarly research based on industries s 
other than the USA and Europe could offer a rich opportunity to explore the cultural 
impact on supply networks strategy.  
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11 APPENDIX C - Data Extraction Forms  
Data Extraction Form Number 1 
 
01 Author of the article Ahuja, Gautam 
02 Title of the article 
Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: a 
longitudinal study 
03 Document name Ahuja, 2000 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 2000 
06 Volume 45 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 425-455 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Chemical Industry 
12 Sample size 97 organisations 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Archival research; electromagnetic databases; general business 
print media; government publications; and consultant reports for 
chemical industry 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis (regression analysis) 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study examines the impact of three aspects of an 
organisation's ego network that include: a) direct ties; b) indirect 
ties; and c) structural holes, on the innovation output of the 
organisation. The analytical framework put forward in this paper 
suggests that three aspects of network structure play different 
roles in the innovation process. 
16 Key findings 
 The degree to which indirect ties benefit the focal 
organisation, however, is likely to be contingent on the 
number of the focal organisation's existing direct ties, such 
that organisations with few direct ties are likely to enjoy 
greater benefits from their indirect ties than organisations with 
many direct ties. 
 Direct ties serve as sources of resources and information, 
indirect ties serve primarily as sources of information, and 
structural holes between partners serve two contradictory 
roles. They expand the diversity of information that 
organisation has access to but also increase exposure to 
potential malfeasance. 
 Direct and indirect ties influence innovation output positively, 
but the impact of indirect ties is moderated by the 
organisation's level of direct ties. 
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 The value of a strategy of substituting indirect ties for direct 
ties will vary significantly across networks. In any network, 
an analysis of the substantive benefit provided by each kind of 
tie must be conducted before a network reconfiguration is 
attempted. 
 Indirect ties are an efficient and effective way of maximizing 
network benefits. 
 In an inter-organisational technology linkage network, an 
organisation's indirect ties serve as a mechanism for 
knowledge spill overs and contribute positively and 
significantly to its innovation output.  
 Unlike direct ties, indirect ties entail relatively low or no 
maintenance costs for the organisation, these benefits are 
extremely welcome. 
17 Abstract 
To assess the effects of an organisation's network of relations on 
innovation, this paper elaborates an analytical framework that 
relates 3 aspects of an organisation's ego network - direct ties, 
indirect ties, and structural holes - to the organisation's 
subsequent innovation output. Results from a longitudinal study 
of organisations in the international chemicals industry indicate 
support for the predictions on direct and indirect ties, but in the 
inter-organisational collaboration network, increasing structural 
holes has a negative effect on innovation.  
18 Key words 
Structural holes; collaboration networks; direct ties; indirect ties; 
innovation output; longitudinal study; chemical industry   
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social network theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and Informal (implicit) 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network (Ego); Ties (Direct and indirect ties); Structural holes 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research Perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 
Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 2 
 
01 Author of the article Alvarez, Gabriela // Pilbeam, Colin // Wilding, Richard  
02 Title of the article 
Nestle´ Nespresso AAA sustainable quality program: an 
investigation into the governance dynamics in a multi-
stakeholder supply chain network. 
03 Document name Alvarez, Pilbeam and Wilding, 2010 
04 Journal title Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 15 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 165-182 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
Switzerland; Costa Rica; Colombia; Guatemala; Mexico; and 
Brazil 
11 Context/Industry  Coffee industry 
12 Sample size 48 interviews and 15 documents 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi structured interviews; documents; archival record 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive research 
15 Study Characteristics 
This longitudinal study highlights the importance of treating 
governance mechanisms not as a fixed variable to be 
determined once and for all in the beginning of a 
relationship, but rather to adapt the coordination 
mechanisms to the external and internal context of the 
relationship and the characteristics of the task at hand. 
16 Key findings 
 In conditions of uncertainty, flexible conditions and the use of 
informal governance mechanisms supported by trust 
facilitated a search and experimentation process.  In an 
environment of high context uncertainty, governance 
mechanisms were mostly informal during the initial 
phase. Repeated ties between partners increases the level 
of trust and lowers the need for formal mechanisms. 
 Formalization of governance mechanisms is 
associated with a need to increase the number of parties 
involved, to enable measurement of identified specific 
objectives and to bring clarity to current and new players 
involved in relationship. 
 As collaboration develops from an experimental and 
project based initiative t o  be co mi n g  a  mo re  
comprehensive program, governance mechanisms co-
evolve with the specificity of objectives and the complexity 
of parties involved. 
 Initial relationship quality among actors can be enhanced 
and extended to new actors through structured 
opportunities for informal encounters. 
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 Relationship quality is the result of an initial store of 
goodwill and actual observations of behaviour over time, 
which acquires more importance as time progresses. 
17 Abstract 
Within the context of a sustainable supply chain, the purpose of 
this paper is to report on empirical longitudinal research on supply 
chain network evolution and dynamics of governance in a 
multi-stakeholder supply chain sustainability initiative led by 
Nespresso, the specialty coffee division of Nestle´. The paper 
proposes a framework to study the creation and evolution of 
governance mechanisms over a five-year period. Data from 48 
semi-structured interviews and 15 recent and historic 
documents were also analyzed. The interviews were conducted 
among current and past representatives of all the 
organisations concerned including coffee traders, NGOs and 
farmers. In contrast with literature on the subject, governance 
mechanisms initially relied mostly on informal mechanisms. 
Formal governance mechanisms were incorporated into the 
relationships to enable the supply chain network to grow and to 
provide clarity to all actors. Relational quality processes that 
increased trust were critical elements in the early phase, and 
were explicitly built into a second phase of development. 
Being a single case study, some caution needs to be applied to 
generalize findings beyond the specific context studied. An 
additional methodological limitation is the limited number of 
actors involved in the overall supply chain network. Paper 
shows the importance of treating governance mechanisms within 
the supply chain not as a fixed variable to be determined once 
and for all in the beginning of a relationship, but rather to 
adapt the coordination mechanisms of the relationships. 
Evolution of relationships over time has been “often called for 
but rarely chosen”. The case highlights potential benefits of 
this type of research to develop an understanding of 
evolution of relationships in a supply chain network.  
18 Key words 
Supply chain management, Governance, Economic sustainability, 
Coffee 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance 
Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); trust; evolution of 
governance mechanisms 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network (Supply); evolution of relationships 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network  
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Individuals (decision makers)  
26 Research Type Longitudinal study 
27 
Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 3 
 
01 Author of the article Anderson, Erin// Jap, Sandy D. 
02 Title of the article The dark side of close relationships 
03 Document name Anderson and Jap, 2005 
04 Journal title MIT Sloan 
05 Date of publication 2005 
06 Volume 46 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 75-82 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location USA, Italy, Canada 
11 Context/Industry  Automobile, construction, finance, agriculture  
12 Sample size 321 pairs of business-to-business relationship 
13 Data collection method Ethnographic study 
14 Method of data analysis Thematic analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study focused towards the exploring the problems in close 
buyer-supplier-relationships and prescribes practical steps to 
overcome these challenges. 
16 Key findings 
 Unlike personal relationships, business relationships cannot be 
expected to endure indefinitely. By recognizing quickly that 
relationship is incompatible/inoperable, companies should cut ties 
and move on to new relationships.  
 New personnel can help reduce the vulnerability and reinvigorate 
the relationship. Relationship managers without battle scars 
may bring in a fresh perspective that is more optimistic. 
 When BSR develops problems, partners will review their goals and 
reevaluate why their relationship was formed in the first place. 
This reconsideration is often helpful for re-stabilizing the rela-
tionship and re-charting its course. 
 A key relationship should not rest on the interpersonal 
relationship between two individual managers. Other individuals 
should be involved on both sides of the partnership on an ongoing 
basis. While this may appear inefficient and redundant, it can serve 
as a worthwhile safeguard. 
 By developing mutual hostages (for instance dedicated 
investments such as assets, human resources, specialized 
strategies and capital equipment that are difficult to move and 
redeploy in other relationships), the partners create what 
economists call "self-enforcing contracts" because each party loses 
an incentive to cheat the other and instead gains a powerful 
motive to stay in the relationship and make the most of it. 
 One of the best approaches for maintaining the initial benefits of a 
close business relationship is constantly to evaluate the relationship. 
17 Abstract 
The vey factors that make partnerships with customers or 
suppliers beneficial can leave those relationships vulnerable to 
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deterioration. 
18 Key words Buyer supplier relationships; coordination; collaboration 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); mutual hostages; evaluation of relationships 
22 Configuration Elements Network (Supply); buyer-supplier relationships   
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationships) 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research Perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 4 
 
01 Author of the article Anderson, James C. // Narus, James A. 
02 Title of the article 
A model of the distributor’s perspective of distributor-
manufacturer working relationships 
03 Document name Anderson and Narus, 1984 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1984 
06 Volume 48 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 62-74 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Electronics industry 
12 Sample size 153 
13 Data collection method 
Mail survey – questionnaire the survey questionnaire based on 
personal interviews  
14 Method of data analysis 
Structural equation Modelling, a series of multiple group 
analyses, similarity coefficients, and LISREL analyses 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study builds upon studies from social exchange theory and 
channels of distribution to present a model of distributor-
manufacturer working relationships from the distributor's 
viewpoint. 
16 Key findings 
 A manufacturer that has more reasonable policies would tend 
to be more willing when requested to modify policies not in 
the best interest of the distributor, engaging in coercive practices 
would be less necessary, and disputes with the distributor would 
need to be more serious for termination. 
 A working relationship characteristic strongly desired by 
distributors is reasonable manufacturer policies. 
 Sound relationships can be developed and maintained when a 
manufacturer provides outcomes that meet or exceed distributor 
expectations, and that are superior to those available from 
alternative suppliers. 
 Manufacturers can also improve benefits received by distributors 
through fostering meaningful communication with distributors 
(particularly with respect to unanticipated changes in price, 
product, or delivery). 
 When the outcomes from a given working relationship meet or 
surpass expectations, better distributor cooperation and 
satisfaction (from the distributor's perspective) results.  
 When outcomes are superior to those of the distributor's best 
alternative supplier, a manufacturer is less likely to have to use 
coercive practices and threats of relationship termination to get 
distributors to perform desired tasks. 
17 Abstract There is a need for more comprehensive models in the field of 
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channels of distribution, and more comprehensive means for 
empirically testing them. Building upon studies from social 
exchange theory and channels of distribution, a model of 
distributor-manufacturer working relationships from the 
distributor's viewpoint is offered. An initial empirical test, 
employing a structural equation methodology, gives acceptable 
support of the model, assuming some measurement limitations. 
Further work on modelling both perspectives of the exchange 
relationship is explored. The model has implications for 
managers responsible for working relationships with industrial 
distributors. Sound relationships can be developed and 
maintained when a manufacturer provides outcomes that meet or 
go beyond distributor expectations and that are superior to those 
available from alternative suppliers. 
18 Key words 
Social; relations; models; manufacturers; exchange; distributors; 
distribution channels 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (Implicit) 
22 Configuration Elements Business-to-business relationships (distributor-manufacturer) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (distributor-manufacturer relationships) 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals (officials) 
26 Research Perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 5 
 
01 Author of the article Anderson, Erin // Weitz, Barton 
02 Title of the article 
The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in 
distribution channels 
03 Document name Anderson and Weitz, 1992 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing Research 
05 Date of publication 1992 
06 Volume 29 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 18-34 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Manufacturers and their distributors selected from a list of the 
Fortune 500 corporations. 
12 Sample size 378  
13 Data collection method Mail Survey based on self administered questionnaire  
14 Method of data analysis Statistical analysis; simultaneous equation system 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that 
idiosyncratic investments have a strong effect on the 
commitment of both parties to the relationship. 
16 Key findings 
 Idiosyncratic (transaction specific) investments strongly 
affect the perceptions of each party about the level of 
commitment of the other party. Idiosyncratic investments 
appear to function in a channel relationship as potent 
pledges. They are associated with stronger commitment on 
the part of the pledger and greater confidence on the part of 
the recipient. 
 Formal contracts do not play a substantial role in most 
relationships; rather, the set of understanding that have 
grown up over time (the ‘implicit contract) is more 
influential. Two-way communication raises the commitment 
level of both the supplier and the distributor. 
 Distributors were more closely aligned with manufacturers 
whom they perceived to be fair in their dealings with other 
distributors. Committing only to reputably trustworthy 
manufacturers presumably serves to reduce the distributor’s 
risk of being mistreated once it is drawn into a partnership 
arrangement. 
 Harmonies relationships provide lasting positive dividends as 
the parties attribute more commitment to each other and 
subsequently increase their own commitment to their 
relationship.  
 Commitment cannot be built on mere assurance and cannot 
be sustained without undertaking genuine risk by dedicating 
resources to the relationship. 
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 Both distributors and manufacturers incorporate in their 
perceptions the history of their arrangement and the 
behaviours they observe in terms of idiosyncratic investment 
and exclusivity. 
17 Abstract 
Commitment in channel relationships is modelled as a function 
of: 1. each party's perception of the others' commitment, 2. self-
reported and perceived pledges (idiosyncratic investments and 
contractual terms) made by each party, and 3. Such factors as 
communication level, reputation, and relationship history. A 
dyadic model represented by a simultaneous equation system is 
estimated with data from 378 pairs of manufacturers and 
industrial distributors. The results indicate that one type of 
pledge - idiosyncratic investments - has a strong effect on the 
commitment of both parties to the relationship. Additionally, 
each party's commitment is affected by the perceived 
commitment of the other party. Idiosyncratic investments signal 
commitment, affecting each party's perceptions of the other 
party's commitment.  
18 Key words 
Models; market research; hypotheses; distribution channels; 
customer relations; correlation analysis; comparative studies; 
commitments 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal and Informal; pledges; commitment; Explicit 
22 Configuration Elements Business-to-business relationships (distributor-manufacturer) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis 
Dyad  (relationship between manufacturers and industrial 
distributors at the branch level) 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals (managers) 
26 Research Perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 6 
 
01 Author of the article Anderson, James C. // Hakansson, Hakan // Johanson, Jan 
02 Title of the article Dyadic business relationships within a business context 
03 Document name Anderson et al., 1994 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1994 
06 Volume 58 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 1-15 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed method)  
10 Geographical Location Sweden 
11 Context/Industry  Participants in a management development program. 
12 Sample size 24  
13 Data collection method Face-to-face semi-structured interviews; archival data. 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive research; statistical analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study intends to provide conceptual development of dyadic 
business relationships that captures the embedded context within 
which those relationships occur. Business network constructs are 
formulated from the perspective of a focal organisation and its 
partner in a focal relation that is connected with other 
relationships. 
16 Key findings 
 A focal business relationship, in addition to desired effects on 
outcomes within that relationship, inevitably may have some 
downsides with respect to a focal organisation's network identity. 
 Anticipated constructive effects on network identity and 
anticipated deleterious effects on network identity likely each 
will be present to a varying extent in each business relationship. 
 The concepts of network horizon, network context, and network 
identity can be applied at each level with correspondingly different 
substantive meanings. Whatever network context is selected, 
definition of the network should focus on the set of significant 
relationships. 
 Three broker roles that significantly contribute to the success of 
business networks are: the architect, who facilitates the building 
of specific networks yet seldom has a complete grasp or 
understanding of the network that ultimately emerges; the lead 
operator, who formally connects specific organisations together 
into an ongoing network; and the caretaker, who focuses on 
activities that enhance network performance and needs to have a 
broader network horizon. 
17 Abstract 
In business-to-business settings, dyadic relationships between 
organisations are of paramount interest. Recent developments in 
business practice strongly suggest that to understand these 
business relationships, greater attention must be directed to 
embedded-context within which dyadic business relationships 
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take place. Drawing on business network research and social 
exchange theory, fundamental conceptualization is provided to 
capture network properties and relationship connectedness 
within dyadic business relationship models.  
18 Key words 
Organization theory; networks; models; client relationships; 
business; research; professional relationships; business 
community. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (lead operator) and informal (caretaker);  Explicit 
22 Configuration Elements Embedded dyadic relationships within networks 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing Organisation (context influencing inter-
organisational relationship) 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship embedded in a network) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual (managers) 
26 Research type Cross Sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 7 
 
01 Author of the article Arino, Africa // de la Torre, Josse 
02 Title of the article 
Learning from failure: Towards an evolutionary model of 
collaborative ventures 
03 Document name Arino and de la Torre, 1998 
04 Journal title Organisation Science 
05 Date of publication 1998 
06 Volume 9 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 306-325 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Longitudinal study) 
10 Geographical Location USA; France 
11 Context/Industry  Household products industry (cosmetics) 
12 Sample size 6  
13 Data collection method Face-to-face interviews; archival data. 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
Building on the literature about the development of alliances and 
an in-depth longitudinal case study, this study proposes a model 
that explains their emergence, evolution, and dissolution. This 
model focuses on the on-going assessment by the partners to an 
alliance of the efficiency and equity conditions prevalent in their 
venture at any given point in time, as mediated by the quality of 
their relationship. 
16 Key findings 
 A successful renegotiation leads to a new equilibrium, and 
new iterations of the execution-learning and re-evaluation 
stages. A unilateral reaction may be undertaken when the result 
of the reevaluation stage requires some corrective action, but 
the relationship quality is low and/or there were no established 
procedures for conflict resolution. 
 Relational quality incorporates learning from past interactions 
and affects the level of inter-partner trust. An alliance will be 
dissolved when either its value to the organisation (or to the 
partner) falls below that of some alternative arrangement 
accomplishing the same purpose, or if there is a serious violation 
of the equity condition. By then, the relationship quality may 
have deteriorated to the point where there is no possible 
renegotiation. 
 External changes, either in the environment or in the strategic 
context in which the alliance develops, trigger the efficiency 
and equity assessments.  An alliance is not an isolated dyadic 
relationship. Rather, it is embedded in a space where other 
organisations will affect its relative value to each partner.  
17 Abstract 
This paper reports on a longitudinal case study of the interaction 
between two partners to a failed international joint venture. We 
develop a model of the collaboration process in partnership and 
alliances based on earlier work by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
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and by Doz (1996). We employ a series of events that occurred 
in the course of the relationship as the unit of analysis in order 
to trace the interactions between the partners and to explicate the 
impact that external shocks have on their perceptions of 
efficiency and equity. The impact of these events, as well as the 
responses they elicit, on the quality of the relationship (and vice 
versa) are also considered. We find that the partners' assess-
ments cause them to either engage in renegotiation of the terms 
of the contract, or to modify their behaviour unilaterally, in an 
attempt to restore balance to the relationship. The process feeds 
back until a new mutual understanding of equity is restored, or 
else the relationship deteriorates gradually until a point when 
the venture is dissolved. We conclude that positive feedback 
loops are critical in the evolutionary process, that relationship 
quality is both an outcome and a mediating variable, and that 
procedural issues are critical from the start in fostering a climate 
for positive reinforcement and the building of mutual trust and 
confidence in the relationship. 
18 Key words 
Alliances; collaborative behaviour; relational quality; joint 
ventures; learning and failure in alliances; mutual trust. 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal  (Explicit); collaboration; trust; feedback loops 
22 Configuration Elements Alliance; Joint Venture  
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (relationship between alliance/joint venture partners) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual (board members of the joint venture) 
26 Research type Longitudinal study 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
  
 155 
Data Extraction Form Number 8 
 
01 Author of the article Arvind, Parkhe 
02 Title of the article 
Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction 
cost examination of inter-organisational cooperation  
03 Document name Arvind, 1993 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1993 
06 Volume 36 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 794-829 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Companies involved in inter-organisational alliances were 
selected from Standard and Poor Register of Corporation  
12 Sample size 111  
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail Survey based on self administered questionnaire  
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; confirmatory factor analysis; regression 
analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This is a large scale empirical study of the structuring of inter-
organisational strategic alliances. It suggests that stable, high-
performing alliances can be differentiated from unstable, low 
performers on the bases of structural properties. 
16 Key findings 
 The establishment of structured mechanisms that provide real 
time information and accurate feedback regarding each 
other’s actions, including effective recognition, verification, 
and signalling systems between partners, will minimize miss-
perceptions, enhance behavioural transparency, and 
strengthen cooperation. 
 Cumulative effects of the past reputation of the organisations 
influence the building up of a reputation that can attenuate or 
intensify fear of opportunism, modifying organisation’s 
behaviour. 
 The potential for opportunism influences both structure and 
performance and that the partners erect a variety of deterrent 
measures to stem possible losses from agreement violations. 
 The specific factors that strengthen reciprocity in an IOR are: 
a) behavioural transparency; b) frequency of interaction; and 
c) long term horizons. 
17 Abstract 
Maintaining robust cooperation in inter-organisational strategic 
alliances has received growing attention in recent research 
grounded in game theory, which has suggested that some alliance 
structures are inherently more likely than others to be associated 
with high opportunity to cheat; high behavioural uncertainty; and 
poor stability, longevity, and performance. These analytical 
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insights are merged with the logic of transaction cost economics 
in a general model of alliance structuring and tested with data 
from 111 inter-organisational alliances. Findings generally 
support the model and hypotheses, suggesting the need for a 
greater focus on game theoretic structural dimensions and 
institutional responses to perceived opportunism in the study of 
voluntary inter-organisational cooperation. 
18 Key words 
Cooperation; strategic alliances; game theory; transaction cost 
economics; opportunism 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (Explicit)  
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Alliances 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation  
24 Unit of analysis Alliances 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals (Senior managers) 
26 Research type Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 9 
 
01 Author of the article Bachmann, Reinhard // Inkpen, Andrew C. 
02 Title of the article Understanding institutional-based trust building process in IORs 
03 Document name Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011 
04 Journal title Organisation Studies 
05 Date of publication 2011 
06 Volume 32 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 281-301 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study analyzes relationships between institutions and trust 
creation by investigating two key issues: a) mechanisms 
through which institutions produce trust; and b) common 
managerial situations in which strong and reliable institutions are 
particularly relevant to trust development. 
16 Key findings 
 Trusting someone builds on a decision which is based on an 
assessment of other party’s competence, integrity, 
benevolence, and quick semi-conscious assessment of 
unrecoverable costs that would occur if other party turned 
out to be untrustworthy. 
 Institutional structures that can reduce risk of misplaced 
trust include: legal regulations, professional codes of 
conduct that are or are not legally binding, corporate 
reputation, standards of employment contracts, and other 
formal and informal norms of behaviour.  
 Both the power of institutional arrangements and the depth of 
the embeddedness of inter-organisational exchanges are 
crucial with regard to the predictability and trustworthiness of 
individual or collective actors who envisage or build a 
business relationship. 
 Law can be an effective risk reducing institution because it 
aligns actors’ expectations and behaviours long before any 
serious disagreement arises. It provides the possibility that 
the trustee faces serious sanctions if he or she does not live 
up to the trustor’s expectations. 
 An organisation’s reputation will influence the degree of 
attraction one has to affiliating with such an organisation. 
Organisations that value their reputation as social capital are 
unlikely to engage in practices that can damage that reputation 
and will thus be more predictable and trustworthy. 
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17 Abstract 
This paper deals with the role of institutions in the development 
of trust in relationships between organisations. We review 
various strands of literature on organisational trust and examine 
the assumptions made about how trust building processes are 
influenced by institutional arrangements. Following this 
conceptual analysis, we discuss four mechanisms that are pivotal 
in the development of institutional-based trust. We also examine 
four situations where the influence of institutions can be 
particularly conducive to building trust. Finally, we argue that 
each of the situations calls for specific mechanisms to be 
predominantly employed in order to effectively create trust in 
IORs. 
18 Key words Institutional-based trust; institutions; IORs; trust; trust building. 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens General Sociological Theory 
21 Mode of Governance 
Formal (Explicit: legal provisions; certificate of exchange 
partners; community structures and procedures) and Informal 
(explicit: corporate reputation) 
22 Configuration Elements Organisations as part of community network 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisations 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 3.0 
 
  
 159 
Data Extraction Form Number 10 
 
01 Author of the article Barney, Jay // Wright, Mike // Ketchen Jr., David J.  
02 Title of the article 
The resource –based view of the organisation: Ten years after 
1991 
03 Document name Barney et al., 2001 
04 Journal title Journal of Management 
05 Date of publication 2001 
06 Volume 27 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 625-641 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper: a) summarizes and synthesizes the contributions of 
the articles offered in this issue; and b) lays out a research 
agenda for important areas not covered in the articles. 
16 Key findings 
 With opportunism, the presence of the organisation facilitates 
superior knowledge transplantation relative to the market 
because of superior coding, better control of opportunistic 
behaviour due to the authority relationship and superior 
information. 
 Actions to gain complementary resources allow 
organisations to learn new and valuable capabilities. 
Strategic alliances are an attractive alternative for 
accessing complementary assets because the investment or 
long term commitment is less than that required in 
acquisitions. 
 Entrepreneurial opportunities emerge when certain 
individuals have insights into the value of resources that 
others do not. It is through the entrepreneurial process of 
cognition, discovery, understanding market opportunities, and 
coordinated knowledge that inputs become heterogeneous 
outputs. Entrepreneurial opportunities emerge when certain 
individuals have insights in value of resources that others 
do not.  
 To the extent that some organisations in a rapidly changing 
market are more nimble, more able to change quickly, and more 
alert to changes in their competitive environment, they will be 
able to adapt to changing market conditions more rapidly than 
competitors, and thus can gain competitive advantage. 
 To the extent that nimbleness, the ability to change quickly, 
and alertness to changes in the market are costly for others 
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to imitate, these abilities can be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage. Governance choices have a significant 
impact on how any rents created through the use of valuable, 
rare, costly to imitate, and non-substitutable resources are 
appropriated.  
 Attention to how a organisation's ethical stances shape and 
are shaped by the organisation's culture may be fruitful to 
analyze corporate social responsibility from a RBV 
perspective and assert that the social performance of 
organisations (especially environmental performance) can 
constitute a source of competitive advantage, particularly in 
high-growth industries. 
17 Abstract 
At present, the resource-based view of the organisation is 
perhaps the most influential framework for understanding 
strategic management. In this editor's introduction, we briefly 
describe the contributions to knowledge provided by the 
commentaries and articles contained in this issue. In addition, we 
outline some additional areas of research wherein the resource-
based view can be gainfully deployed. 
18 Key words 
Resource based view; strategic management; knowledge 
management 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Resource Based View 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit);  
22 Configuration Elements Alliances 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influences Network  
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 1.50 
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Data Extraction Form Number 11 
 
01 Author of the article Barney, Jay, 1991 
02 Title of the article Organisation resources and sustained competitive advantage 
03 Document name Barney, 1991 
04 Journal title Journal of Management 
05 Date of publication 1991 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 99-120 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study puts forward analytical framework that to evaluate 
whether the sources of an organisation can provide it with 
sustained competitive advantage.   
16 Key findings 
 Formal planning system in an organisation enables it to 
recognize and exploit other organisations of their resources, 
and some of these resources might be sources of competitive 
advantage.  
 An information processing system that is deeply embedded 
in an organisation’s informal and formal management 
decision-making process may hold the potential of sustained 
competitive advantage. 
 A closely knit, highly experienced management team maybe 
a substitute for an information-processing system embedded 
in an organisation’s informal and formal decision-making 
process. 
 A positive reputation of organisations among customers and 
suppliers is a source of competitive advantage if it is rare and 
imperfectly imitable. 
 Managers are limited in their ability to manipulate all the 
attributes and characteristics of their organisations. It is this 
limitation that makes some organisation resources 
imperfectly imitable and thus potentially sources of sustained 
competitive advantage. 
 Organisations cannot expect to purchase sustained 
competitive advantages on open markets. Such advantages 
are found in rare, imperfectly imitable and non sustainable 
resources already controlled by an organisation. 
17 Abstract 
Building on the assumptions that strategic resources are 
heterogeneously distributed across organisations and that these 
differences are stable over time, the link between organisation 
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resources and sustained competitive advantage is analyzed. Four 
empirical indicators of the potential of organisation resources to 
generate sustained competitive advantage are examined: 1) 
value, 2) rareness, 3) imitability, and 4) substitutability. A 
framework for evaluating whether or not particular organisation 
resources can be sources of sustained competitive advantage is 
developed. As an example of how this framework might be 
applied, it is used in the analysis of the competitive implications 
of several resources that others have suggested might be sources 
of sustained competitive advantage. The implications of the 
proposed organisation resource model of sustained competitive 
advantage for other business disciplines are examined. 
18 Key words 
Sustainable; strategic planning; resource allocation; 
organisational behaviour; organisation theory; economic 
models; business enterprises; experimental designs; competitive 
advantage; empirical research 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Resource Based View 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit);  
22 Configuration Elements Alliances 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influences Network  
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 1.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 12 
 
01 Author of the article Barratt, Mark 
02 Title of the article Understanding the meaning of collaboration in supply chain 
03 Document name Barratt, 2004 
04 Journal title Supply Chain Management: An international Journal 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 9 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 30-42 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study proposes that a segmented supply chain 
approach limiting collaboration to a small but  potentially 
critical number of customers and suppliers is a more 
appropriate context for successful supply chain collaboration. 
16 Key findings 
 Participants in collaboration must be prepared to 
commit resources as any initiatives in this area are 
likely to be resource intensive in early stages of their 
development and over the longer terms as collaboration 
is rolled out across relevant suppliers and customers.  
  Bearing in mind the need for a process focus for  
collaboration, intra-organisational support is required 
in two distinct forms. First, in the shape of  initial 
and ongoing senior management  support, and second, 
in terms of gaining the support of other parts of the  
organisation, e.g. purchasing and manufacturing. 
The degree of  intra-organisational support is likely 
to determine the degree of process alignment and 
ultimately how successful the supply chain 
collaboration is likely to be .  
 For many organisations their focus is not on the 
supply chain. With distractions such as shareholders, 
the supply chain and any collaborative initiatives are 
likely to be seen as unnecessary expenditure. The 
partial solution arises from the early delivery of 
promised, but possibly limited benefits, as a way of 
gaining momentum and fostering greater levels of 
organisational support. 
 Supply chain collaboration does not need to be based on 
technology. In the initial stages of collaboration, use 
of simplistic technologies (such as email) are likely to 
be more effective and significantly less expensive than 
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the current collaboration tools being offered by software 
vendors.  
17 Abstract 
Despite its infancy, some authors are already suggesting that 
the writing may be on the wall for supply chain 
collaboration. It has been reported that supply chain 
collaboration has proved difficult to implement; there has 
been an over-reliance on technology in trying to implement 
it; a failure to understand when and with whom to 
collaborate; and fundamentally a lack of trust between 
trading partners. This paper proposes that a supply chain 
segmentation approach, based on customer buying 
behaviour and service needs, is the most appropriate context for 
collaboration. The paper also proposes the need for a greater 
understanding of the elements that make up supply chain 
collaboration, and in particular how the relevant cultural, 
strategic and implementation elements inter-relate with each 
other. 
18 Key words 
Supply chain management; channel relationships; organisational 
behaviour. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); commitment 
22 Configuration Elements Supply chain segmentation 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Individual influencing Organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 13 
 
01 Author of the article Bastl, Marko // Johnson, Mark // Choi, Thomas Y. 
02 Title of the article 
Who’s Seeking Whom? Coalition Behaviour of a Weaker Player 
in Buyer-Supplier Relationships 
03 Document name Bastl, Johnson, and Choi, 2012 
04 Journal title Journal of Supply Chain Management 
05 Date of publication 2012 (forthcoming) 
06 Volume NA 
07 Number NA 
08 Page numbers NA 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case Study) 
10 Geographical Location UK 
11 Context/Industry  Aerospace, defence and power sector  
12 Sample size 
Face-to-face interviews; company documentation; archival 
records. 
13 Data collection method Face-to-face semi-structured interviews; archival data 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study theorizes weaker player in BSR by applying coalition 
theory to supply chain dynamics. 
16 Key findings 
 A supplier in a weaker power position in a buyer-supplier-
supplier triad would try to create a coalition with another 
supplier to gain leverage against a common buyer.   
 Two buyers can create a coalition to gain leverage against a 
common supplier if their coalition collectively yields more 
power than the supplier. The buyer can create a coalition 
with a second-tier supplier if the buyer is in a weaker power 
position compared to the first-tier supplier. This coalition 
will yield more power against the first-tier supplier. 
 Relational governance (e.g. trust) does not act as a direct 
substitute to formal contracts in inter-organisational 
exchange. A more effective way of safeguarding 
exchange is through trust and the mutual 
acknowledgment of long-term cooperation in addition to 
legal contracts. 
17 Abstract 
Our intent with this research is to articulate propositions for 
coalition building behaviours involving the weaker player in a 
buyer-supplier relationship. The context of our study begins in 
dyads but grows into triads as coalitions are formed. We 
consider coalition formation arising from power asymmetry in 
dyadic buyer-supplier relationships. However, when a weaker 
player pairs up with another player, the context of our study 
becomes triads (i.e., buyer-supplier-supplier or buyer-buyer-
supplier). Based on coalition theory, we identify three 
archetypes and then formulate four coalition conditions under 
each archetype. Each coalition condition, framed in a supply 
network triad, constitutes a finding. For instance, we propose 
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that a supplier in a weaker power position in a buyer-supplier-
supplier triad would try to create a coalition with another 
supplier to gain leverage against a common buyer. According to 
coalition theory, it does not matter whether this new supplier has 
more or less power compared to the old supplier as long as their 
coalition collectively yields more power than the buyer. By the 
same token, two buyers would create a coalition to gain leverage 
against a common supplier if their coalition collectively yields 
more power than the supplier. Furthermore, the buyer would 
create a coalition with a second-tier supplier if the buyer is in a 
weaker power position compared to the first-tier supplier and 
their coalition would yield more power against the first-tier 
supplier. This study marks one of the first attempts at formally 
theorizing the weaker player in the buyer-supplier relationship. 
It also marks the first attempt at applying coalition theory to 
supply chain dynamics and it extends emerging work in supply 
network triads. 
18 Key words Power; triads; coalition; coalition theory; supply networks 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Coalition Theory 
21 Mode of Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); legal bonds; 
cooperative norms; formal contracts; trust; power. 
22 Configuration Elements 
Network (buyer-supplier dyadic relationship embedded in triad); 
multi-tier suppliers 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influences (relationships) Networks 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier dyadic relationship embedded in triad) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 14 
 
01 Author of the article 
Bastl, Marko // Johnson, Mark // Lightfoot, Howard // Evans, 
Steve 
02 Title of the article 
Buyer-Supplier Relationships in a servitized environment: An 
examination with Cannon and Perrault’s Framework 
03 Document name Bastl et al., 2012 
04 Journal title International Journal of Operations and Production Management 
05 Date of publication 2012 
06 Volume 32 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 650-675 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location UK 
11 Context/Industry  Aerospace, defence and power sector. 
12 Sample size 16 respondents belonging to 3 organisations 
13 Data collection method 
Face-to-face interviews; company documentation; archival 
records. 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study extends the existing research on servitization by 
empirically examining the implications of the adoption of 
servitization on buyer-supplier relationships. This study also 
synthesizes extant knowledge to generate and apply a 
framework for examining buyer-supplier relationships across 
multiple dimensions. 
16 Key findings 
 A positive experience with increased information sharing with 
customers was translated into the awareness that similar 
practices should be implemented with upstream suppliers. 
Although there were variations in the links between the two 
suppliers and the focal company, closer operational linkages 
emerged as a consequence of a deliberate inter-organisational 
effort to effectively support the integrated solutions. 
 Because of the direct interaction between supplier and the 
customer, the focal company lost its bridge position between 
its supplier and its customer. This emerging structural 
arrangement increased exchange complexity and risk for the 
focal company. The emergence of cooperative norms as an 
alternative governance source to legal contracts was logical, 
given the emergence of trust as a safeguarding mechanism. 
 Consistency in developing cooperative norms is important. 
Selective approach adopted by focal company to cooperate 
with suppliers only on channels related to integrated 
solutions, whilst maintaining arms-length, non-cooperative 
behaviour on product channels, hindered adoption of cooperative 
norms.  
17 Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine a buyer’s adoption of 
servitization and the associated implications for the relationships 
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with its suppliers. The authors use the case study approach to 
examine the tripartite relationship between a manufacturing 
company and two of its two suppliers. The paper explores the 
perspectives of employees on multiple organisational levels, and 
collects evidence on both sides of a relationship. The authors use 
template analysis utilizing Cannon and Perrault’s relationship 
connectors framework to analyze the data. There are overarching 
implications of servitization adoption for buyer-supplier 
relationships. Implications are notable in all five relationship 
connectors. Parties expected more open exchange of information, 
operational linkages were strengthened and changes in the structural 
arrangements of relationships were witnessed. Legal contracts are 
complemented by relational norms. Authors also observed a 
departure away from a win-lose mentality and increased levels of 
supplier adaptation to support the buyer’s provision of integrated 
solutions. Findings are confined to this tripartite relationship 
and to an extent are context specific. The study unveils buyer-
supplier relationships in a servitized context and provides 
managers with a better understanding of some of the potential 
implications that the adoption of a servitization strategy may have 
for managing buyer-supplier relationships. This is the first 
empirical study that explores the implications of servitization on 
buyer-supplier relationships. It advances the understanding of the 
implications that the adoption of servitization has on the manner in 
which two parties interrelate and conduct commercial exchange. 
18 Key words 
Buyer-supplier relationships; servitization; integrated solutions; 
buyer-seller relationships 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); legal bonds; 
cooperative norms 
22 Configuration Elements 
Network (buyer-supplier dyadic relationship embedded in triad); 
multi-tier suppliers 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influences (relationships) Networks 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 15 
 
01 Author of the article Demil, Benoit // Lecocq, Xavier 
02 Title of the article 
Neither market nor hierarchy nor network: The emergence of 
bazaar governance 
03 Document name Benoit and Xavier, 2006 
04 Journal title Organisational Studies 
05 Date of publication 2006 
06 Volume 27 
07 Number 10 
08 Page numbers 1447-1466 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study argues that bazaar governance can justifiably claim to 
be a new kind of governance structure: that it is an original 
means of organizing exchanges that cannot be subsumed by 
other structures. 
16 Key findings 
 Open source communities do not rely on employment 
contracts and so are unable to be governed by formal 
authority, as is the case in a hierarchy. 
 The differences between bazaar and market are: a) as access 
to the source code is made public and free, price, the major 
communication mechanism in market is not a coordination 
mechanism that governs exchanges in bazaar.; b) for 
volunteers in open source communities potential extrinsic 
rewards coexist with strong intrinsic motivations that can be 
more compelling; c) in market, sellers and customers are 
clearly distinguished; hierarchy involves defined work roles. 
However, in open source communities, users and producers 
are potentially the same agents, giving this governance 
structure a high level of local adaptation. 
 Identities of the interacting agents in bazaar do not matter, 
whereas network supposes strong ties where great importance 
is given to the identity of agents and to their previous 
interactions. 
 In bazaar, membership is open because nobody can prohibit 
access to an open source community and no one can 
appropriate property rights over open source product, resulting 
in a principle of non-excludability.  
 Network calls for long-term engagement to minimize 
opportunism while bazaar  
does not presuppose any long-term engagement or strong 
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ties among actors. 
17 Abstract 
A growing body of literature describes the open source 
phenomenon in the software industry. Drawing on transaction 
cost economics, we propose that open source projects illustrate a 
new generic governance structure — which we label bazaar 
governance — based on a specific legal contract: the open 
license. We characterize this structure in terms of its strengths 
and weaknesses and compare it to market, organisation and net 
Data Extraction Form Numbers. Low levels of control and weak 
incentives intensity are distinctive features of bazaar, lending a 
high uncertainty to governed transactions. However, bazaar 
governance promotes the openness of open source communities, 
which can generate strong positive network externalities and 
subsequent efficiency in cumulative transactions. Our theoretical 
developments offer a potential basis for future research. 
18 Key words 
Bazaar governance; governance structure; open source; 
transaction cost economics 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal contracts (explicit); legal contracts; open license 
22 Configuration Elements Network  
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influences organisations 
24 Unit of analysis Organisations 
25 Unit of data collection Transactions 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 16 
 
01 Author of the article 
Bititci, Umit S. // Martinez, Veronica // Albores, Pavel // 
Parung, Joniarto  
02 Title of the article Creating and managing value in collaborative networks 
03 Document name Bititci et al., 2004  
04 Journal title 
International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics 
Management 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 34 
07 Number ¾ 
08 Page numbers 251-268 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This is an analytical paper that examines the interplay between 
individual and collective capabilities and competencies and value 
transactions in collaborative environments. 
16 Key findings 
 A single enterprise can have more than one value 
proposition. i.e. a value proposition for each business unit. 
 An enterprise can participate within more than one 
extended/virtual enterprise. 
 Individual competencies and capabilities (therefore the value 
proposition), of each enterprise have strong integration with the 
value proposition of the overall extended enterprise. 
 Competencies and capabilities (therefore the value propositions) 
of each enterprise contribute and support the overall value 
proposition of the extended enterprise. 
 Overall value proposition of the extended enterprise can be 
different from the value propositions of its members. 
 Value proposition of the extended enterprise should be reflected in 
the kind of value offered to the end customer 
 Value proposition of the extended enterprise is function of the 
collective competencies and capabilities. 
 In an extended enterprise there is a higher degree of strategic and 
operational integration between the members. In a cluster there is a 
degree of strategic integration within the core-network in order to 
leverage the support functions but the focus is still on the creation of 
competitive advantage for each individual enterprise. Therefore 
strategic synergy and operational integration are not necessary. 
 In a cluster each member can leverage the advantages of being a 
member of the cluster to develop its own competitive advantage 
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by enhancing its competencies and capabilities to develop a 
unique value propositions for its own target customers and 
markets. 
17 Abstract 
The theory behind value creation is examined and two types of 
value are identified, internal value (shareholder value) and 
external value (value proposition). The literature on collaborative 
enterprises/network is also examined with particular emphasis on 
supply chains, extended/virtual enterprises and clusters as 
representatives of different forms and maturities of 
collaboration. The interplay of value transactions and 
competencies and capabilities are examined and discussed in 
detail. Finally, a model is presented which consists of value 
transactions and a table that compares the characteristics of 
different types of collaborative enterprises/networks. It is 
proposed that this model presents a platform for further 
research to develop an in-depth understanding into how value 
may be created and managed in collaborative 
enterprises/networks. 
18 Key words Value analysis; supply chain management; cluster analysis 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit); strategic and operational integration  
22 Configuration Elements Networks; clusters; collaborative enterprises 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
IOR influences network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (Collaborative relationship) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 17 
 
01 Author of the article Blois, Keith 
02 Title of the article 
Business to business exchanges: A rich descriptive apparatus 
derived from Macneil’s and Menger’s Analysis  
03 Document name Blois, 2002 
04 Journal title Journal of Management Studies 
05 Date of publication 2002 
06 Volume 39 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 523-551 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  Electronics (Semi conductor manufacturers) 
12 Sample size 3 case companies 
13 Data collection method Face-to face interviews  
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper suggests that combining Menger's description of 
exchange with a more micro interpretation of Macneil's analysis 
of exchange provides an extended understanding of the nature of 
exchange that might be described as ‘a rich descriptive 
apparatus’. 
16 Key findings 
 Within ‘a relationship’ the behaviour of both the customer 
and the seller would be expected to be predicated on the 
assumption that although it is a theoretical possibility, it is 
not a realistic probability that the other party: 1) will behave 
opportunistically when unpredicted contingencies arise; 2) 
will exploit situations where moral hazard exists; or 3) will 
do other than to seek ‘win, win’ solutions if unexpected 
circumstances arise. 
 Ten specific norms can be found in the many different forms 
of contracts that exist in a modern society. These ten norms 
are: 1) Role integrity; 2) Reciprocity; 3) Implementation of 
planning; 4) Effectuation of consent; 5) Contractual 
solidarity; 6) The linking norms: restitution; reliance; and 
expectation; 7) Creation and restraint of power; 8) 
Flexibility; 9) Proprietary of means; and 10) Harmonization 
of the social matrix. 
 Value equation’ illustrates, the costs that a customer believes 
it will incur by making the exchange must be less than the 
benefits that it anticipates the exchange will bring. 
 An exchange’ is the sum of a number of attributes passing 
between the two organisations and because of the nature of 
these attributes and the involvement of many different people 
the norms that are applicable may vary. There can be 
elements of an exchange that are discrete — even within an 
exchange which is overall perceived to be relational. 
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Alternatively, within an exchange that is seen overall as 
being discrete, there may be elements that are subject to 
relational norms. 
17 Abstract 
The dichotomy "market" or "hierarchy" has exercised a 
dominant influence on the study of forms of governance and 
their operation for some time. However, in the past 2 decades 
there have been large numbers of investigations of intermediate 
forms of governance. Subsequently it has been recognized that 
the behaviour that occurs within exchanges is not determined by 
the forms of governance used and this points to a need to 
understand behaviour within a variety of exchanges. An 
apparatus, based on Macneil's analysis, in conjunction with 
Menger's insights into the nature of exchanges, for describing 
behaviour within exchanges is proposed.  
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; corporate governance; organisational 
behaviour; professional relationships; organisation theory 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance 
Formal (explicit) and Informal (explicit); contracts; relational 
norms  
22 Configuration Elements Clusters; IORs 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
IOR influences network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (Collaborative relationship) 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals (members of the board of directors) 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 3.0 
  
 175 
Data Extraction Form Number 18 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Blowfield, Mick // Dolan, Catherine 
02 Title of the article 
Outsourcing governance: Fairtrade’s message for C21 global 
governance 
03 Document name Blowfield and Dolan, 2010 
04 Journal title Corporate Governance 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2010 
06 Volume 10 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 484-499 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
Kenya and UK 
11 Context/Industry  Tea industry 
12 Sample size 437 interviews an 12 focus groups 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Face to face semis structured interviews, indepth interviews, focus 
groups 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive research 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This paper aims to examine one of the more mature models of multi-
stakeholder co-governance  
- Fairtrade, and how this is being used by business for delivering 
ethical governance. 
16 Key findings 
 Outsourcing of governance puts companies in jeopardy. Despite 
the promise that Fairtrade harnesses trade for social justice, the 
failure to achieve the desired outcomes for the poor, indicates that 
it is not engaging mainstream business in a global justice 
movement. 
 Value chain gatekeepers influence governance system even as 
they outsource governance function. 
 Outsourcing governance allows companies to make specialists 
responsible for the difficult aspects of value chain governance 
when: a) there was an expectancy that the auditing, monitoring, 
and remediation functions would need to be in-house; and b) it 
also enables companies to potentially wash their hands of the risk 
that consumers (or producers) will object to the unfulfilled 
promises.   
17 Abstract 
This paper seeks to bring together ethical governance theory and 
empirical findings to examine the shifting nature of governance in 
global value chains, and the implications of this shift for mainstream 
companies. In particular, it aims to examine one of the more mature 
models of ethical value chain governance, Fairtrade, and how this is 
being used by business. Information is derived from a longitudinal 
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study of multi-stakeholder co-governance in Kenya and the UK, and 
an analysis of the literature on similar co-governance models. The 
paper shows that mainstream companies are looking to multi-
stakeholder models not only to protect their reputation, but as a way 
of governing ethical dimensions of their value chains. However, 
rather than a form of co-governance, it has become a way of 
outsourcing governance, enabling companies to strengthen their 
public credibility, while simultaneously transferring an especially 
difficult element of modern value chain governance to organisations 
enjoying high consumer trust. Yet, primary data suggest that these 
governance systems are not delivering the benefits promised, at least 
at the producer level. By outsourcing governance to initiatives with 
dubious credibility in this way, companies may seem at risk. 
However, the mismatch between the promise and delivery of 
Fairtrade does not seem to be affecting consumer confidence and, 
until it does, companies may continue to benefit from the halo effect 
of being a Fairtrade ally. But there are also opportunities for companies 
to use Fairtrade’s weaknesses to make the value chain a better avenue 
for delivering ethical governance, with implications for similar co-
governance models. The study draws on one of the very few pieces 
of longitudinal field research on the impacts of Fairtrade. It 
approaches Fairtrade from a governance rather than reputations 
perspective, and emphasizes the implications for mainstream business 
rather than the co-governance movement. 
18 Key words Governance, Fair trade, Social responsibility, Value chain  
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Stakeholder Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and Informal (implicit); outsourced governance; 
trust; power; social norms; reputation 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Global supply networks; value chains 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
IOR influences network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Individuals (shareholders; employees; consumers)   
26 
Research 
perspective 
Longitudinal Study 
27 
Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 19 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Boari, Cristina // Lipparini, Andrea 
02 Title of the article 
Networks within industrial districts: organizing knowledge creation 
and transfer by means of moderate hierarchies 
03 Document name Boari and Lipparini, 1999 
04 Journal title Journal of Management of Governance 
05 
Date of 
publication 
1999 
06 Volume 3 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 339-360  
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
Italy 
11 Context/Industry  Packaging machinery industry 
12 Sample size 6 case companies (1 focal company and 5 suppliers) 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Face to face interviews  
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
The introduction by the leading organisation of a moderate hierarchy in 
its network of suppliers has a significant impact at both organisation 
and network level and suggests important implications both for 
knowledge management and inter-organisational relations within 
geographical clusters (industrial districts). 
16 Key findings 
 With the layering of supplier relationships coordinated by a single 
contact in the assembly organisation (i.e. vertical keiretsu), the 
articulation and coding of organisational knowledge increases 
efficiency and learning, frequently preventing the atrophy of 
knowledge exchange and development processes. 
 Learning in networks, by mean of hierarchisation, is 
“systematized” in order to produce what describes as high-order 
capabilities, echoing the distinction between individual and 
organisational competencies. 
 Codifiability is heavily influenced by the ability of the integrator 
and/or coordinator organisations to structure the knowledge within a 
set of rules and relationships which can be readily communicated, 
and the ability to forge network identity. Early externalization and 
socialization of tacit knowledge to selected network member/s is 
enabled by this ability and deliberately sought by the leading 
organisation. 
 Within industrial districts, organisational and managerial 
knowledge may be important attributes in the selection of the indi-
vidual actors to be involved by leading organisations in new 
product creation projects. 
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 The competitive advantage of leading organisations lies in their 
ability to identify suppliers with the appropriate technical 
competencies, and also in their ability to select suppliers with 
competencies in the coordination and management of other 
organisations, as much as in the selection and management of new 
second-tier suppliers. 
17 Abstract 
This paper furnishes evidence of innovative modes of organisation of 
IORs and knowledge management within industrial districts. With 
the aid of a district organisation, we first highlight the marked 
tendency among the largest companies to eschew an exclusively 
endogenous innovative process. Next, we analyze how the leading 
organisation can play an active role within a network by assigning 
outside its boundaries tasks that were once undertaken in-house. This 
happens gradually with the moderate hierarchisation of originally 
restructured network relationships. In its attempt to organize 
innovative modes of design and manufacturing, without losing 
control and strategic legitimization, the leading organisation elects a 
coordinating agent with direct responsibility over a selected team of 
specialist suppliers. 
18 Key words 
Knowledge management; industrial concentration; supply chains; 
studies; organisational behaviour; districts; business networking. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and Informal (implicit); governance of networks 
through formal coordinating agents 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network; restructured network relationships; hub (Focal 
company)and spoke arrangement 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation (governance of networks) 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Individuals (managers) 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross-sectional approach 
27 
Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 20 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Bourlakis, Constantine // Michael, Bourlakis 
02 Title of the article 
Information technology safeguards, logistics asset specificity and 
fourth party logistics network creation in the food retail chain 
03 Document name Bourlakis and Bourlakis, 2005 
04 Journal title The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2005 
06 Volume 20 
07 Number 2/3 
08 Page numbers 88-98 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
UK 
11 Context/Industry  Food retail industry 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study argues that information technology developments can 
help retailers to exert as much monitoring and control over third-
party logistics organisations as over an in-house operation. This 
study constructs a buyer-supplier information technology safeguards 
relationship matrix, focusing on the relationship between a food 
retailer and a third-party logistics organisation. 
16 Key findings 
 If asset specific transaction costs are perceived as generally low 
and not complex for both the buyer and the supplier, there is no 
need for network formation. There is a simple spot market 
situation where retailer either externalizes or internalizes retail 
logistics functions.  
 If transaction costs are perceived as high for both the buyer and 
the supplier due to high asset specificity and operational 
complexity, the retailer will engage into a fourth-party logistics 
network formation if and only if such transaction costs are 
reduced via certain information technology mechanisms.   
 Asset specificity examines whether assets used by the buyer and 
supplier of the asset can be redeployed in alternative uses and by 
alternative users. If assets are highly specialized to a transaction, 
they have limited or no value outside that transaction. If assets 
are not highly specialized to a transaction, they have 
considerable value outside transaction. 
 The fourth-party logistics network has a strong potential to 
emerge as the most efficient organisational mode as it can 
decrease transaction costs via complexity reduction and 
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absorption embedded in the retail chain. These transaction costs 
are the result of the new "value-added" logistics services 
required by the retailer and of the extra fleet needed to deal with 
home delivery and factory gate pricing demands. 
17 Abstract 
This paper investigates the evolutionary process of the retail 
logistics network formation, and proposes a relationship framework 
between the logistics asset buyer (the retailer) and the logistics asset 
supplier (the third-party logistics organisation). The evolutionary 
process is based on the way the asset specificity element of 
transaction costs theory can be perceived by the logistics asset buyer 
and the logistics asset supplier. The asset specificity element is 
linked to both network and buyer-supplier relationship theories with 
the aim of conceptualising a buyer-supplier relationship framework. 
A new relationship framework is developed based on the buyers'-
suppliers' perceptions in relation to logistics asset specificity, and 
the conditions required for the formation of the retail logistics 
network are illustrated. If transaction costs are perceived as high by 
both the buyer and the supplier of a logistics asset, the retailer will 
engage into a fourth-party logistics network formation where the use 
of information technology systems is of critical importance. 
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; logistics;  supply chains; grocery stores; 
information technology; vendor supplier relations 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit); IT-based coordination device  
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Buyer-supplier relationship; network (logistics) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
IOR influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationships) 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 21 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Brass, Daniel J. // Galaskiewicz, Joseph // Greve, Henrich R. // Tsai, 
Wenpin 
02 Title of the article 
Taking stock of networks and organisations: A multi level 
perspective 
03 Document name Brass et al., 2004 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Journal 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2004 
06 Volume 47 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 795-817 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
Based on the social network research in management journals in the past 25 
years, this paper highlights the importance of investigating networks as a multi-
level phenomenon. 
16 Key findings 
 The predictable consequences of networks are: 1) they transfer 
information that gives rise to attitude similarity, imitation, and 
generation of innovations; 2) they mediate transactions among 
organisations and cooperation among persons; and 3) they give 
differential access to resources and power. 
 Events exogenous to networks can either reinforce or loosen 
structure in interorganisational and in intra-organisational 
networks.  
 Actors' characteristics can also have an impact on changes in 
interpersonal, inter unit, and interorganisational networks. 
 The tension between the hope of acquiring new capabilities and the 
fear of losing control over one's own resources can cause network 
reproduction and change at both the interpersonal and 
interorganisational levels of analysis. 
 Changes in interpersonal networks within a work unit may be 
contingent upon changes in an organisation. As organisations grow 
by adding more units, their networks of internal relations increase. On 
the other hand, as organisations downsize or divest assets, the network 
ties between personnel and departments are disrupted. 
 Groups whose members have connections to other groups are likely to 
be more innovative, but they may have much weaker member identity 
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and less member loyalty. 
 The decisions of organisations may be affected by their peers with 
respect to both selling and buying networks (White, 2001), just as 
individuals are affected by their peers. 
 Niche overlap provides a strong incentive for collusion and the 
creation of ties among structural equivalents by: a) providing an 
incentive for competitors to share information on customers; b) 
engaging in joint ventures and strategic alliances; and c) interlock.  
 When competitors form alliance ties with each other, they may also 
try to gain advantage over a competitor outside their alliance. The 
potential of using alliances with competitors to defeat other 
competitors raises the possibility of alliance networks competing 
with other alliance networks. 
17 Abstract 
The central argument of network research is that actors are embedded in 
networks of interconnected social relationships that offer opportunities 
for and constraints on behaviour. We review research on the antecedents and 
consequences of networks at the interpersonal, inter-unit, and 
interorganisational levels of analysis, evaluate recent theoretical and 
empirical trends, and give directions for future research, highlighting 
the importance of investigating cross-level network phenomena. 
18 Key words Network; embeddedness; social relationships;  
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (implicit) 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network; alliance; groups; ties 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing individuals 
24 Unit of analysis Network; organisation 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 22 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Burgess, Kevin // Singh, Parkash J. // Koroglu, Rana 
02 Title of the article 
Supply chain management: A structured literature review and 
implications for future research 
03 Document name Burgess et al., 2006 
04 Journal title International Journal of Operations and Production Management 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2006 
06 Volume 26 
07 Number 7 
08 Page numbers 703-729 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size 100 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Electronic data bases 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This paper, through a systematic and structured review of 100 articles, 
provides insights into the conceptualization and research 
methodological bases of the SCM field. 
16 Key findings 
 SCM is a relatively “young” field with exponential growth in 
interest from researchers. 
 The dominant characteristics of SCM field include: a) a reliance 
on the manufacturing and consumer goods industries for empirical 
as well as analytical illustration; b) a conceptual framing of SCM 
mostly as a process; c) a predomination of transaction cost economics 
and strategy-based competitive advantage theoretical grounding; c) 
the presence of mostly descriptive-type theories; d) strong positivist 
paradigmatic stances in the research methods employed; and, e) 
the utilization of analytical conceptual, as well as empirical 
statistical sampling and case study methods. 
 The dominant characteristics have prevented plurality of ideas in 
terms of how the area is conceptualized, theoretically described 
and researched, making the development of the field a narrowly 
concentrated one. The lack of plurality of ideas has prevented 
wider dissemination and greater acceptance of ideas outside the 
functional areas that SCM has traditionally been associated with. 
The soundness and robustness of the ideas underpinning SCM 
have not been fully tested. 
17 Abstract 
Purpose – The field of supply chain management (SCM) has 
historically been informed by knowledge from narrow functional 
areas. While some effort towards producing a broader organisational 
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perspective has been made, nonetheless, SCM continues to be largely 
eclectic with little consensus on its conceptualization and research 
methodological bases. This paper seeks to clarify aspects of this 
emerging perspective. 
Design/methodology/approach – A total of 100 randomly selected 
refereed journal articles were systematically analyzed. 
Findings – A number of key findings emerged: the field is a relatively 
“new” one; several disciplines claim ownership of the field; consensus 
is lacking on the definition of the term; contextual focus is mostly on 
the manufacturing industry; predominantly “process” conceptual framing 
prevails; research methods employed are mostly analytical conceptual, 
empirical surveys or case studies; the positivist research paradigmatic 
stance is prevalent; and theories related to transaction cost economics 
and competitive advantage dominate. 
Originality/value – This review identifies various conceptual and 
research methodological characteristics of SCM. From a philosophy 
of knowledge perspective, it is suggested that SCM be framed as a 
Lakatosian Research Program, for this has the best potential to assist 
in the development of SCM body of knowledge in a sustainable way 
into the future. 
18 Key words Supply chain management; literature; research 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (implicit) 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network; alliance; groups; ties 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
NA 
24 Unit of analysis Network; organisation 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 23 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Cannon, Joseph, P. // and Perreault Jr., William D. 
02 Title of the article Buyer-seller relationships in business markets 
03 Document name Cannon and Perreault, 1999 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing Research 
05 
Date of 
publication 
1999 
06 Volume 36 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 439-460 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sample) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  Members of the National Association of Purchasing Management. 
12 Sample size 428  
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis, cluster 
analysis and MANOVA;  Duncan’s multiple-range test;  
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study provides a framework for examining buyer-supplier 
relationships along five dimensions: information exchange, operational 
linkages, legal bonds, cooperative norms and buyer-supplier 
adaptations. 
16 Key findings 
Drawing on relationship theories and observations of business 
practice, the following relationship connectors are identified and 
provide the basis for an empirical taxonomy:  
 Information exchange is an expectation of an open sharing of 
information that might be useful for both parties 
 Operational linkages capture the degree to which the systems, 
procedures and routines of both parties (for example customer and 
supplier) have been linked to facilitate operations 
 Legal bonds are detailed and binding contractual agreements that 
specify the obligations and roles of both parties in the relationship 
 Cooperative norms reflect expectations two exchanging parties 
have about working together to achieve mutual and individual 
goals jointly 
  e) Buyer and supplier Relationship-specific adaptations are 
investments in adaptations to adaptation process, product, or 
procedures specific to the needs or capabilities of an exchange 
partner.  
17 Abstract 
This study specifies 6 key underlying dimensions (connectors) that 
characterize the manner in which buyers and sellers relate and 
conduct relationships. Measures for these relationship connectors 
(information exchange, operational linkages, legal bonds, 
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cooperation and relationship-specific adaptations by buyers and 
sellers) are developed in a series of pretests. Then, on the basis of 
relationship profiles for more than 400 buyer-seller relationships 
sampled from a wide array of industries and market situations, 
numerical taxonomy is applied to develop an empirically based 
classification of different types of business relationships. Contrary to 
approaches used in much of the extant literature, taxonomic methods 
do not rely on an assumption that the connectors are highly inter-
correlated or that they combine in some linear fashion to form a 
single underlying dimension. 
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; statistical analysis; market research; 
industrial markets; vendor supplier relations; manufacturers; 
suppliers. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens 
Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory; Resource 
Dependency Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and Informal (explicit); legal bonds; cooperative 
norms 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Dyad 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-seller relationship). 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Individuals (managers). 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional approach. 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 24 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Choi, Thomas Y. // Hong Yunsook 
02 Title of the article 
Unveiling the structure of supply networks: case studies in 
Honda, Acura, and DaimlerChrysler 
03 Document name Choi and Hong, 2002 
04 Journal title Journal of Operations Management 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2002 
06 Volume 20 
07 Number 5 
08 Page numbers 469-493 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed methods) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive industry 
12 Sample size 3 supply networks 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi-structured interviews; archival data; and field observations. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Analysis was based on the three dimensions of structure: 
formalization, centralization, and complexity. First, within-case 
analysis was conducted where three different sets of behavioural 
principles were developed. Second, once the within-case analyses 
was done, a cross-case analysis was conducted, where the structures 
of the three networks were compared and contrasted to develop one 
overarching set of principles that eventually lead to the propositions 
regarding the supply-network structure. 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study investigates structures of supply networks and 
principles involved in operation of supply networks. 
16 Key findings 
Formalized rules, norms, and policies lead to the varying degrees of 
centralization in the supply network, and the varying degrees of 
centralization affect the level of complexity in the supply network. 
The cost consideration represents the most salient force that shapes 
the emergence of the supply-network structure. Long-term plans are 
controlled through positive feedback, whereas short-term activities 
are controlled through negative feedback. The program level 
activities where under-specified requirements need to be 
converted into concrete requirements are associated with the 
broadly defined rules and procedures as a control mechanism 
that is flexible. The implicit yet clearly understood norms lead to 
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flexibility and the sense of equity when working without a contract in 
early program development; however, the explicit and formalized 
procedures and rules regarding cost lead to rigidity in relation-
ships and the sense of inequity. The centrally selected second- and 
third-tier suppliers tend to be less cooperative with the first-tier 
suppliers that manage daily activities.   
17 Abstract 
Three complete supply networks have been mapped in this study. 
These supply networks pertain to the center console assembly and 
come from three different product lines—Honda Accord, Acura 
CL/TL, and DaimlerChrysler (DCX) Grand Cherokee. Based on 
these three cases of supply networks, propositions are built 
concerning how the structure of supply networks operates. Based 
on the extant literature, we frame structure in three dimensions—
formalization, centralization, and complexity. As an underlying 
methodology, we first conduct the within-case analysis and then 
expand the analysis to cross-case context. The three structural 
dimensions affect one 
18 Key words 
Supplier management; operation strategy; case study research; 
supply network; supply chain 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics  
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit); rules; policies; contracts; feedback loops 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chain (centralized); hierarchical supplier structures (multi-
tier)  
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Individuals (managers) 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 25 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Choi, Thomas, Y. // Kim, Yusoon 
02 Title of the article 
Structural Embeddedness and supplier management: A network 
Perspective 
03 Document name Choi and Kim, 2008 
04 Journal title Journal of Supply Chain Management 
05 Date of publication 2008 
06 Volume 44 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 5-13 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  Aerospace; information technology; automotive 
12 Sample size 3 case companies – details not provided 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Not provided 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Not provided 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study highlights that buying companies with good understanding 
of their suppliers' structural embeddedness will perform better in 
operations, finance, and  supplier management as compared with those 
without such an understanding. 
16 Key findings 
 Structural embeddedness of suppliers, as a strategic consideration, 
needs more attention from the buying companies. These companies 
have traditionally focused more on suppliers' internal capabilities 
and stability when evaluating and selecting suppliers.  
 Structural embeddedness refers to the state of dependency of a 
company on its immediate as well as distant business partners in 
supply networks.  
 The concept of structural embeddedness highlights the impact a 
network has on the company's business decisions, actions, and 
outcomes for both positive and negative performance - how a 
supplier's performance is influenced by which other companies it is 
connected to, directly or indirectly, in its supply network.  
 A supplier's structural embeddedness in network can serve as an 
additional lens through which to take another strategic look at 
supplier - the buyer can garner the knowledge that may be used as 
leverage.  
 An adequate understanding of suppliers' structural embeddedness 
allows a buying company to evaluate its current or potential 
suppliers more accurately.  
 Being embedded in the relationship with suppliers that are linked to 
other technologically or operationally advanced companies could 
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be beneficial to the company.  
 Buying companies may want to consider maintaining the 
relationships with poorly performing suppliers if they have good 
potential for serving as the conduit to other companies or networks 
with innovative technologies or new materials.  
 The knowledge of what networks supplier is part of can assist 
buying companies in reliable forecasting of future performance of 
supplier and of buying company's long-term success.  
 Being aware of suppliers' extended networks might make it easier 
for a buying company to manage and control the flow of 
information and materials.  
 A buying company's ability to take advantage of a supplier's 
structural embeddedness hinges on having a good relationship with 
that supplier.  
 Buying companies need to evaluate and manage suppliers not only 
for their internal capabilities but also for their structural 
embeddedness in supply networks.  
17 Abstract 
The concept of structural embeddedness refers to importance of 
framing suppliers as being embedded in larger supply networks rather 
than in isolation. Such framing helps buying companies create more 
realistic policies and strategies when managing their suppliers. 
Performance of a supplier is dependent on its own supply networks. 
By adopting concept of structural embeddedness, we learn that a 
buying company needs to look at a supplier's extended supply network 
to arrive at a more complete evaluation of that supplier's performance. 
By doing so, a buying company may do a better job of selecting 
suppliers for long-term relationships and may also find value in 
maintaining relationships with poorly performing suppliers who may 
potentially act as a conduit to other companies with technological and 
innovative resources. 
18 Key words 
Social network analysis; supplier selection; supplier evaluation; 
supplier performance; supplier relationship; extended supplier 
network. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit); standards for supplier selection 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network; structured embeddedness 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation (IOR embedded in network) 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 26 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Choi, Thomas Y. // Linton, Tom 
02 Title of the article Don’t Let your supply chain control your business 
03 Document name Choi and Linton, 2011 
04 Journal title Harvard Business Review 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2011 
06 Volume 89 
07 Number 12 
08 Page numbers 112-117 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
Multinational companies 
11 Context/Industry   Automotive and Electronics.   
12 Sample size 20 leading multinational corporations. 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi-structured face-to-face interviews. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive research 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study examines the benefit for the original equipment 
manufacturers of developing and managing direct business 
relationships with lower-tier vendors. 
16 Key findings 
 In addition to using approved vendor lists, original equipment 
manufacturers should employ an updated form of value analysis 
when making sourcing decisions--including which items top-tier 
suppliers will be allowed to purchase on their own. 
 An original equipment manufacturer can forge direct ties with 
lower-tier suppliers by: a) building informal personal 
relationships with the suppliers' executives even if it doesn't have 
contracts with those companies; or b) establishing a formal 
agreement. 
 Manufacturers that radically shrink their purchasing departments 
when they delegated sourcing may have to expand them in order 
to handle more relationships. They may need to supplement or 
replace people who have only commercial expertise with people 
who have analytical skills and deep knowledge of commodity 
markets. 
 Lower-tier suppliers can provide valuable information about the 
latest manufacturing advances and technological innovations. 
Companies that lack such access have found themselves reacting 
to competitors' innovations and struggling to match their features 
and prices. 
 As technology makes the supply chain much more transparent to 
end customers companies face the fallout from their suppliers' 
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responsibility towards environmental stability.  
 While selecting vendors, companies should keep in mind the 
following guidelines: a) retain control over items that have the 
most significant impact on the total cost of goods sold; b) 
consider a supplier's innovation potential; c) take into account 
the environmental and social impact of parts, including the 
processes used to produce them; d) stay close to vendors that can 
provide early information on shifts in the economy; and d) 
revamping purchasing. 
17 Abstract 
In the past 25 years, major original-equipment manufacturers around 
the world have shifted to the Japanese tiered approach to supply 
chains. They've radically reduced the number of suppliers that they 
directly manage and off-loaded responsibility for supervising the 
rest, along with the task of building major subsystems, to a handful 
of first-tier suppliers. But we believe that the delegation has gone 
too far. The remedy is for OEMs to forge direct relationships with a 
select number of lower-tier suppliers, and in this article, we'll 
explain how.  
18 Key words 
Management science; original equipment manufacturer; vendor 
supplier relations; supply chain management. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); standards; formal 
agreements; informal personal relationships 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network; Multi-tier suppliers 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 27 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Choi, Thomas Y.// Wu, Zhaohui 
02 Title of the article 
Triads in Supply Networks: Theorizing Buyer-Supplier-Supplier 
Relationships 
03 Document name Choi and Wu, 2009 
04 Journal title Journal of Supply Chain Management 
05 Date of publication 2009 
06 Volume 45 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 8-25 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This paper focuses on the internal dynamics of triads in supply 
networks by applying balance theory and structural-hole concept to 
nine archetypes of buyer-supplier-supplier relationships. 
16 Key findings 
 The buyer's ability to mediate relationships is an antecedent to 
establishing a balanced state with all positive relationships. The 
realization by both suppliers of a negative relationship with buyer 
leads them to develop a positive relationship. If the buyer favours 
one supplier over the other, a negative relationship occurs 
between the two suppliers. 
 As long as the buyer successfully maintains positive relationships 
with both suppliers, the negative relationship between the two 
suppliers tends to move towards a positive one. 
 If the negative relationship between S1 and S2 persists, then one 
of the existing positive relationships the buyer has with its 
suppliers may move toward a negative one. 
 If S2 adheres to its negative relationship with the buyer and S1 
sees more value in its positive relationship with the buyer, then 
the relationship between S1 and S2 tends to move toward a 
negative one. If S2's desire to grow the business overcomes its 
negative position toward the buyer, then the relationship between 
the buyer and S2 tends to move toward a positive one, as long as 
the other two relationships in the triad remain positive. 
 Without active intervention by the buyer to improve its negative 
relationship with both suppliers, S1 and S2 tend to develop a 
positive relationship to counterbalance their negative relationship 
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with the buyer. 
 When the buyer intervenes to improve the negative relationships 
with its suppliers, it will most likely improve with only one of the 
suppliers, as long as the relationship between the suppliers 
remains negative. When the buyer has a positive relationship with 
S1 and S2 that are disconnected from each other, the buyer enjoys 
leverage power. 
 If the buyer were to bring otherwise disconnected S1 and S2 
together in a joint project, the buyer may lose some of the 
leverage power but S1 and S2 would tend to develop a positive 
relationship on the strength of the buyer's positive relationship 
with both S1 and S2. 
 When the buyer has a positive relationship with S1 and a negative 
one with S2, the structural hole is less likely to be filled compared 
to the situation where the buyer has a positive relationship with 
both S1 and S2. When the buyer has a negative relationship with 
both suppliers in the structural hole context, the buyer is weakest 
in its leverage power compared to situations when it has a 
positive relationship with at least one supplier. 
17 Abstract 
Past studies in supply chain management have focused on dyadic 
relationships (e.g. buyer-supplier), as all relationships in a network 
begin with a dyad. However, dyads do not capture essence of a network. 
We posit in this paper that triads are the fundamental building blocks of 
a network. To begin considering triads in supply networks, we build on 
two extant bodies of literature – the buyer-supplier relationship and the 
supplier-supplier relationship literature which offers us the context of 
buyer-supplier-supplier triads. By doing so, we are taking the first step 
towards cracking the internal dynamics of triads in supply networks. To 
build analytical propositions, we apply balance theory and the 
structural-hole concept. We identify nine triadic archetypes of buyer-
supplier-supplier relationships and state key propositions that aid in 
decision making in supply networks. 
18 Key words 
Balance theory; triads; buyer-supplier-supplier relationships; 
structural hole; supply chain management. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Balance Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (explicit); positive and negative relationships 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Networks (triads); buyer-supplier-supplier relationships; structural 
hole; supply chains 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 28 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Corpanzano, Russell // Mitchell, Marie S.  
02 Title of the article Social Exchange Theory: An interdisciplinary Review 
03 Document name Corpanzano and Mitchell, 2005  
04 Journal title Journal of Management 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2005 
06 Volume 31 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 874-900 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
The primary contribution of this review was outlining the nature of 
reciprocity within exchange and distinguishing three different types of 
reciprocity: (a) reciprocity as a transactional pattern of interdependent 
exchanges, (b) reciprocity as a folk belief, and (c) reciprocity as a 
moral norm. 
16 Key findings 
 Reciprocal interdependence emphasizes contingent interpersonal 
transactions, whereby an action by one party leads to a response 
by another. The process begins when at least one participant makes a 
move and if the other reciprocates, new rounds of exchange initiate. 
Once the process is in motion, each consequence can create a self-
reinforcing cycle. The sequence is likely to be continuous, making 
it difficult to organize into discrete steps. 
 Reciprocity as a folk belief involves the cultural expectation that 
people get what they deserve.  Participants in these transactions 
accept some combination of (a) a sense that over time all 
exchanges reach a fair equilibrium, (b) those that are unhelpful 
will be punished, and (c) those who are helpful will receive help 
in the future.  
 Reciprocity as a norm and individual orientation considers a 
cultural mandate, in which those who do not comply are 
punished. The key difference between a norm and a folk belief is that 
norms involve a quality that philosophers sometimes term ought. 
That is, a norm is a standard that describes how one should 
behave, and those who follow these norms are obligated to 
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behave reciprocally. 
 Leaders provide the first signal of a desire for a closer relationship 
to subordinates, such as a direct communication or implicit offer 
(e.g., desirable task). The leader waits for the worker’s response, 
if employee responds favorably, and then leader can begin another 
episode. 
 A leader’s offers and a subordinate’s responses can generate high-
quality leader-member-exchange relationship (LMX). Once a 
high-quality LMX is realized, the relationship itself alters the 
nature of future transactions.  
 Employees exchange commitment in return for organisational 
support. Commitment is both particularistic (commitment to the 
organisation) and symbolic (it is not a tangible commodity). 
Committed workers are more desirous of maintaining their 
associations and will become more motivated on behalf of their 
employers. 
 The output from a past transaction can be the resource 
exchanged in a future transaction. This cause and effect are 
determined by where in the sequence the researcher elects to 
examine the process. If reciprocated, the quality of the 
relationship improves, enabling more socio-emotional 
exchanges. 
17 Abstract 
Social exchange theory (SET) is one the most influential conceptual 
paradigms in organisational behaviour. Despite its usefulness, 
theoretical ambiguities within SET remain. As a consequence, tests 
of the model, as well as its applications, tend to rely on an 
incompletely specified set of ideas. The authors address conceptual 
difficulties and highlight areas in need of additional research. In so 
doing, they pay special attention to four issues: (a) the roots of the 
conceptual ambiguities, (b) norms and rules of exchange, (c) nature of 
the resources being exchanged, and (d) social exchange relationships. 
18 Key words Social exchange theory; reciprocity; workplace relationships 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); social norms  
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Relationships (inter-organisational reciprocal relationships) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Individual influencing Organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 29 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Das, T.K. // Teng, Bing-Sheng 
02 Title of the article 
Between trust and control: developing confidence in partner 
cooperation in alliances 
03 Document name Das and Teng, 1998 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review  
05 
Date of 
publication 
1998 
06 Volume 23 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 494-512 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This article proposes an integrated framework of trust and control for 
developing an organisation's confidence in partner cooperation in 
strategic alliances.  
16 Key findings 
 Trust and control are two alternative sources in developing 
confidence in partner cooperation, although the two are not linked 
by a simple complementary relationship. 
 Trust cannot be a control mechanism, if both trust and control are 
defined restrictively for increased clarity. 
 Trust is defined as a positive expectation about others' motives, 
and control as the process of regulating others' behaviour to make 
it more predictable. 
 The deployment of control mechanisms may either enhance or 
undermine the trust level, depending on the specific type of 
control mechanisms partners use.  
 Trust level plays a moderating role between control mechanisms 
and control level. Trust level will facilitate the deployment of 
control mechanisms, even though some of these very mechanisms 
may be suggestive of a lack of trust.  
 Structural arrangements, including rules and regulations, are the 
heart of formal control. In strategic alliances formal control tends 
to be especially relevant, owing to the relatively high degrees of 
goal incongruence and performance ambiguity. 
 Organisations with a high need for control prefer alliance goals of 
short-term orientation, because performance evaluation and 
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feedback can be monitored more frequently against immediate 
objectives. 
17 Abstract 
Strategic alliances have been recognized as arenas with potential for 
opportunistic behaviour by partners. Hence, an organisation needs to 
have an adequate level of confidence in its partner's cooperative 
behaviour. The notion of confidence in partner cooperation in 
alliance is examined and it is suggested that confidence comes from 
2 distinct sources: trust and control. The argument is made that trust 
and control are parallel concepts and that their relationship is of a 
supplementary character in generating confidence. In addition, it is 
suggested that control mechanisms have an impact on trust level and 
that the trust level moderates the effect of control mechanisms in 
determining the control level. Finally, the various ways to build trust 
within strategic alliances and important alliance control mechanisms 
is discussed.  
18 Key words 
Alliance;  control mechanism; trust; organisational behaviour; 
cooperation; management theory 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Forma (explicit) and informal (explicit); rules; regulations; trust; 
feedback 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Alliance;  
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad embedded in network  
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 30 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Deffe, Clifford C. // Stank, Theodore P. 
02 Title of the article 
Applying the strategy-structure-performance paradigm to the supply 
chain environment 
03 Document name Deffe and Stank, 2005 
04 Journal title The International Journal of Logistics Management 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2005 
06 Volume 16 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 28-55 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This paper highlight the importance of aligning the key elements of 
strategy-structure-performance paradigm with key structural 
elements of supply chain management including:  technology 
integration, communication, standardization, decision-making 
centralization and decentralization, and reward and compensation 
integration.  
16 Key findings 
 A organisation that adopts a supply chain strategy will 
demonstrate a high level of: a) computer systems technology 
coordination and flexibility; b)  formal and informal 
communication; c)  data coding and notation communication; d) 
individual-level and organisational-level rewards across supply 
chain entities 
 An organisation that adopts a supply chain structure to support 
strategy will demonstrate a high level of: a) revenue enhancement; 
b) operating expense reduction; c) working capital efficiency; and 
d) fixed capital efficiency. 
 Appropriate supply chain performance will provide input to adjust 
supply chain strategy. 
 Organisational culture provides a sense of control by unifying the 
way organisational members process information and react to the 
environment. This facilitates the achievement of a higher level of 
behavioural predictability.  
 Clear objectives not only help set the direction for the alliance but 
also facilitate the establishment of specific rules and regulations. 
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Goals are important for formal control mechanisms because they 
specify what is expected of partners. 
 Goal setting process is a form of normative control. Because it 
allows partners to form a consensus gradually, their incentive to 
deviate from agreed-upon objectives is significantly curbed.  
17 Abstract 
Purpose – The paper extends a central paradigm of the strategy 
literature to the supply chain environment to foster a better 
understanding of the elements characterizing strategic decisions that 
lead to supply chain structural development and performance. 
Design/methodology/approach – Strategic literature is reviewed to 
provide a fuller explanation of the strategy-structure-performance 
(SSP) research stream. SSP foundational principles are linked to supply 
chain management concepts, and synthesized into an explanatory 
framework. Propositions for future research are presented based upon 
the framework. 
Findings – An iterative relationship among internal organisation 
strategy, structure, and performance measurement systems is 
indicated, implying that organisation supply chain strategy should 
be complementary with that of supply chain partners. 
Research limitations/implications – The paper presents a content 
analysis of existing research and a conceptual framework emerging 
from it. No data were collected nor were research propositions tested. 
Practical implications – The primary implication is “know your supply 
chain partners”. Do their strategies mesh – either as consistent or 
complementary – to your own organisation’s supply chain strategy? 
Strategic alignment is a necessary precursor to deployment of an 
effective supply chain structure. 
Originality/value – The paper shows that SSP theory can be extended 
beyond the organisation to the complex supply chain environment. 
18 Key words Supply chain management, Strategic management, Decision making 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Suitable theory unavailable 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (Explicit); goals 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network; supply chain 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network (supply chain)  
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 31 
 
01 Author of the article Delbufalo, Emanuela 
02 Title of the article 
Outcomes of inter-organisational trust in supply chain 
relationships: a systematic literature review and a meta-analysis 
of the empirical evidence 
03 Document name Delbufalo, 2012 
04 Journal title Supply Chain Management:  An International Journal 
05 Date of publication 2012 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 377-402 
09 Paper Type Literature Review  
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size 56 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Data collected from three databases: Business Source Premier; 
ABI/Informs; Ingenta. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Meta Analysis 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study provides a critical review on outcomes of inter-
organisational trust in supply chain relationships. A systematic 
literature review methodology in combination with a meta-analytic 
approach is adopted to review the empirical work published in 
academic journals from 1990 to 2010. 
16 Key findings 
 Studying inter-organisational outcomes in multiple industries 
inflates the effect size of trust-outcome relationships as 
compared to studying trust in a single industry. 
 Cross-industry studies strongly yield the relationship between 
trust and multiple outcomes, such as for example transaction 
costs, innovativeness, investment in specific assets, supplier 
integration and satisfaction. 
 Indirect and relational outcomes take longer to come than 
economic outcomes. 
 Inter-organisational trust has a small effect size on the level of 
behavioural uncertainty even if the relationship is negative. 
 There are differences in the effects of inter-organisational 
trust across national and cultural contexts. 
 Examining inter-organisational trust at one point in time 
inflates the true effect size of trust-outcome relationships as 
compared to longitudinal research design. 
 Use of triangulation in the study of inter-organisational trust 
outcomes can improve the completeness of the enquiry more 
than a single research method. 
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 The combined use of a qualitative and quantitative 
approach appears the most effective as the two methods 
complement each other.  
17 Abstract 
This study’s purpose is to improve the understanding of inter-
organisational trust outcomes in supply chain relationships. It 
focuses on synthesizing the empirical research published from 
1990 to May 2010 in order to establish both what we know and 
do not know about this topic, thereby identifying areas for 
future research. The research methodology used is the systematic 
literature review. It differs from traditional narrative reviews by 
being more systematic and explicit in the selection of the 
studies and employing rigorous and reproducible evaluation 
methods. In total 56 were selected from three databases: Business 
Source Premier; ABI/Informs; Ingenta. A meta-analysis was 
conducted to examine the correlated outcomes of inter-
organisational trust in supply chain relationships. A total of 33 
outcome variables and 96 independent samples with an overall 
sample size of 69,452 were included in the meta-analytic 
process, providing insights for dissemination and discussion. 
Three major themes emerge from the analysis: direct, indirect 
and relational outcomes. Inherent limitations could appear with 
regard to the methodological approaches used. The main 
research challenges refer to the: conceptualization of inter-
organisational trust; definition of supply chain relationship 
typologies; and availability of primary data for the meta-
analytic synthesis. This is the first study employing a 
combination of systematic literature review and meta-analytic 
methodologies to explore the supply chain literature on inter-
organisational trust outcomes. The findings are of value to 
academics and practitioners alike. 
18 Key words 
Inter-organisational trust; supply chain; supply chain management; 
trust; empirical literature; outcomes; meta-analysis; review; channel 
relationships. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (explicit); trust 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chain,  
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (Trust based inter-organisational relationship) 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 32 
 
01 Author of the article Doney, Patricia M. // Cannon, Joseph P. 
02 Title of the article An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships 
03 Document name Doney and Cannon, 1997 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 61 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 35-51 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  Industrial manufacturing 
12 Sample size 210 purchasing managers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and 
regression analysis;  and LISREL analysis (LISREL VII) 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study provides and empirically tests a analytical framework 
used to identify the antecedent so trust  
16 Key findings 
 Information provided by a trusted party is used more and thus 
provides greater value to the recipient. Organisational buyers 
who trust salespeople exhibit more integrative bargaining 
strategies, which lead to benefits for both parties. 
 Buying organisations develop trust in both the supplier 
organisation and the supplier's salesperson. Current supplier 
selection is not influenced by trust of the supplier organisation or 
its salesperson. 
 In the industrial buying context of this study, the key criteria for 
supplier selection are delivery performance and relative 
price/cost. 
 Trust of the supplier organisation and trust of the salesperson 
(operating indirectly through supplier organisation trust) do 
increase the likelihood that buyers anticipate doing business with 
the supplier organisation in the future. 
 Buyers appeared to form trust in selling organisations on the 
basis of characteristics of the organisation (e.g., size) and actual 
behaviours (e.g., investing in customer-specific assets). 
Together, such characteristics and behaviours provide the buyer 
with an indication that acting in an untrustworthy (or 
opportunistic) way would be costly for the supplier. 
 Relationships built on calculative trust are at the lowest and most 
fragile level. The highest levels of trusting relationships are 
based on internalizing the other's desires and intentions-where 
trust emerges through the process of intentionality. 
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 Trust built on closely identifying with the partner is more 
flexible to changing conditions and a more difficult bond to 
break than is calculative trust. 
 The interpersonal trust engendered by salespeople and 
transferred to the supplier organisation plays a key role in 
developing and maintaining enduring buyer-seller relationships.  
 Although trust is higher for selected suppliers than for those not 
selected, aspects of the marketing mix-price and reliable 
delivery-actually make the sale.  
 Professional buyers are trained to focus on objective evidence 
that demonstrates the superiority of the product offering, rather 
than on subjective assessments of trust. 
17 Abstract 
A study integrates theory developed in several disciplines to 
determine 5 cognitive processes through which industrial buyers can 
develop trust of a supplier organisation and its salesperson. These 
processes provide an analytical framework used to identify 
antecedents of trust. The impact of supplier organisation and 
salesperson trust on a buying organisation's current supplier choice 
and future purchase intentions is also examined. The analytical 
model is tested on data collected from more than 200 purchasing 
managers. Results indicate that several variables influence the 
development of supplier organisation and salesperson trust. Trust of 
the supplier organisation and trust of the salesperson (operating 
indirectly through supplier organisation trust) influence a buyer's 
anticipated future interaction with the supplier. However, after 
controlling for previous experience and supplier performance, 
neither trust of the selling organisation or its salesperson influence 
the current supplier selection decision.  
18 Key words 
Professional relationships; suppliers; salespeople; corporate 
purchasing; purchasing agents; regression analysis; studies; 
economic theory; cognition and reasoning; buyers 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (explicit); trust 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Dyad 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Individual influencing Organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship) 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Individual 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 33 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Doz, Yves L. 
02 Title of the article 
The evolution of cooperation in strategic Alliances: Initial 
conditions or learning process 
03 Document name Doz, 1996 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 
Date of 
publication 
1996 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number Special Issue 
08 Page numbers 55-83 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
US-Switzerland, US-Italy, US-France 
11 Context/Industry  Chemicals, IT, capital equipment 
12 Sample size 3 case companies 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Archival data; semi-structured interviews 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study examines whether the initial conditions (task definition, 
org. routines, interface structure and partners' expectations) facilitate 
or hamper learning of alliance partners. 
16 Key findings 
 Initial conditions (e.g. task definitions, organisational routines, 
interface structure and partners' expectations) facilitate or 
hamper partner learning along five dimensions (environment, 
task process skills and goals). 
 Successful alliances are those where partners engage in series of 
iterative and interactive learning cycles over time typically 
characterized by greater trust and adaptive flexibility, as well as 
the willingness to make larger and larger and increasingly 
specific and irreversible commitments. 
 Initial conditions may allow cognitive learning (e.g. 
understanding how cooperation should take place) but also make 
alliance participants more aware of the difficulties in behavioural 
learning. 
 Initial conditions that allow separate learning by the partners but 
do not foster joint learning are likely to lead to failure in alliance 
formation. 
 Successful learning followed by negative revaluation may lead to 
the failure of alliance formation. 
17 Abstract 
An examination is made of how the learning, along several 
dimensions - environment, task, process, skills, goals - that takes 
place in strategic alliances between organisations mediates between 
 206 
the initial conditions and the outcomes of these alliances. Through a 
longitudinal case study of 2 projects in one alliance, replicated and 
extended in another 4 projects in 2 alliances, a framework was 
developed to analyze the evolution of cooperation in strategic 
alliances. Successful alliance projects were highly evolutionary and 
went through a sequence of interactive cycles of learning, re-
evaluation, and readjustment. Failing projects, conversely, were 
highly inertial, with little learning, or divergent learning between 
cognitive understanding and behavioural adjustment, or frustrated 
expectations. Although strategic alliances may be a special case of 
organisational learning, it is believed that analyzing the evolution of 
strategic alliances helps transcend too simple depictions of inertia 
and adaptation, in particular by suggesting that initial conditions 
may lead to a stable imprinting of fixed processes that make 
alliances highly inertial or to generative and evolutionary processes 
that make them highly adaptive, depending on how they are set.  
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; strategic planning; organisational learning; 
organisation theory; cooperation; alliances. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); irreversible commitment; 
trust 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network (alliance) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network (alliance) 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Longitudinal study 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 34 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Dwyer, Robert F. // Schurr, Paul H. // Oh, Sejo 
02 Title of the article Developing buyer-seller relationships 
03 Document name Dwyer et al., 1987 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 
Date of 
publication 
1987 
06 Volume 51 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 11-27 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study put forwards a framework for developing a marketing 
strategy based on long term buyer-seller relationships. This 
framework covers both inter-organisational and consumer 
relationships.   
16 Key findings 
 To improve customer service and satisfaction, the seller needs to 
know whether purchases are expanding or contracting. 
 Conflict is predictable within a relationship just as periods of 
resource scarcity, misperception, changing values and concepts 
of fair play. 
 Functional benefits of conflict include: a) more effective and 
frequent communication; b) a critical review of  past actions; c) a 
more equitable distribution of system resources; d) a more 
balanced power distribution in the relationship; and e) 
standardization of modes of conflict resolution. 
 Situational proximity between parties facilitates awareness. 
 Exploratory relationship is very fragile in the sense that minimal 
investment and interdependence make for simple termination. 
 In developing relations, there is reluctance to engage in 
bargaining. Uncertainty and the level of ‘stakes’ of the exchange 
affects the extent and nature of bargaining. 
 When a party fulfils perceived exchange obligations, its 
attractiveness to the other part increases. 
 Exchange of ‘hostage’ (bilateral exchange of transaction-specific 
human or physical assets) communicates credibility of 
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commitment to relationship, and thus supports expanded alliance 
and exchange.  
17 Abstract 
A framework is described for developing buyer-seller relationships. 
Discrete (manifested by money on one side and an easily measured 
commodity on the other) and relational (transpiring over time with 
participants deriving complex, personal, noneconomic satisfactions 
and engaging in social exchange) exchanges are contrasted using 
modern contract law ideas. A 5-phase model is proposed that 
includes the general phases through which relationships evolve: 1. 
awareness or recognition of a feasible exchange partner, 2. 
exploration, the search and trial phase, 3. expansion, the continual 
increase in benefits and interdependence, 4. commitment, an 
implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity, and 5. 
dissolution. Hypothesized transitions and key distinctions between 
phases are emphasized. A marketing research agenda is proposed, 
and 3 key facets of managing buyer-seller relationships are outlined: 
1. performance metering, 2. conflict management, and 3. exit 
barriers.  
18 Key words 
Vendors; studies; models; market research; customer relations; 
consumer relations; buyers; trust; strategic planning 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); standardized modes of 
conflict resolution; information exchange; balance of power 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Network evolution (5 phases)  
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing Network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-seller relationship) 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 
Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 35 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Dyer, Jeffrey H. // Ouchi, William G. 
02 Title of the article Japanese-Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a Competitive Edge 
03 Document name Dyer and Ouchi, 1993 
04 Journal title Sloan Management Review 
05 
Date of 
publication 
1993 
06 Volume 35 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 51-63 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA and Japan 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive industry 
12 Sample size 147 including 4 auto makers and 143 suppliers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Comparative data analysis based on the survey results – details not 
provided 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study prescribes a series of lessons that the US managers must 
learn from the Japanese approach of managing their suppliers in 
order to successfully compete at the global level. 
16 Key findings 
 Extensive vertical integration often leads to less innovation and 
underperformance by world-class standards. 
 Outsourcing production should be given preference over in-
house production, ceteris paribus. 
 Managers must recognize the dependence on those individuals 
and companies outside their organisations who have the ability to 
supply key inputs and perform key tasks more efficiently and 
effectively than they do. 
 Reduce the number of direct suppliers to reduce costs and 
increase quality through greater economies of scales and less 
variation in inputs. 
 Make customized investments to optimize the value chain and 
tailor systems to meet customer and supplier needs. Investment 
in customized assets can create significant economic value when 
information is openly share, problems are continuously identified 
and solved, and a see through value-chain is created. 
 Force suppliers to compete and reward superior performance.  
 Support the weaker suppliers improve so that they will continue 
to provide competition to the stronger suppliers.  
 Work with partners as a consultant to solve problems jointly and 
improve productivity. 
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 Protect investment by building trust through: a) stock swaps; b) 
inter-organisational employee transfer; and/or c) flexible 
contracts. 
 Find ways to promote trust while making customized 
investments to reduce costs and improve quality.    
17 Abstract 
Evidence from an increasing number of industries and sources 
suggests that much of the Japanese success can be attributed to 
Japanese-style business partnerships (JSP). A JSP is an exclusive 
supplier-purchaser relationship that focuses on maximizing the 
efficiency of the entire business system (value chain). JSPs realize 
economic benefits not available to organisations that either vertically 
integrate or keep a large supplier base. There are usually 3 types of 
benefits: 1. fewer direct suppliers, 2. customized investments, and 3. 
forced competition. The Japanese have recognized the need to be 
interdependent and have responded by developing bonding 
mechanisms that build trust and goal congruence between 
companies. US companies need to develop a capability for 
partnership or be at a competitive disadvantage. The US can adapt 
the Japanese partnership approach to the environment in the same 
way that it is learning Japanese production practices. Data and 
insights into the topic came from 2 Japanese and 2 US automakers 
and 143 of their suppliers.  
18 Key words 
Techniques; suppliers; purchasing; partnering; cooperation;  
competitive advantage; Japanese style business partnership; value 
chain; business system; trust; goal congruence. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 
Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (explicit);  
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Supply Chains; multi-tier suppliers 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing Network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (supplier-purchase relationship) 
25 
Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation 
26 
Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 36 
 
01 Author of the article Dyer, Jeffrey H. // Singh, Harbir 
02 Title of the article 
The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganisational competitive advantage. 
03 Document name Dyer and Singh, 1998 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1998 
06 Volume 23 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 660-679 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The central thesis is that a pair or network of organisations can 
develop relationships that result in sustained competitive advantage. 
16 Key findings 
 Greater the alliance partners' investment is in relation-specific 
assets, the greater the potential will be for relational rents. 
 Greater the length of the safeguard is to protect against 
opportunism, the greater the potential will be to generate 
relational rents through relation-specific assets. 
 The greater the alliance partners' investment is in inter-
organisational knowledge-sharing routines, the greater the 
potential will be for relational rents. 
 Greater the partner-specific absorptive capacity is, the greater 
the potential will be to generate relational rents through 
knowledge sharing. 
 Greater the alignment of incentives by alliance partners is to 
encourage transparency and reciprocity and to discourage 
free riding; the greater the potential will be to generate 
relational rents through knowledge sharing. 
 Greater the proportion is of synergy-sensitive resources owned 
by alliance partners that, when combined, increase the 
degree to which the resources are valuable, rare, and 
difficult to imitate, the greater the potential will be to 
generate relational rents. 
 Ability of alliance partners to generate relational rents from 
complementary strategic resources increases with the 
degree of compatibility in their organisational systems, 
processes, and cultures (organisational complementarity). 
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 Greater the alliance partners' ability is to align transactions 
with governance structures in a discriminating (transaction 
cost minimizing and value maximizing) way, the greater the 
potential will be for relational rents. 
 Greater the alliance partners' ability is to employ self-
enforcing safeguards (e.g., trust or hostages) rather than third-
party safeguards (e.g., legal contracts), the greater the 
potential will be for relational rents, owing to (1) lower con-
tracting costs, (2) lower monitoring costs, (3) lower adaptation 
costs, (4) lower re-contracting costs, and (5) superior 
incentives for value-creation initiatives. 
 Greater the alliance partners' ability is to employ informal self-
enforcing safeguards (e.g., trust) rather than formal self-
enforcing safeguards (e.g., financial hostages), the greater the 
potential will be for relational rent, owing to (1) lower mar-
ginal costs and (2) difficulty of imitation.  
17 Abstract 
In this article we offer a view that suggests that an organisation's 
critical resources may span organisation boundaries and may be 
embedded in inter-organisational resources and routines. We 
argue that an increasingly important unit of analysis for 
understanding competitive advantage is the relationship between 
organisations and identify four potential sources of 
interorganisational competitive advantage: (1) relation-specific 
assets, (2) knowledge-sharing routines, (3) complementary 
resources/capabilities, and (4) effective governance. We 
examine each of these potential sources of rent in detail, 
identifying key sub processes, and also discuss the isolating 
mechanisms that serve to preserve relational rents. Finally, we 
discuss how the relational view may offer normative prescriptions 
for organisation-level strategies that contradict the prescriptions 
offered by those with a resource-based view or industry structure 
view. 
18 Key words 
Inter-organisational resources; relation-specific assets, 
knowledge-sharing routines, complementary 
resources/capabilities, effective governance; resource-based 
view; industry structure view. 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory; Resource Based View 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); relational rents 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Alliance 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network  
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (IORs) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 37 
 
01 Author of the article Dyer, Jeffrey H. 
02 Title of the article 
Effective inter-organisational collaboration: How organisations 
minimize transaction costs and maximize transaction value 
03 Document name Dyer, 1997 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 18 
07 Number 7 
08 Page numbers 535-556 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location UDA and Japan 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive industry 
12 Sample size 
344 (including 152 responses from automaker purchasing 
department and 192 from suppliers) 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail Survey based on self administered questionnaire  
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
Based on the data collected from automotive industry, this study 
empirically examines the conditions under which transactors can 
simultaneously achieve the twin benefits of high asset specificity 
and low transaction costs 
16 Key findings 
 The higher the probability of repeated exchange, the lower the 
transaction cost. 
 The greater the total volume of exchange between transactors, 
the lower the transaction cost per unit of exchange. 
 The greater the degree of information sharing between the 
transactors, the lower the information asymmetries and the 
lower the transaction costs. 
 Self-enforcing safe-guards (i.e. goodwill trust, financial 
hostage) result in lower transaction costs than the legal 
contracts if the expected duration of exchange is long term. 
 Above some minimum threshold level of trust, additional 
relation-specific investments serve to increase commitment 
and the cost of unilateral defection, thereby resulting in lower 
transaction costs.  
17 Abstract 
This study of automotive transaction relationships in the U.S.A. 
and Japan offers data which indicate that transaction costs do not 
necessarily increase with an increase in relation-specific 
investments. We empirically examine the conditions under which 
transactors can simultaneously achieve the twin benefits of high 
asset specificity and low transaction costs. This is possible 
because the different safeguards which can be employed to 
control opportunism have different set-up costs and result in 
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different transaction costs over different time horizons. We 
examine in detail the practices of Japanese organisations which 
result in effective inter-organisational collaboration.  
18 Key words 
Collaboration; transaction cost; value; asset specificity; 
opportunism; organisational studies. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); information sharing; 
good will trust; financial and asset hostage 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Supply networks (Global) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual (managers) 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 38 
 
01 Author of the article Ellram, Lisa M. // Hendrick, Thomas, E. 
02 Title of the article Partnering Characteristics: A dyadic perspective 
03 Document name Ellram and Hendrick, 1995 
04 Journal title Journal of Business Logistics 
05 Date of publication 1995 
06 Volume 16 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 41-64 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Air transport; banking; chemicals; electronic and electrical 
equipment; engineering and management services; fabricated 
metal products; food; furniture and fixtures; industrial 
equipment, machinery and instruments; paper and packaging; 
printing and publishing; rubber and plastics; textiles; 
transportation equipment; trucking; warehousing; apparel; 
primary metal industries; wholesale trade-non-durable goods. 
12 Sample size 80 IORs 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper examining partnering characteristics from the 
perspective of matched pairs including both the buyer and 
supplier by drawing on a large sample of organisations 
from a wide variety of industries, including transportation 
and warehousing. 
16 Key findings 
 Partnering arrangements among buyers and suppliers are 
generally viewed positively by both parties.  
 Buyers and suppliers have similar perceptions of the 
partnering arrangement across a number of factors which 
have been discussed as key characteristics of partnering in 
previous studies. These factors include a futuristic 
orientation, a win/win-risk sharing approach to the 
relationship, and excellent communications.  
 Both buyers and suppliers desire to improve the partnering 
relationship in many ways, even though the current 
relationship is viewed very favorably. 
 There is widespread agreement among buyers and suppliers 
regarding the aspects of the partnering relationship that 
could be improved upon. 
 There is widespread agreement between buyers and suppliers 
regarding the level of improvement desired. 
 Both buyers and suppliers want more sharing of risks, 
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more continuous improvement focus, and a greater 
willingness to help the other and be flexible in 
arrangements, rather than take legal recourse. 
17 Abstract 
An examination is made of the perceptions of buyer-seller 
partnership characteristics from the perspectives of both the 
buying and the supplying organisations. The characteristics were 
derived from previous research and a review of the literature. 
Based on empirical evidence from a survey of matched pairs of 
buyers and suppliers who mutually agreed that they are involved 
in a partnership, an analysis is made of the differences and 
similarities for: 1. perceptions regarding the current partnering 
relationship from the perception of buyers and suppliers, 2. the 
desired characteristics of the partnering relationship between 
buyers and suppliers, and 3. current and desired partnering 
relationship characteristics within the group of buyers and within 
the group of suppliers. In addition to similarities and differences, 
the absolute level of partnering characteristics perceived today 
and desired in the future is discussed.  
18 Key words 
Buyers; suppliers; studies; perceptions; comparative analysis; 
partnering. 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit) 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; groups; partnerships 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-supplier relationship) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual (managers) 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 39 
 
01 Author of the article Fisher, Marshal L. 
02 Title of the article What is the right supply chain for your product? 
03 Document name Fisher, 1997 
04 Journal title Harvard Business Review 
05 Date of publication 1997 (March/April) 
06 Volume 75 
07 Number 2  
08 Page numbers 105-116 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Worldwide organisations operating in USA, Europe, Asia 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive; sportswear; food;   
12 Sample size Not provided 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Not provided 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Not provided 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study provides a framework for the practioners to guide 
them in understanding the nature of the demand for their products 
and devise the supply chain that can best satisfy that demand. 
16 Key findings 
 The first step in devising an effective supply-chain strategy is 
to consider the nature of the demand for the products one's 
company supplies. Products classified on the basis of their 
demand patterns are: either primarily functional or primarily 
innovative. Each category requires a distinctly different kind 
of supply chain. The root cause of the problems plaguing 
many supply chains is a mismatch between the type of 
product and the type of supply chain. 
 Supply chain's physical function includes converting raw 
materials into parts, components, and eventually finished 
goods, and transporting all of them from one point in the 
supply chain to the next. Less visible but equally important is 
market mediation, whose purpose is ensuring that the variety 
of products reaching the marketplace matches what 
consumers want to buy. 
 For products with short life cycle, it is important read early 
sales numbers or other market signals and to react quickly. 
The crucial flow of information occurs not only within the 
chain but also from the marketplace to the chain. The critical 
decisions to be made about inventory and capacity are not 
about minimizing costs but about where in the chain to 
position inventory and available production capacity, in order 
to hedge against uncertain demand. Suppliers should be 
chosen for their speed and flexibility, not for their low cost. 
 Economic gain from reducing stock outs and excess inventory 
is so great that intelligent investments in supply chain 
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responsiveness will always pay for themselves. 
 When a company has an unresponsive supply chain for 
innovative products, the right solution is to make some of the 
products functional and to create a responsive supply chain 
for the remaining innovative products. 
 A lean, efficient distribution channel is exactly right for 
functional cars but totally inappropriate for innovative cars, 
which require inventory buffers to absorb uncertainty in 
demand. 
17 Abstract 
Although there has never been so much technology and brain 
power applied to improving supply chain performance, the actual 
performance of many supply chains has never been worse. In 
some cases, costs have risen to new levels because of adversarial 
relations between supply chain partners as well as dysfunctional 
industry practices such as an overreliance on price promotions. 
The new ideas and technologies have not worked because 
companies lack a framework for deciding which ones are best for 
their particular situation. A framework is provided to managers 
for helping them understand the nature of the demand for their 
products and devise the supply chain that can best satisfy that 
demand. Once products have been classified on the basis of their 
demand patterns, they fall into one of 2 categories: they are either 
primarily functional or primarily innovative. The root cause of 
the problems plaguing many supply chains is a mismatch 
between the type of product and the type of supply chain.  
18 Key words 
Supply chains; guidelines; product management; product life 
cycle; supply and demand; strategic planning; technology 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Not mentioned 
21 Mode of Governance Not mentioned 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chains 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
1.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 40 
 
01 Author of the article Fulmer, Ashley C. // Gelfand, Michele J. 
02 Title of the article 
At what level (and in whom) we trust: Trust across multiple 
organisation levels  
03 Document name Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012 
04 Journal title Journal of Management 
05 Date of publication 2012 
06 Volume 38 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 1167-1230 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This review highlights the need to differentiate trust in a referent and 
trust at a level. It identifies common and distinct antecedents and 
consequences across referents and levels of analysis and highlights 
their strengths and limitations. 
16 Key findings 
 Interpersonal trust can be more difficult to develop when two 
parties have power differences than when they hold similar power. 
The situation is reversed if the power difference is expected or even 
deemed appropriate. 
 During trust repair, high-power trustees are more likely to convince 
trustors to give them the benefit of the doubt; however, because 
individuals with high power are perceived to be in control, it may 
be more difficult for the high-power violator to attribute the 
violation to situational forces 
 Gratitude and empathy both increase trust but through different 
processes, such as reciprocity and social identification, 
respectively.  
 Anger and disappointment lead to different forms of trust 
dissolution. Understanding how emotions are implicated in trust 
should be especially relevant during trust violations, as violations 
are emotionally charged events for trustors. 
 A match between trust and actual trustworthiness is rare because 
individuals cannot have complete information about the trustee. 
Mismatches, on the other hand, have costs and benefits. If one 
trusts more than the actual trustworthiness warrants’ there is the 
potential benefit of self-fulfilling prophecy through which 
trustworthiness may increase, but the trustor also risks violations. 
 Trust relationships move from calculus-based trust to 
identification-based trust. However, the extent to which this is the 
case depends on the level of interdependence of a culture. 
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17 Abstract 
Despite the importance of trust across multiple levels in organisations, 
extant reviews have focused predominantly on trust at the individual 
level. A systematic review of trust research across levels and trust 
referents is sorely needed to synthesize the growing number of both 
micro and macro studies on this topic. Moreover, as trust is a linchpin 
for divergent areas, such as negotiation, leadership, team processes, human 
resource management, organisational change, entrepreneurship, and 
strategic alliances, a multilevel review of trust can facilitate integration in 
the field of organisational sciences. In this review, the authors adopt a 
levels-of-analysis approach to organize the research on trust between 
2000 and 2011 in multiple referents that include interpersonal, team, and 
organisation at the individual, team, and organisational levels and 
analyze the similarities and differences in antecedents, consequences, and 
theoretical perspectives dominant at each level. Building on this 
foundation, the authors identify current strengths, weaknesses, and research 
gaps; offer recommendations for integration across levels and referents; 
and discuss lingering questions that research so far has overlooked. In 
doing so, the review offers a systematic and comprehensive view of the 
current state of the trust literature in organisational sciences and provides 
a blueprint for future research. 
18 Key words Trust processes; levels of analysis; organisations; teams. 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (Explicit); trust 
22 Configuration Elements Alliance; team; organisation; team 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 41 
 
01 Author of the article Ganesan, Shankar 
02 Title of the article 
Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller 
relationships 
03 Document name Ganesan, 1994 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1994 
06 Volume 58 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 1-19 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling)  
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Six regional department store chains  
12 Sample size 176  individuals 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Descriptive statistics; Confirmatory Factor Analysis; LISREL 
analysis; multiple regression analysis.  
15 Study Characteristics 
This study aims to determine the factors that affect the long term 
orientation in buyer-seller relationships. This study compares the 
perspectives of both the buyer (retailer) as well as the seller 
(vendor) by conducting a two stage mail survey. 
16 Key findings 
 Both retailer and vendor perspectives indicate that long-term 
orientation is determined by the extent to which a retailer or 
vendor trusts the channel partner. 
 Locking in channel partners through transaction specific 
investments and dependence is not enough to develop a long-
term relationship: Actions that foster a climate of trust are 
needed. 
 One way to gain control over important and critical vendors is 
to be long-term oriented and improve the overall profitability 
of both parties through investments in the relationship. Such 
an approach eventually would reduce the asymmetry in 
dependence and increase mutual dependence. In contrast, 
retailers are likely to have a short-term orientation with 
vendors who are dependent on them. Retailers view a vendor's 
dependence on them as a liability for the vendor and use it to 
their own advantage.  
 Reputation of the vendor had a significant effect on its 
credibility but reputation of the retailer did not. This suggests 
that retailers and vendors could be influenced by a different 
set of cues regarding the trustworthiness of their partners. 
Retailers could rely on external cues, such as reputation for 
fairness in the marketplace, whereas vendors could rely more 
on internal cues, such as actual interactions with the retailers.  
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 When retailers and vendors have a diverse market with many 
products, customers, and competitors, they are more inclined 
to reduce their dependence on a particular retailer or vendor 
and deal with multiple entities on a short-term basis. 
17 Abstract 
Marketing managers must know the time orientation of a 
customer to select and use marketing tools that correspond to the 
time horizons of the customer. Insufficient understanding of a 
customer's time orientation can lead to problems, such as 
attempting relationship marketing when transaction marketing is 
more appropriate. It is suggested that long-term orientation in a 
buyer-seller relationship is a function of 2 main factors: 1. mutual 
dependence, and 2. the extent to which they trust one another. 
Dependence and trust are related to environmental uncertainty, 
transaction-specific investments, reputation, and satisfaction in a 
buyer-seller relationship. The framework presented is tested with 
124 retail buyers and 52 vendors supplying to those retailers. The 
results indicate that trust and dependence play key roles in 
determining the long-term orientation of both retail buyers and 
their vendors. The results also indicate that both similarities and 
differences exist across retailers and vendors with respect to the 
effects of several variables on long-term orientation, dependence, 
and trust. 
18 Key words 
Vendors; relations; orientations; marketing; buyers; retail stores; 
market research; customer relations. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); interdependence; reputation; trust 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
IORs 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing Network 
24 Unit of analysis Dyad (buyer-seller relationship) 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 42 
 
01 Author of the article Garbarino, Ellen // Johnson, Mark S. 
02 Title of the article 
The different roles of satisfaction, trust and commitment in 
customer relationships 
03 Document name Garbarino and Johnson, 1999 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1999 
06 Volume 63 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 70-87 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Non-profit repertory theatre company 
12 Sample size 401 customers of the theatre 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Structural equation analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study investigates the transactional/relational continuum in a 
consumer setting and tests this notion using structural equation 
analysis. 
16 Key findings 
 Unlike low relational customers, whose future intentions are 
driven by overall satisfaction, high relational consistent 
subscribers are driven by trust and commitment. For high 
relational customers, overall satisfaction has no significant 
influence on future intentions. 
 Transactional marketing programs focused on managing 
satisfaction will be more effective for low relational 
customers. Relationship marketing programs directed toward 
high relational customers should focus on maintaining and 
building trust and commitment, not satisfaction. 
 Attitudes toward the physical facilities affect satisfaction but 
not trust and commitment; facility attitudes affect the future 
intentions of the weak relationship customers but have no 
influence on the future intentions of the more relational 
subscribers.   
17 Abstract 
Several theories of relationship marketing propose that customers 
vary in their relationships with an organisation or a continuum 
from transactional to highly relational bonds. Using structural 
equation analysis, the relationships of satisfaction, trust and 
commitment to component satisfaction attitudes and future 
intentions for the customers of an off-Broadway repertory theatre 
are examined. For low relational customers, overall satisfaction is 
the primary mediating construct, while high relational customers 
use trust and commitment as the mediators between component 
attitudes and future intentions.  
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18 Key words 
Relationship marketing; market research; theatres and cinemas; 
consumer behaviour; 
statistical analysis; consumer attitudes; customer satisfaction; 
variables; customer relations 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust; commitment; customer satisfaction 
22 
Configuration 
Elements 
Relationship (Buyer-seller relationship) 
23 
Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing individuals 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 43 
 
01 Author of the article Gassenheimer, Jule B. // Hunter, Garry K. // Siguaw, Judy A. 
02 Title of the article 
An evolving theory of hybrid distribution: Taming a hostile 
supply network 
03 Document name Gassenheimer et al., 2007 
04 Journal title Industrial Marketing Management 
05 Date of publication 2007 
06 Volume 36 
07 Number 5 
08 Page numbers 604-616 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study intends to: a) improve understanding about the 
complexity of governing a supply network that embraces channel 
hybridization; b) investigate trust in the context of a network 
distribution structure, where both cooperation and competition 
abound; c) identifies two forms of credible commitments that a 
supplier can use to govern its relationship with hybrid channel 
members: branded variants and compensation schemes; and d) 
provides an insight or improving relationships and 
performance within hybrid distribution. 
16 Key findings 
 To properly govern a supply network involving hybrid 
distribution, suppliers must consider positioning of all 
distribution partners and relationship with and between 
each.  
 Apart from considering the economic and social costs of 
expansion, it is important to gauge how competition and 
cooperation within the supply network influence perceptions of 
supply chain members, particularly issues of fairness. 
 The ability of the supplier to broker multiple relationships 
fairly builds trust and has a significant impact in governing 
supply network relations. 
 Trust within hybrid distribution networks promotes 
cooperation and indicates that distributors realize the value 
the supplier contributes to the distributors' outcomes and 
remain confident that long-term gains outweigh short-term 
sacrifices. 
 The use of credible commitments in the form of branded 
variants directly increases the distributors' perceptions of the 
supplier's distributive fairness, increases structural holes 
between types of distributors, and indirectly increases 
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distributor trust in the supplier. 
 The use of credible commitments in the form of 
compensation schemes directly increases the distributors' 
perceptions of the supplier's distributive fairness, decreases 
structural holes between the supplier and the distributors, and 
indirectly increases trust in the supplier. 
 The greater the structural holes between the supplier and 
distributors, the less the cooperation between the supplier 
and the distributors. The greater the structural holes between 
types of distributors, the greater the cooperation between the 
supplier and the distributors. The greater the distributor’s 
trust in the supplier, the greater the cooperation between 
the supplier and the distributors. Suppliers that maintain 
structural holes between types of distributors by 
brokering the relationship will improve supply network 
performance. Cooperation between the supplier and the 
distributors will be positively associated with supply network 
performance. 
17 Abstract 
Suppliers attempting to expand markets through hybrid 
distribution have created a complex, potentially hostile 
environment that reaches beyond dyads to network relationships. 
We offer a multi-theoretic paradigm that uses the network, social 
capital, structural holes and distributive fairness literatures to 
guide suppliers in the transition of governing hybrid channels so 
that when markets do overlap, cooperation and competition can 
effectively co-exist within the supply network. Specifically, we 
propose that social capital, structural holes, trust, and distributive 
fairness can be used to govern the effectiveness of cooperation 
and competition among hybrid channels and yield higher 
performance within the supply network. A corresponding 
propositional inventory is offered. 
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; suppliers; distribution channels; 
cooperation; competition 
19 Organisation Field Marketing  
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory; Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (Explicit); social capital;  
22 Configuration Elements Networks; hybrid distribution channels 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 44 
 
01 Author of the article Ghosh, Anupam // Fedorowicz, Jane 
02 Title of the article The role of trust in supply chain governance 
03 Document name Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008 
04 Journal title Business Process Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2008 
06 Volume 14 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 453-470 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Retail sector 
12 Sample size 24 decision makers belonging to two different suppliers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi-structured interviews 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Content analysis of transcribed and coded data collected through 
interviews 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper identifies key interorganisational governance 
mechanisms and shows how they can shape information sharing 
in a supply chain. 
16 Key findings 
 While information technology serves as an enabler for 
information sharing to take place, successful deployment of 
interorganisational coordination efforts within a supply chain 
depends upon the existence of a cohesive set of communication-
enhancing governance mechanisms that can be clearly linked to 
performance and process improvements. Knowledge of the role 
of these governance mechanisms will help chain partners to 
realign business relationships and contribute to overall chain 
performance. 
 Within the governing structure of a contract, information 
sharing between retailers and suppliers (or any buyers and 
sellers) will require both a shift in operational processes and 
company culture, thereby highlighting the importance of trust. 
When useful information is shared in a timely manner, supply 
chain performance will be enhanced and long-term business 
relationships will be bolstered. 
17 Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide and illustrate a 
framework for the role of governance mechanisms in information 
sharing among supply chain members. The importance of trust in 
governing IORs is emphasized. 
Design/methodology/approach – Trust, bargaining power, and 
contract are three key constructs supporting the governance of 
information sharing and material flow coordination in supply 
chains. A conceptual framework showing how these governance 
mechanisms affect coordination and ultimately, supply chain 
performance is presented. Four types of trust – calculative, 
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competence, integrity, and predictability – are thought to play an 
important role in determining the efficacy of information sharing. 
Three research questions are posed on the relationships among trust, 
bargaining power, contracts, and information sharing in supply chain 
coordination. These governance issues are shown to be key factors in 
the supply chain business model, as illustrated in a case study from 
the retail distribution industry in the USA where collaborative 
planning, forecasting and replenishment is used to exchange supply 
and demand forecasts. 
Findings – An example from the retail distribution industry shows 
that the three constructs of the governance framework are 
intertwined. Trust as a governance mechanism plays a crucial role 
in sharing information among business partners. 
Research limitations/implications – The proposed framework is 
illustrated with a single case. It will need to be tested empirically 
for supply chains across different industries. 
Originality/value – The paper presents a governance mechanism 
framework for supply chain information sharing. Knowledge of the 
role of governance mechanisms in information sharing coordination 
will help chain members to realign business relationships and 
contribute to improved overall operational performance of the 
chain. 
18 Key words 
Information exchange, Governance, Supply chain management, Trust, 
Channel relations 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust, bargaining power, and 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chains 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals 
26 Research perspective Cross section approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 45 
 
01 Author of the article Ghoshal, Sumantra // Moran, Peter 
02 Title of the article Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory 
03 Document name Ghoshal and Moran, 1996 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1996 
06 Volume 21 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 13-47 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The primary objective in this article is to caution against the 
growing tendency of applying the TCE logic for such normative 
purposes. 
16 Key findings 
 TCE has been criticized for: a) embodying a hidden ideology 
that distorts more than it illuminates; b) ad-hoc theorizing 
divorced from reality; c) lacking generality because of 
ethnocentric bias; d) ignoring the contextual grounding of 
human actions; and e) for other such purported acts of 
omission and commission. 
 Opportunism is influenced by three factors :) "prior 
conditioning" that includes all the attitudes and values 
formed through exposure to conscious as well as subliminal 
stimuli; b) "feeling for the entity"  that represents the 
individuals' favourable or unfavourable assessment of the 
specific transaction partner, the group or the organisation; 
and c) “opportunistic behaviour” – an incongruence between 
attitude and behaviour that may give rise to dissonance, if 
behaviour was accompanied by high commitment, freedom 
of choice and consequence.  
 The influence of hierarchical governance mechanisms such 
as fiat, monitoring, and control is positive on the cost of 
opportunistic behaviour and negative on the feeling for the 
entity. 
 Social control can influence behaviour with or without a 
change in individual attitudes. 
 As the increased use of rational controls (a) increases the 
organisation's dependency on those controls, (b) shifts 
voluntary compliance and extra role behaviour to 
compulsory compliance and work-to-rule, and (c) encourages 
more difficult to detect opportunistic behaviour, the cost of 
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removing these controls will grow until it is no longer an 
option for the organisation. 
 Equilibrium between dishonesty and control may be reached, 
temporarily, when the organisation exhausts its opportunities 
to apply rational controls. By then, the most promising 
individuals within the organisation (i.e., those who are most 
equipped to succeed) will more likely be those who are most 
skilled at furthering their own interests, with the most guile. 
17 Abstract 
Transaction cost economics (TCE), and more specifically the 
version of TCE that has been developed by Oliver Williamson 
(1975, 1985, 1993), has become an increasingly important 
anchor for the analysis of a wide range of strategic and 
organisational issues of considerable importance to 
organisations. As argued by some of its key proponents, the 
theory aims not only to explain but also to influence practice 
(Masten 1993). It is argued that prescriptions drawn from this 
theory are likely to be not only wrong but also dangerous for 
corporate managers because of the assumptions and logic on 
which it is grounded. Organisations are not mere substitutes for 
structuring efficient transactions when markets fail; they possess 
unique advantages for governing certain kinds of economic 
activities through a logic that is very different from that of a 
market. TCE is bad for practice because it fails to recognize this 
difference. Sources of organisational advantage are identified.  
18 Key words Transactional analysis; studies; economic theory; cost analysis. 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Hierarchical governance mechanism; fiat; monitoring and 
control 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influence 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 46 
 
01 Author of the article 
Giunipero, Larry C.// Hooker, Robert E.// Mathews, Sacha 
J.//Yoon, Tom E.// Brudvig, Susan 
02 Title of the article 
A decade of SCM Literature: Past, Present, and Future 
Implications 
03 Document name Giunipero et al., 2008 
04 Journal title Journal of Supply Chain Management 
05 Date of publication 2008 
06 Volume 44 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 66-86 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size 405 studies 
13 
Data collection 
method 
To develop an extensive database of academic articles within 
the SCM field, several citation identification methods were 
employed. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
A content analysis methodology was employed to code and 
categorize the selected articles into 13 categories. Analysis 
techniques were divided between basic and advanced data 
analysis techniques. Basic data analysis consisted of 
descriptive statistics, means testing, correlation and content 
analysis. Advanced data analysis techniques consisted of 
regression, factor analysis, SEM/path analysis, ANOVA and 
cluster analysis. The least common types of data analysis 
techniques were content analysis and Discriminant 
Analysis/Cluster analysis. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This research is focused towards systematically capturing 
trends, gaps and the future direction for the SCM field as 
depicted in the SCM literature and covered by a wide cross-
section of nine peer-reviewed journals.  
16 Key findings 
 A lagging trend in the SCM literature is environmental, 
for example, green supply chain and social responsibility. 
 The practitioner literature is increasing its coverage of 
green supply chains and their carbon footprint. 
 Electronic interchanges help organisations achieve cost 
savings and better integrate their business partnerships. 
 SCM research in the e-commerce area also addresses 
streamlining processes associated with inventory 
management and order fulfillment. 
 This review indicates a dominance of research at the focal 
organisation level or one link upstream or downstream.  
17 Abstract 
This study covers a decade of academic research in the Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) field, offering an in-depth analytical 
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review focused on the existing trends and gaps in the supply 
chain literature. Nine academic journals were investigated and a 
subject categorization is developed for SCM research. A content 
analysis was then conducted on 405 articles, focusing on the cate-
gories covered within the SCM literature, various levels of the 
chain examined and sample populations and industries 
studied, as well as the research methods employed. Finally, 
a conceptual framework of the most highly researched 
categories in SCM indicates that there is a need for more 
research that seeks to understand the nature of multiple 
links in SCM chains and networks, as opposed to focusing 
on dyadic and IORs. 
18 Key words 
Supply chain management; supply management; literature review; 
alliances; strategy 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens NA 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply Chains 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
NA 
24 Unit of analysis NA 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 47 
 
01 Author of the article Grandori, Anna // Soda, Giuseppe 
02 Title of the article A relational approach to organisational design 
03 Document name Grandori and Soda, 2006 
04 Journal title Industry and Innovation 
05 Date of publication 2006 
06 Volume 13 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 151-172 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed methods) 
10 Geographical Location Italy 
11 Context/Industry  Chipboard producer and marketer 
12 Sample size Single case company 
13 Data collection method 
Face-to-face interviews; focus groups; direct observations; 
documentary analysis. (details not provided).  
14 Method of data analysis 
Correlation analysis between interdependence matrices and 
coordination matrices to detect sub-optimal matches. 
15 Study Characteristics 
The approach to organisation design presented here is based on a 
procedure, not on a repertory of alternative forms. Hence, it 
allows solving new design problems, to devise structures in new 
fields where no repertory exists, to solve complicated 
organisational problems where the solution is neither obvious 
nor standardized. 
16 Key findings 
 The analysis for slack resources has shown that the 
organisation has designed its knowledge capacity to 
effectively face variance in the quantities of resources. These 
resources can be maintained in excess and are able to absorb 
the variability of demands. 
 Physical resources are in general more constrained, in the 
sense that increasing reserves has a more direct impact on 
costs. 
 As the strength of interdependence increases, the greater a 
deficit of coordination appears. It is the most common 
encountered problem in organisation design. 
 Majority activities that are interdependent in a constrained 
way belong to different organisational units, specializing in 
different functions and processes. Hence, nothing is more 
likely than their interdependence being underrated with a 
deficit of inter-functional coordination. 
 Maintenance activities (critical to production) are currently 
externalized. If they are correctly externalized, that is, the 
cost of producing certain maintenance services internally is 
higher than the external costs, and coordination costs are 
approximately equal then the study also supports the 
proposition that networks of tight, hierarchical and team like 
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coordination can and should cut organisation boundaries. 
17 Abstract 
The paper criticizes the currently dominant view of organisation 
forms as "discrete alternatives" and "coherent" set attributes, and 
proposes a more refined and micro-analytic view of organisation 
forms as particular combinations of coordination mechanisms 
and rights allocations. This view is relevant for understanding 
and devising "new" forms and proposing solutions for governing 
the composite and fast changing systems of today. The view is 
"relational" as it offers a procedure for devising "superior" 
configurations as combinations-relations between organisational 
components-in a quasi-continuous space of possibilities. The 
approach is sustained by the quantitative methods of network 
analysis as applied to relations among organisation's resources 
and activities. Theoretically, the approach revisits organisation 
design, integrating classic organisation theory tenets with the 
new inputs provided by organisational economics. Substantively, 
it is argued that a mix of much differentiated coordination 
mechanisms is usually superior to the codified, "packaged", 
allegedly "coherent", forms of organisation. The procedure 
presented in the paper is applied to a field experiment in a 
medium size organisation. 
18 Key words 
Coordination; mechanism; governance; relation; configuration; 
network; organisation design; quantitative methods; network 
analysis. 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) an informal (explicit); coordination; 
information exchange 
22 Configuration Elements IORs embedded in networks 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 48 
 
01 Author of the article Granovetter, Mark 
02 Title of the article The strength of weak ties 
03 Document name Granovetter, 1973 
04 Journal title American Journal of Sociology 
05 Date of publication 1973 
06 Volume 78 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 1360-1380 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Professional, technical, and managerial job changers living in a 
Boston suburb 
12 Sample size A random sample of 100 individuals 
13 Data collection method Face to face indepth interviews 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper demonstrates that the personal experience of 
individuals is closely bound up with larger-scale aspects of 
social structure, well beyond the purview or control of 
particular individuals.  
16 Key findings 
 The removal of the average weak tie would do more 
"damage" to transmission probabilities than would that of the 
average strong one. This means that whatever is to be 
diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse 
greater social distance when passed through weak ties rather 
than strong. 
 Since the resistance to a risky or deviant activity is greater 
than to a safe or normal one, a larger number of people will 
have to be exposed to it and adopt it, in the early stages, 
before it will spread in a chain reaction. Individuals with 
many weak ties are, by my arguments, best placed to diffuse 
such a difficult innovation, since some of those ties will be 
local bridges. 
 The fewer indirect contacts one has the more encapsulated he 
will be in terms of knowledge of the world beyond his own 
friendship circle; thus, bridging weak ties (and the 
consequent indirect contacts) are important in both ways. 
 From the individual's point of view, then, weak ties are an 
important resource in making possible mobility opportunity. 
Seen from a more macroscopic vantage, weak ties play a role 
in effecting social cohesion. 
 Trust in leaders is integrally related to the capacity to predict 
and affect their behaviour. Leaders, for their part, have little 
motivation to be responsive or even trustworthy toward those 
to whom they have no direct or indirect connection. Network 
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fragmentation, by reducing drastically the number of paths 
from any leader to his potential followers, would inhibit trust 
in such leaders. 
 Linkage of micro and macro levels is of central importance 
to the development of sociological theory. Such linkage 
generates paradoxes: weak ties are indispensable to 
individuals' opportunities and to their integration into 
communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to 
overall fragmentation. 
17 Abstract 
Analysis of social networks is suggested as a tool for linking 
micro and macro levels of sociological theory. The procedure is 
illustrated by elaboration of the macro implications of one aspect of 
small-scale interaction: the strength of dyadic ties. It is argued 
that the degree of overlap of two individuals' friendship 
networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one 
another. The impact of this principle on diffusion of influence and 
information, mobility opportunity, and community organisation is 
explored. Stress is laid on the cohesive power of weak ties. Most 
network models deal, implicitly, with strong ties, thus confining 
their applicability to small, well-defined groups. Emphasis on 
weak ties lends itself to discussion of relations between groups and 
to analysis of segments of social structure not easily defined in 
terms of primary groups. 
18 Key words 
Social networks; sociological theory; ties; diffusion studies; 
cognitive balance 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); social capital 
22 Configuration Elements IORs; ties 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 49 
 
01 Author of the article Granovetter, Mark 
02 Title of the article 
Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness 
03 Document name Granovetter, 1985 
04 Journal title American Journal of Sociology 
05 Date of publication 1985 
06 Volume 91 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 481-510 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This article concerns the embeddedness of economic behaviour. 
It argues that the level of embeddedness of economic behaviour 
is: a) lower in non-market societies; and b) it has changed less 
with modernization than is claimed by development theorists. 
16 Key findings 
 In the under socialized account, atomization results from 
narrow utilitarian pursuit of self-interest; in the over 
socialized one, from the fact that behavioural patterns have 
been internalized and ongoing social relations thus have 
only peripheral effects on behaviour. 
 Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social 
context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them 
by the particular intersection of social categories that they 
happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are 
instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations. 
 In business relations the degree of confidence must be more 
variable, but Prisoner's Dilemmas are nevertheless often 
obviated by the strength of personal relations, and this 
strength is a property not of the transactors but of their 
concrete relations. 
 Social relations, rather than institutional arrangements or 
generalized morality, are mainly responsible for the 
production of trust in economic life. 
 There are two ways to reduce this risk: a) to recognize that 
distrust, opportunism, and disorder are by no means absent; 
and b) to insist that while social relations may indeed often be a 
necessary condition for trust and trustworthy behaviour, 
they are not sufficient to guarantee these and may even 
provide occasion and means for malfeasance and conflict on 
 238 
a scale larger than in their absence. 
 The trust engendered by personal relations presents, by its 
very existence, enhanced opportunity for malfeasance. 
 Force and fraud are most efficiently pursued by teams, and 
the structure of these teams requires a level of internal trust that 
usually follows preexisting lines of relationship.  
 The extent of disorder resulting from force and fraud depends 
very much on how the network of social relations is structured. 
More extended and large-scale disorder results from coalitions 
of combatants, impossible without prior relations. 
 It is not only at top levels that organisations are connected by 
networks of personal relations, but at all levels where 
transactions must take place. 
17 Abstract 
How behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations is 
one of the classic questions of social theory. This paper concerns 
the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of 
social relations, in modern industrial society. Although the usual 
neoclassical accounts provide an "under socialized" or atomized-
actor explanation of such action, reformist economists who attempt 
to bring social structure back in do so in the "over socialized" way 
criticized by Dennis Wrong. Under- and over socialized accounts 
are paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of 
social relations, and a sophisticated account of economic action 
must consider its embeddedness in such structures. The argument is 
illustrated by a critique of Oliver Williamson's "markets and 
hierarchies" research program.  
18 Key words Embeddedness; social structure; economic action. 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); social capital 
22 Configuration Elements IORs; ties; embeddedness 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 50 
 
01 Author of the article Greening, Phil // Rutherford, Christine 
02 Title of the article 
Disruptions and supply networks: a multi-level, multi-theoretical 
relational perspective 
03 Document name Greening and Rutherford, 2011 
04 Journal title The International Journal of Logistics and Management 
05 Date of publication 2011 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 104-126 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The objective of this paper was to review the extant relational literature 
relating to  
networks, with a view to combining these theoretical perspectives with 
the literature  
surrounding supply chain disruptions. 
16 Key findings 
 Dense networks establish strong network behavioural norms 
anchored in the routine operation of the network. In the case of 
disruption, these may inhibit the speed of network response to 
unexpected, sudden and high impact events. 
 In the event of a disruption, surviving nodes in this type of network 
will be able to switch suppliers quickly, setting the network on a 
trajectory of faster recovery when compared to a less dense network. 
 Opportunistic behaviour will result in further switching of suppliers 
as the network gravitates closer to equilibrium during the post-
disruption recovery phase. 
 Disruptions located in networks with high dependency ties will have 
greater impact, and will consequently generate longer periods of 
recovery. The presence of holes may also be an indication that the 
network is still evolving and prior to disruption was on a trajectory 
that would have resulted in the structural holes being bridged. 
 A disruption has more impact in an evolving network (described by 
the presence of holes) than it does in a dense network with 
proportionately less holes. Nodes whose shortest connecting path 
to a disruptive event is via a weak tie will be impacted less and 
recover more quickly than nodes whose shortest connecting path is 
through a greater number of strong ties. 
17 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for the 
analysis of supply network disruptions and present a number of 
propositions to define a future research agenda. In doing so, it draws on a 
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review of the literature regarding supply chain disruptions; relationship 
formation and evolution; and network formation and evolution.  The 
literature review combined traditional contextual analysis with citation 
analysis and co-citation, assuming a multi-level, multi-theoretical 
perspective.  The findings highlight a paucity of empirical research 
regarding supply chain disruptions assuming a network perspective, 
highlighting the dynamic nature of networks and emphasizing the 
difference between supply chain disturbance and disruption.  The paper 
stops short of testing specific hypotheses, providing a conceptual 
framework and a series of propositions from which testable hypotheses can 
be developed. The necessity of assuming a dynamic, multi-level, multi-
theoretical perspective highlights the difficulties of empirical research in 
this area. However, the significance of understanding the network 
context of disruption and its connection to the securing of appropriate 
responses and ultimately reasonable mitigation is unavoidable. The 
ability to understand the implications of network structure and 
network relational dynamics in the context of disruption will enable 
managers to respond appropriately to disruptive supply chain events. 
This capability will assume increasing importance in the vulnerable and 
sensitive global economy.  The paper’s specific consideration of 
disruption (as opposed to disturbance), and the necessitated speed of 
response leads to the development of several disruption-specific 
propositions and the development of a new research agenda. 
18 Key words Supply chain management, Social networks 
19 Organisation Field Supply chain management  
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration Elements Supply Network; structure; formation; evolution; dynamics; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing Network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 51 
 
01 Author of the article Gulati, Ranjay // Singh, Harbir  
02 Title of the article 
The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination costs and 
appropriation concerns in strategic alliances 
03 Document name Gulati and Singh, 1998 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 1998 
06 Volume 43 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 781-814 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location Worldwide industries 
11 Context/Industry  Biopharmaceuticals, new materials, and automobile sectors. 
12 Sample size 
The total sample of 1,570 alliances included 769 alliances in the 
new materials industry, 345 alliances in automotives, and 456 
alliances in biopharmaceuticals. Unit of analysis here is the 
individual alliance and not organisations 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
By directly modelling the influence of anticipated coordination 
costs on the governance structure of alliances after accounting for 
concerns about appropriation, the study provides a window into 
the multiple logics used by alliance participants in determining 
the governance structure used to formalize alliances. 
16 Key findings 
 Using a typology of three types of alliance structure and the 
magnitude and type of hierarchical controls present in each, 
the extent of coordination costs and appropriation concerns in 
an alliance can predict the use of particular governance 
structures. 
 The greater the anticipated coordination costs arising from 
interdependence associated with a strategic alliance at the 
time of its formation, the more hierarchical is the governance 
structure used to formalize it. 
 Reciprocally interdependent alliances are likely to have 
structures with greater hierarchical control than those with 
sequential interdependence, which in turn are likely to have 
more hierarchically organized alliances than those with 
pooled interdependence. 
 Alliances involving a technology component were likely to 
use more hierarchical structures than those that did not 
involve one.  
 The presence of a technology component in alliances 
enhances the influence of the appropriability regime of the 
 242 
industry on the governance structure used. 
 The combination of a technology component and an alliance 
in a sector with a weak appropriability regime increases the 
likelihood of organisations choosing hierarchical governance 
structures. 
 It is important to consider alliances between organisations as 
occurring within a rich social context in which organisations 
are embedded. This context channels valuable information 
between organisations and can thus influence not only the 
formation of new alliances and the choice of partners but also 
the specific structures used to formalize alliances. 
17 Abstract 
This study examines why organisations choose different 
governance structures across their alliances. The coordination 
costs in alliances that arise from interdependence of tasks along 
organisational boundaries and the related complexity of ongoing 
activities to be completed jointly or individually is focused on. A 
typology of alliance governance structures that differentiates 
structures by the magnitude of hierarchical controls is used to test 
hypotheses predicting alternative contractual choices. Empirical 
data on alliance announcements in 3 worldwide industries over a 
20-year period is used to assess which factors explain the choice 
of alliance types. The findings suggest that the magnitude of 
hierarchical controls in contractual relationships such as alliances 
is influenced by the anticipated coordination costs and by 
expected appropriation concerns.  
18 Key words 
Alliances; organisational structure; hypotheses; statistical 
analysis; corporate governance; organisational studies 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); hierarchical  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks (alliances);  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross section approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 52 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Gulati, Ranjay // Nohria, Nitin // Zaheer, Akbar 
02 Title of the article Strategic Networks 
03 Document name Gulati et al., 2000 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 
Date of 
publication 
2000 
06 Volume 21 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 203-215 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study examines the five domains of strategy research that are 
influenced by network approach: a) industry structure; b) 
positioning within industry; c) coordination, network evolution; d) 
contracting; and e) inimitable resources.  
16 Key findings 
 A network perspective suggests that both contracting and 
coordinating costs can be influenced by viewing each 
transaction as simply an event in an evolving network of 
relationships. 
 Organisation’s networks, and the resources they allow the 
organisation to tap into, can serve as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage.  
 A resource-rich partner with the right capabilities has the 
potential to provide a focal organisation with an inimitable 
source of valuable resources and capabilities. 
 Managing the network involves using appropriate 
governance mechanisms, developing inter-organisational 
knowledge sharing routines, making appropriate relationship-
specific investments, and initiating necessary changes to the 
partnership as it evolves while also managing partner 
expectations. 
 Organisations can get better at forging alliances and 
extracting returns from them as they gain more experience. 
From a strategic standpoint, this suggests that experience with 
alliances can be a source of strategic advantage. 
 Structural network characteristics can affect the profitability of 
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the organisations in an industry. For instance: a) network 
density; b) structural holes; c) structural equivalence; and d) core 
versus peripheral organisations. Each of these factors can 
influence the profitability of industries and of the organisations 
within them. 
 Network ties to certain favourable supplier industries may 
preclude access by other organisations or industries, and 
thus maintain high profits in the focal industry by imposing 
limits on organisation entry into the industry. 
17 Abstract 
This paper introduces the important role of networks of inter-
organisational ties in examining fundamental issues in strategy 
research. Prior research has primarily viewed organisations as 
autonomous entities striving for competitive advantage from 
either external industry sources or from internal resources and 
capabilities. However, the networks of relationships in which 
organisations are embedded profoundly influence their conduct 
and performance. We identify five key areas of strategy 
research in which there is potential for incorporating strategic 
networks: (1) industry structure, (2) positioning within an 
industry, (3) inimitable organisation resources and capabilities, 
(4) contracting and coordination costs, and (5) dynamic network 
constraints and benefits. For each of these issues, the paper 
outlines some important insights that result from considering 
the role of strategic networks. 
18 Key words 
Ties; inimitable resources; capabilities; contracting; coordination 
costs; dynamic network constraints.   
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; coordination  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; embedded IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing Network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 53 
 
01 Author of the article Gulati, Ranjay 
02 Title of the article 
Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal 
study 
03 Document name Gulati, 1995 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 1995 
06 Volume 40 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 619-652 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA, Europe, Japan 
11 Context/Industry  Materials, industrial automation, automotive 
12 Sample size 166 organisations 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Published financial and alliance data for each year between 1980-
1989 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Social network analysis using UCINET 4 - a comprehensive 
software package for conducting the structural analysis of 
interorganisational networks. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study proposes a framework to explain the formation of 
interorganisational alliances within a social context - 
accumulation of prior alliances.   
16 Key findings 
 Dyadic interdependence is relevant in guiding alliance 
formation. Interdependent organisations are more likely to 
seek each other out as alliance partners.  
 Social context resulting from cumulative prior alliances 
influence alliance formation between organisations. 
 Previously unconnected organisations are more likely to enter 
alliance if they have a common partner. Inter-organisational 
networks are not only valuable conduits for information about 
specific organisational practices but they also provide an 
important impetus for guiding the choice of partners in new 
ties. 
 Previously allied organisations are likely to engage in further 
alliances. 
 Social network of indirect ties is an effective referral 
mechanism for bringing organisations together and that dense 
co-location in an alliance network enhances mutual 
confidence as organisations become aware of the possible 
negative reputational consequences of their own or other's 
opportunistic behaviours.  
17 Abstract 
This study explores how social structure affects inter-
organisational alliance formation patterns. It proposes that the 
social context emerging from prior alliances and considerations 
of strategic interdependence influence partnership decisions 
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between organisations. This social network facilitates new 
alliances by providing valuable information to organisations 
about the specific capabilities and reliability of potential partners. 
The role of both direct ties between organisations and their 
overall networks were examined with comprehensive 
longitudinal multi-industry data on the formation of inter-
organisational strategic alliances between 1970 and 1989. Results 
are consistent with both strategic interdependence and social 
structural explanations of alliance formation. Support for the 
interaction of the two sets of factors also emerged. The 
implications of incorporating both sets of explanations for the 
formation of interorganisational ties are discussed. 
18 Key words 
Strategic alliances; social networks; embeddedness; cooperative 
capabilities; organisational learning 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); past experience; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network (alliances); direct and indirect ties. 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Longitudinal study 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 54 
 
01 Author of the article Gulati, Ranjay 
02 Title of the article Alliances and Networks 
03 Document name Gulati, 1998 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1998 
06 Volume 19 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 293-317 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study demonstrates: a) how social networks can be 
influential in the creation and success of alliances; and b) how a 
perspective informed by the structural embeddedness of 
organisations can provide important new insights into the key 
issues on strategic alliances. 
1 Key findings 
 There are two broad analytical approaches for examining the 
influence of social networks. The first emphasizes the 
differential informational advantages bestowed by social 
networks, while the second highlights the control benefits 
actors can generate by being advantageously positioned within 
a social network. 
 In network analysis, the position an actor occupies in the 
structure is a function of the actor’s relational pattern in this 
network. 
 Relational embeddedness suggests that actors who are strongly 
tied to each other are likely to develop a shared 
understanding of the utility of certain behaviour as a result of 
discussing opinions in strong, socializing relations, which in 
turn influence their actions. 
 Actors who share direct connections with each other are likely 
to possess more common information and knowledge of each 
other. Information travels not only through proximate ties in 
networks, but through the structure of the network itself. 
 For organisations to build ties that effectively address their 
needs while minimizing the risks posed by such concerns, 
they must be aware of the existence of their potential 
partners and have an idea of their needs and requirements.  
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 Organisations need information about the reliability of the 
partners being considered for future alliance, especially when 
success depends heavily upon the partners’ behaviour. 
 An important implication of the embeddedness of 
organisations in social networks is the enhanced trust 
between organisations. 
 Knowledge-based trust resulting from mutual awareness 
and equity norms and deterrence-based trust arising from 
reputational concerns creates ‘self-enforcing’ safeguards 
and can substitute for contractual safeguards in a 
relationship. 
17 Abstract 
This paper introduces a social network perspective to the study 
of strategic alliances. It extends prior research, which has 
primarily considered alliances as dyadic exchanges and paid 
less attention to the fact that key precursors, processes, and 
outcomes associated with alliances can be defined and shaped 
in important ways by the social networks within which most 
organisations are embedded. It identifies five key issues for the 
study of alliances: (1) the formation of alliances, (2) the choice 
of governance structure, (3) the dynamic evolution of 
alliances, (4) the performance of alliances, and (5) the 
performance consequences for organisations entering alliances. 
For each of these issues, this paper outlines some of the 
current research and debates at the organisation and dyad 
level and then discusses some of the new and important 
insights that result from introducing a network perspective. It 
highlights current network research on alliances and suggests 
an agenda for future research 
18 Key words 
Governance structures; alliances; networks; evolution; 
performance. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); past experience; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network (alliances); direct and indirect ties. 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional study 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 55 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Gulati, Ranjay 
02 Title of the article 
Network location and learning: The influence of network resources 
and organisations capabilities of alliance formation 
03 Document name Gulati, 1999 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 
Date of 
publication 
1999 
06 Volume 20 
07 Number 5 
08 Page numbers 397-420 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling)   
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA (54 organisations);  Japan (66 organisations); Europe (46 
organisations) 
11 Context/Industry  
New materials (66 organisations); automotive (52 organisations ); 
Industrial automation(52 organisations) 
12 Sample size 166 organisations 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical sampling (dynamic panel probit model) 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This paper examines the factors that affect the likely hood that 
organisations will enter into an alliance in each period of 
observation. The unit of analysis for this study is the organisation-
year. 
16 Key findings 
 The tendency of organisations to enter new alliances is 
influenced by the amount of network resources available to them. 
 The extent of capabilities (that an organisation accumulates with 
forming alliances) positively affects the frequency with which 
organisations enter new alliances. 
 A position of higher centrality within a network leads to the 
formation of more alliances.  
 The extent of capabilities organisations accumulated with 
forming alliances also positively affected the frequency with 
which they entered new alliances. 
17 Abstract 
This paper presents a dynamic, organisation-level study of the role 
of network resources in determining alliance formation. Such 
resources inhere not so much within the organisation but reside in 
the inter-organisational networks in which organisations are placed. 
Data from extensive fieldwork show that by influencing the extent to 
which organisations have access to information about potential 
partners, such resources are an important catalyst for new alliances, 
especially because alliances entail considerable hazards. This study 
also assesses the importance of organisations’ capabilities with 
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alliance formation and material resources as determinants of their 
alliance decisions. I test this dynamic framework and its hypotheses 
about the role of time-varying network resources and organisation 
capabilities with comprehensive longitudinal multi-industry data on 
the formation of strategic alliances by a panel of organisations 
between 1970 and 1989. The results confirm field observations that 
accumulated network resources arising from organisation 
participation in the network of accumulated prior alliances are 
influential in organisations’ decisions to enter into new alliances.  
18 Key words 
Strategic alliances; social networks; embeddedness; cooperative 
capabilities; organisational learning 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of 
Governance 
Informal (explicit); past experience; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network (alliances); direct and indirect ties. 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation 
26 Research 
perspective 
Cross sectional study 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 56 
 
01 Author of the article Gundlach, Gregory T. // Achrol, Ravi S. // Mentzer, John T. 
02 Title of the article The structure of commitment in exchange 
03 Document name Gundlach et al., 1995 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1995 
06 Volume 59 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 78-92 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical analysis) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Microcomputer industry 
12 Sample size 130 top managers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis,; multiple regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
The effect of credibility and proportionality of commitment 
inputs upon the development of relational social norms, 
opportunism, and long-term commitment intentions is studied. 
16 Key findings 
 Reciprocal or joint commitment inputs can lead to stable 
long-term relationships through aligning participants' 
incentive structures and enhancing their confidence in each 
other. 
 Asymmetries in commitment result in unsatisfactory 
relationships because the more committed party is vulnerable 
to opportunism by the less committed party. The less 
committed party is more willing to abandon the relationship 
and less willing to reciprocate sacrifices made by the 
committed party.  
 Matching commitments align incentives toward parity, 
whereas disproportionate commitments lead to contrary 
incentives and motives. A more committed party may become 
vulnerable to opportunism, whereas a less committed partner 
may be tempted to exploit its advantage, especially under 
adverse market conditions. 
 Higher stakes in a relationship are associated with the 
development of relational social norms. When parties pledge 
significant resources, they develop a vested interest in 
preserving and cultivating a relationship. Relational norms act 
to provide social safeguards and promote further commitment 
 Relational norms yield the requisite social safeguards that 
enable parties to feel confident in their future commitment 
intentions. The malleable and enduring nature of this form of 
governance compared to other approaches (i.e., law) is 
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especially conducive to exchanges requiring long-term 
commitments. 
 Opportunistic inclinations arise because of disproportionate 
commitment structures in exchange relationships. Where 
opportunism occurs, relational sentiments and climate are 
undermined. Partners are less likely to exhibit solidarity and 
mutuality or behave in a flexible and compromising manner.  
 Distributors often made financial investments in manufacturer 
RandD projects and next period production runs to secure 
inventory (partly because distributors held somewhat greater 
financial resources relative to their operational needs in the 
early periods of the simulation). By contrast, manufacturer 
commitment inputs involved brand design intentions, RandD 
projects, advertising copy/media strategies, and preferential 
terms of trade. These commitments were relatively more 
redeployable than distributor commitments.  
17 Abstract 
Commitment is an essential part of successful long-term 
relationships. Whereas commitments by both parties in an 
exchange can provide the foundation for development of 
relational social norms, disproportionate commitments can lead 
to opportunism by the less committed partner. Longitudinal 
effects of the credibility of long-term commitment intentions, 
relational social norms, and opportunism in one time period on 
commitment inputs and long-term commitment intentions in later 
periods are investigated. Data gathered from a behavioural 
simulation suggest that: 1. credibility of commitment inputs in 
exchange is positively related to the development of relational 
social norms, 2. relational social norms may be undermined by 
opportunistic conduct, and 3. presence of relational social norms 
in one time period is positively related to commitment inputs and 
long-term commitment intentions in later periods.  
18 Key words Long term commitment; relational social norms; opportunism;  
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); commitment; relational social norms 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 57 
 
01 Author of the article Heide, Jan B. // John, George 
02 Title of the article Do norms matter in marketing relationships? 
03 Document name Heide and John, 1992 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1992 
06 Volume 56 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 32-44 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Standard Industrial Code 35, 36 and 37 
12 Sample size 60  industrial buyers and suppliers   
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and 
multiple regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study proposes that the presence of alternative normative 
structures may actually enhance an organisation's ability to 
structure a relationship in accordance with transaction cost 
prescriptions. 
16 Key findings 
 Specific assets do not have a universally positive effect on 
vertical control. A positive impact of specific assets is 
contingent on the presence of relational norms. 
 A limitation of the transaction cost framework is highlighted, 
namely a preoccupation with the conditions that motivate an 
organisation to structure relationships in a particular way 
without specifying the mechanisms that provide the ability to 
implement the desired structures. Relational norms can provide 
the ability to implement the desired structures, though 
accounting for their presence requires an extension of the 
behavioural assumptions on which the transaction cost 
framework is built.  
 Organisations should focus on efficiency rather than control 
in a relationship. This is contrary to the key normative 
guidelines that follows from Porter’s analysis that 
organisations should acquire the maximum amount of control 
in a relationship and conversely, to the extent possible, to 
avoid relinquishing control. 
 Power in an exchange relationship can be used by an 
organisation as a mechanism to structure exchange 
relationships in the desired way. A dominant partner in terms 
of bargaining power can extract safeguards for specific 
investments. 
 It does not suffice to place markets and hierarchies at the ends 
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of a continuum and interpolate between them. Underpinnings of 
such quasi market modes differ fundamentally from both 
markets and hierarchies. Normative structure is one aspect that 
must be attended to more closely in analyzing such cases. 
17 Abstract 
Transaction cost analysis is rapidly becoming an important 
analytical paradigm in marketing. However, the accumulation of 
transaction cost studies has been accompanied by a growing body 
of criticism, primarily directed toward its underlying behavioural 
norm of opportunism. That norm is a serious analytical deficiency, 
not only because it may be descriptively inaccurate, but also 
because it limits the applicability of the analytical framework. 
The authors show that norms play a very significant role in 
structuring economically efficient relationships between 
independent organisations. In the absence of supportive norms, 
it is not possible for parties whose specific assets are at risk to 
acquire vertical control as per the transaction cost prescription. 
Instead, those parties lose control because of their dependence. 
An empirical test of the conceptual model in a sample of 
manufacturer-supplier relationships shows good support for the 
authors' hypotheses. 
18 Key words 
Transaction cost; opportunism; relational norms; organisational 
studies; governance. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); relational norms; power; exchange 
relationships 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (Exchange) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 58 
 
01 Author of the article Heide, Jane B.  // Miner, Anne S. 
02 Title of the article 
The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and 
frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation 
03 Document name Heide and Miner, 1992 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1992 
06 Volume 35 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 265-291 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Standard Industrial Code 35, 36 and 37 
12 Sample size 136  industrial buyers and suppliers (including 60 OEMs)  
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and 
multiple regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study is focused on the effects of anticipated future 
interaction on interorganisational cooperation. The purpose in this 
inquiry was twofold: a) to add to the understanding of 
interorganisational cooperation; b) to explore further the potential 
value of interactive models in the systematic study of IORs. 
16 Key findings 
 Extendedness in a relationship will have a positive effect on the 
level of cooperation between two interacting organisations in 
a Prisoner's Dilemma context. 
 The greater the number of likely future interactions, the less 
important is the payoff in a current period relative to the 
number of potential opportunities for reward or retaliation, 
and the lower is the relative risk of current cooperation. 
 In an asymmetrical relationship, the dependency may not be 
reciprocal, so that one partner has power over the other but 
not vice versa. In that case, exploitation rather than cooperation 
might result. 
 If degree of boundedness is asymmetric, the more dependent 
party may "cooperate" because the other party demands it. 
Such a pattern of apparent cooperation by the weaker party 
can be seen as compliance rather than cooperation. 
 Organisations learn about each other over time but adopt 
stable patterns of either cooperation or defection, so that 
relationship length would have no simple overall main effect 
on cooperation. 
 Ambiguity in performance evaluation will have a negative 
effect on the level of cooperation between two organisations 
interacting in a Prisoner's Dilemma context. 
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 A organisation's immediate payoff is (1) highest if the 
organisation defects while the other cooperates, (2) next 
highest when there is joint cooperation, (3) next highest when 
there is joint defection, and (4) lowest if the organisation 
cooperates while the other defects. 
17 Abstract 
This research examined cooperation between 136 industrial buyers and 
suppliers. We identified four domains of potential cooperation: 
flexibility, information exchange, shared problem solving, and 
restraint in the use of power. Using an iterated games framework, we 
predicted that (1) anticipated open-ended future interaction, or 
extendedness, and (2) frequency of contact will increase the chances 
that a pattern of cooperative behaviour will occur, but (3) 
performance ambiguity will decrease such chances. Regression 
analysis results indicated that extendedness and frequency are 
associated with joint cooperation. Neither simple structural theories 
of cooperation nor interactive models stressing commitment would 
fully predict these results, which support the potential value of 
interactive perspectives on interorganisational cooperation in 
particular and on IORs in general. 
18 Key words 
Power; interorganisational cooperation; flexibility; information 
exchange; shared problem solving; restraint; structural theories 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); coordination; 
cooperation 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
IORs;  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing IOR 
24 Unit of analysis Inter-organisational relationship 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 59 
 
01 Author of the article Heide, Jan B. 
02 Title of the article Interorganisational governance in marketing channels 
03 Document name Heide, 1994 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1994 
06 Volume 58 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 71-85 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Standard Industrial Code 35, 36 and 37 
12 Sample size 60  industrial buyers and suppliers   
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and 
multiple regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
This article draws on a number of analytical perspectives on 
inter-organisational governance to develop a formal typology of 
approaches to relationship management. It proposes that 
nonmarket governance is a heterogeneous phenomenon and 
different relationship management strategies are appropriate 
under different conditions. 
16 Key findings 
 Business relationships can be organized in a unilateral 
fashion, by means of an authority structure that provides one 
exchange partner with the ability to develop rules, give 
instructions, and in effect impose decisions on the other. 
 The ability to govern by means of authority is not limited to 
intra-organisation settings, but also can be achieved between 
organisations by means of contractual provisions, which 
essentially "produce the effects of hierarchies". 
 For dependence to give rise to a bilateral pattern of interaction 
both parties somehow must be locked into the relationship. 
Bilateral structures can be crafted purposely in relationships 
between parties who possess inherently individual 
orientations. This can be accomplished by crafting a self-
enforcing agreement or an incentive structure that makes the 
expected gains from maintaining the relationship exceed the 
potential short-term gains from opportunism or defection. 
 Unilateral dependence creates a safeguarding problem, which 
requires that mechanisms be designed explicitly to reduce the 
exposure to opportunism. Unilateral governance can be 
implemented in such a situation by means of explicit 
contractual provisions that simulate the effects of 
organisational hierarchies. 
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 Nonmarket governance is a heterogeneous phenomenon, 
which can be accomplished in a unilateral and a bilateral 
fashion. These exchange problems can be handled through 
"hard" or "soft" contracting, respectively. 
17 Abstract 
Relationship management rapidly is becoming a central research 
paradigm in the marketing channels literature. A growing body of 
conceptual and empirical literature addresses different aspects of 
IORs, building in part on recent analytical developments in 
organisation theory, law, and economics. However, some of these 
analytical frameworks make radically different assumptions 
about the nature of IORs, although these differences to date have 
not been examined systematically in the marketing literature. 
These analytical perspectives are reviewed, and a formal 
typology of approaches to relationship management is developed. 
Specifically, typologies of 3 different forms of governance, 
which vary systematically in terms of how specific inter-
organisational processes are carried out, are developed. The 
antecedents of different relationship forms are discussed, and the 
results of a preliminary empirical test are presented.  
18 Key words 
Studies; relations; organisation theory; models; marketing; 
interdepartmental; corporate governance; organisational 
behaviour; market research. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts (soft and 
hard) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 60 
 
01 Author of the article Hill, Charles, W.L. 
02 Title of the article 
Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications 
for Transaction Cost Theory  
03 Document name Hill, 1990 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1990 
06 Volume 15 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 500-513 
09 Paper Type  Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study demonstrates that, over time, the invisible hand of 
market favours actors whose behavioural repertoires are biased 
towards cooperation, rather than opportunism. When the state of 
equilibrium is reached the population of economic actors will 
contain only those whose behavioural repertoires are biased 
towards cooperation.  
16 Key findings 
 It is best to act opportunistically for the last move because 
there is no future influence. 
 On the next-to-last move neither player will have an incentive 
to cooperate and trust because each once can anticipate 
opportunistic action by the other on the final move.  
 Reputation has an economic value that plays an important 
part in determining the willingness of others to enter into an 
exchange with a given actor who has a questionable 
reputation. 
 If avoidance of a party with tarnished image is not viable, 
other actors will demand that the potentially opportunistic 
party absorb bonding costs when they enter into an exchange 
with an actor of questionable reputation. These bonding and 
monitoring costs absorb much of the composite quasai rent 
that is inherent in the exchange, reducing the economic value 
generated from any investment in specialized assets. 
 The invisible hand of market will delete opportunistic actors 
when the focal exchange is characterized by substantial asset-
specificity investments and high switching costs (i.e. market 
is not competitive). 
17 Abstract Transaction cost theorists have generally neglected to consider 
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the implications that the invisible hand of the market mechanism 
can have for the risk of opportunism. In the long run, the invisible 
hand deletes actors whose behaviours are habitually 
opportunistic. Consequently, as markets move towards the state 
of competitive equilibrium, the risk of opportunism will be low, 
even for transactions supported by specific asset investment. 
Therefore, in many contexts, the transaction cost rationale for 
internationalization has been overstated.  
18 Key words 
Transaction cost; opportunism; market mechanism; asset 
specificity; game theory; prisoner’s dilemma; reputation. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and Informal (explicit); reputation 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 61 
 
01 
Author of the 
article 
Hillman, Amy J. // Withers, Michael C. // Collins, Brian J. 
02 Title of the article Resource dependency theory: A review 
03 Document name Hillman et al., 2009 
04 Journal title Journal of Management 
05 Date of publication 2009 
06 Volume 35 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 1404-1427 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This literature review is focused towards the resource dependence 
theory (RDT) logic for engaging in the focal strategies, the current 
state of empirical testing of RDT, and how research in these areas 
extends the RDT perspective. 
16 Key findings 
 Board of directors can bring four benefits to organisations: 
advice and counsel, channels of information flow, preferential 
access to resources, and legitimacy. 
 The dynamic nature of boards (i.e., changing composition as 
environmental needs change) appears to be a nearly normative 
convention, although this has received little empirical testing. 
 Organisation, through political mechanisms, attempt to create for 
themselves an environment that is better for their own interest. 
They may use political means to alter the condition of the external 
economic environment. In doing so, organisations actively seek to 
create their environment by trying to shape government 
regulations that produce a more favorable environment. 
 Organisations heavily dependent on the government are more 
likely to engage in political activity. As regulatory agency 
dependency increases (the agency controls more of the 
organisation’s financial resources), managers are more favorably 
disposed toward political activity. 
 Managers perceive government as one of most difficult environ-
mental dependencies to control because of the heterogeneous 
interests of different agencies and political decision makers. 
 Organisations who are more dependent on the government will 
engage in political action; the financial benefits accrue to those 
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that create co-optive linkages. 
 Poor organisation performance may be attributed to a 
misalignment of organisational behaviour with the environment. 
Replacing the CEO with someone capable of coping with the 
critical problems facing the organisation may remedy this 
misalignment. 
 As environmental uncertainty increases, years of business unit 
tenure decreases for individuals selected as general managers. In 
these instances, experience from a single organisation is viewed 
to be less relevant than diverse, extra organisational experiences 
in a highly uncertain environment. 
 Companies in dire financial situation were more likely to hire an 
outside CEO than their healthier counterparts. 
 Resource scarcity and intra-organisational political activity shape 
the post succession environment so the successor’s role is well 
defined. With scarce resources, impact of successors’ actions 
will be much less ambiguous than when resources are abundant. 
17 Abstract 
Thirty years have passed since Pfeffer and Salancik’s seminal 
work on (RDT). During this time RDT has been applied broadly 
across the research domain to explain how organisations reduce 
environmental interdependence and uncertainty. In this review, the 
authors assess the conceptual development, empirical research, and 
application of RDT. They structure their review around the five 
options that Pfeffer and Salancik propose organisations can enact to 
minimize environmental dependences: (a) mergers/vertical 
integration, (b) joint ventures and other IORs, (c) boards of directors, 
(d) political action, and (e) executive succession. Authors summarize past 
work, synthesize contemporary thought, and propose future research 
directions. 
18 Key words Resource dependence, boards of directors, organisation linkages. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Resource Dependency Theory 
21 Mode of 
Governance 
Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); interdependence; IORs 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; joint ventures; vertical integration 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
NA 
24 Unit of analysis NA 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
NA 
26 Research 
perspective 
NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 62 
 
01 Author of the article Shostack, Lynn G. 
02 Title of the article How to design a service 
03 Document name Shostack, 1982 
04 Journal title European Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1982 
06 Volume 16 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 49-63 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual)  
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper highlights that ‘what’ is being marketed is often a 
complex combination of products and services. The first step 
towards rational service design is to develop a system - known as 
service blueprint - which will allow the structure of a service to 
be mapped in an objective and explicit manner to capture all the 
essential functions to which marketing applies.  
16 Key findings 
 The difference between products and services is that products 
are tangible objects that exist in both time and space; services 
consist solely of acts or processes, and exist in time only.  
 The basic distinction between "things" and "processes" is 
the starting point for a focused investigation of services. 
Services are rendered; products are possessed. Services cannot be 
possessed; they can only be experienced, created or participated 
in. 
 A marketer must be aware of and have a method for both 
setting and tracking the deviation tolerance of a service; that 
is, the degree to which the kinetic execution of the service 
can or will be allowed to vary from the blueprint. 
 Since a service is basically a process, service blueprinting rests 
on systems that have been developed to deal with processes, 
acts and flows. Three systems are relevant: time/motion or 
methods engineering; project programming; and computer 
systems and software design. 
 A service blue print provides both a visual and a 
quantitative description of any service element that is 
more precise than verbal definitions and less subject to 
interpretation or misinterpretation. 
 A service blueprint establishes a permanent benchmark 
against which execution can be measured, modification 
proposals analyzed, competitors compared, prices 
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established and cogent promotional plans developed. 
 A service blueprint allows a service to be created on 
paper. Rather than resorting to subjective and imprecise 
concept testing as a means of service development, an ac-
tual blueprint can be tested, in which the proposed service 
has been thoroughly and specifically worked out. 
17 Abstract 
Effective service marketing requires recognition of the complex 
combination of products and services which make up a simple 
service. Molecular modelling approaches product/service 
combinations comprehensively, offering a visual framework for 
the relationships of products and services. A change in any 
aspect of the product/service configuration produces a change in 
the overall configuration. After determining the position of a 
service in the molecular model, the marketer develops a service 
blueprint based on time/motion engineering, project scheduling, 
identification of service functions, and establishment of 
tolerance levels. The blueprint serves as a visual representation 
of the service which can be tested, altered, and retested. It also 
provides a framework for assessing modification proposals, 
competition, and consumer needs. 
18 Key words 
Product development; models; marketing; functions; services; 
design. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance NA 
22 Configuration Elements Relationship (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 63 
 
01 Author of the article Hu, Jersan // Tsai, Yafang 
02 Title of the article Paradigms of derived exchange value effects in market networks 
03 Document name Hu and Tsai, 2007 
04 Journal title Industrial Marketing Management 
05 Date of publication 2007 
06 Volume 36 
07 Number 5 
08 Page numbers 636-650 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Taiwan 
11 Context/Industry  Public health insurance  
12 Sample size 5 interviews and secondary archival data. 
13 Data collection method Face-to-face interviews 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This investigation conducts an in-depth inquiry of relational 
exchange behaviours and their derived exchange effects on B2B 
exchanges in the Taiwanese National Health Insurance system. 
16 Key findings 
The interaction between organisations involves exchanging 
required value as management resources from one another. 
The exchange value includes economic value, social value, 
technical value, and knowledge value. 
The inter-organisational exchange value could be delivered to 
the other party through the specific exchange. The value of the 
specific exchange between organisations should be transferred 
down-stream and may simultaneously transfer the offering value. 
Meanwhile, the previous exchange value could influence the 
related succeeding exchange. 
The derived exchange value between organisations could 
positively or negatively affect the succeeding exchanges; and 
it would also be influenced which originate from the previous 
exchange.  
Previous exchange behaviours can affect either or both focal 
exchangers. Therefore, the derived effect can be unilateral or 
bilateral impact. 
The transfer relationships of focal exchange value may 
affect one another. Hence, the relationships of derived effect 
can be open type or circuit type. 
The derived effect of exchange value between organisations 
can be: (1) unilateral open type; (2) unilateral circuit type; (3) 
bilateral open type; (4) bilateral circuit type of exchange 
networks. 
17 Abstract 
Customer consumption value ultimately derives from enterprise 
production the consumption benefits which originating from 
inter-organisational cooperation as well as the transferred and 
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accumulated exchange value of the enterprise with external 
organisations. This study plans to clarify the effect of the derived 
exchange relationship on enterprise exchange value, and also to 
identify the network models of different derived effect 
relationships. An analysis of the Taiwanese public health system 
revealed both positive and negative exchange value effects that 
impacted relationships among actors in the overall health 
system. Four generic models were presented by analyzing the 
qualitative data from phenomenon of different types of inter-
organisational exchange behaviours, and other more complex 
models deduced from four generic models were also proposed 
18 Key words 
Relationship marketing; Business network; Business to business 
marketing; Business marketing; Industrial marketing 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); relational exchange behaviour 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 64 
 
01 Author of the article Human, Sherrie E. // Provan, Keith G. 
02 Title of the article 
An emergent theory of structure and outcomes in small-
organisation strategic manufacturing networks 
03 Document name Human and Provan, 1997 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 40 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 368-403 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case Study) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Wood products; metal working; and apparel industry  
12 Sample size 
2 networks in secondary wood-products industry comprising 
organisations that manufacture furniture. Total number of 
organisations is 42 (19 organisations in first network; 23 
organisations in second network). 
13 Data collection method 
Exploratory interviews; telephonic interviews; closed question 
surveys; articles and network reports. Data collected twice with 
a gap of two years – longitudinal study. 
14 Method of data analysis 
Qualitative inductive research and network analysis 
methodologies. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study offers evidence that the structure of SME networks is 
important for network effectiveness primarily as a way of 
facilitating interactions among organisations that are committed 
to the network concept. It demonstrates that IORs within 
purposefully constructed SMEs are unique and that network 
involvement can yield positive results that are not likely for non-
network organisations. 
16 Key findings 
 Organisations in small-to-medium-sized-enterprise strategic 
networks are likely to achieve a broad range of favourable 
transactional and transformational outcomes as a result of 
their network involvement. Transactional outcomes are most 
likely to be consistent across SME networks, whereas 
transformational outcomes are likely to vary across 
networks. 
 Organisations in small-to-medium-sized-enterprise strategic 
networks are more likely than market (non-network member) 
organisations to obtain outcomes related to increasing 
interorganisational exchanges of friendship, information, 
business, and competencies and increasing organisational 
credibility and access to resources. 
 Small-to-medium-sized-enterprise network structure can be 
explained by the domain similarity of the organisations that 
compose a network. Specifically, a domain- similar network 
is likely to have a strong central administrative structure and 
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an interactive structure of high density within which multiple 
organisations are central. A network having relatively low 
domain similarity is likely to have a moderately weak central 
administrative structure and a low-density interactive 
structure with few central organisations. 
 For domain-similar organisations, numerous transactional 
and transformational outcomes will occur when a small-to-
medium-sized-enterprise network's administration is central 
and active in network-wide coordination and when network 
interactive structure is dense and decentralized. 
 For organisations having low domain similarity, numerous 
transactional (but not transformational) outcomes will occur 
when a small-to-medium-sized-enterprise network's 
administration is central and active in interactions with 
individual member organisations and when inter-
organisational exchange density is low but centralized. 
17 Abstract 
A study compares 2 networks of small- to medium-sized 
manufacturing enterprises in the US wood products industry. 
Qualitative and survey data were collected from a sample of 
active participants in each network as well as from a sample of 
organisations that were not network members (market 
organisations) in the same industry. Using both qualitative and 
network analysis methodologies, a model is developed, as well 
as testable propositions concerning key aspects of network 
structure and outcomes.  
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; comparative analysis; alliances; wood 
products; networks; structures 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); formal 
administrative structure;  
22 Configuration Elements Network; structure; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 65 
 
01 Author of the article Human, Sherrie E. // Provan, Keith G. 
02 Title of the article 
Legitimacy Building in the evolution of small networks – Study 
of success and demise 
03 Document name Human and Provan, 2000 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 2000 
06 Volume 45 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 327-365 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Wood products; metal working; and apparel industry  
12 Sample size 
2 networks in secondary wood-products industry comprising 
organisations that manufacture furniture. Total number of 
organisations is 42 (19 organisations in first network; 23 
organisations in second network). 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Exploratory interviews; telephonic interviews; closed question 
surveys; articles and network reports. Data collected twice with a 
gap of two years – longitudinal study. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Socio-metric analysis using UCINET software 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study focus on the ways in which multilateral networks of 
small and medium-sized manufacturing organisations form, 
grow, and ultimately move toward either sustainment or demise, 
focusing on how legitimacy is built as networks evolve. 
16 Key findings 
 Multilateral networks build legitimacy along three key 
dimensions: network as form, network as entity, and network 
as interaction. 
 Legitimacy building during network formation will emphasize 
legitimizing the network as form and network as entity, 
regardless of the network's strategic orientation.  
 The overall strategic orientation of the network for building 
legitimacy that emerges during network formation will reflect 
the needs and interests of the dominant stakeholders in the 
pre-network organisational field. 
 Networks adopting either an inside-out or an outside-in 
legitimacy building strategy during network formation will 
maintain that strategic orientation during early network 
growth.  
 During early growth, networks with an inside-out strategic 
orientation will primarily emphasize legitimizing the network 
as interaction and the network as entity. Legitimacy of the 
network as entity will depend on the ability of the NAO to 
work closely with member organisations to establish a 
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recognizable network identity.  
 During early growth, networks with an outside-in strategic 
orientation will emphasize building legitimacy of the network 
as interaction significantly less than networks with an inside-
out orientation.  
 For networks to be successful in moving from early growth 
into sustainment, the legitimacy of the network as form, the 
network as entity, and the network as interaction must all be 
established.  
 Networks having an inside-out strategic orientation are more 
likely to establish the legitimacy of the network as interaction 
than networks having an outside-in strategy.  
 Networks seeking long-term sustainment must adopt a dual 
legitimacy-building strategy, emphasizing both outside-in and 
inside-out strategies, although not necessarily equally, if 
legitimacy across all three dimensions is to be maintained.  
17 Abstract 
This article reports a longitudinal examination and comparison of 
2 multilateral networks of small and medium-sized organisations 
in the US wood-products manufacturing industry. The research 
focused on how each of these networks built legitimacy over the 
course of their early evolution, from the pre-network field, to 
initial formation and growth, and toward sustainment, 
culminating in the success of one and the demise of the other. 
The findings demonstrate that despite differences in their early 
bases of support, which resulted in very different strategic 
emphases, the 2 networks ultimately had to address 3 
conceptually distinct dimensions of legitimacy - the network as 
form, the network as entity, and the network as interaction. Based 
on the findings, specific propositions are developed and some 
tentative conclusions drawn about how legitimacy is established 
in multilateral networks and how the failure to build legitimacy 
across the 3 dimensions may lead to network collapse. 
18 Key words 
Organisational structure; organisational behaviour; alliances; 
studies; wood products 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); formal 
administrative structure;  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; structure; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 66 
 
01 Author of the article Humphries, Andrew S. // Wilding, Richard D. 
02 Title of the article 
Long term collaborative business relationships: The impact of 
trust and C3 behaviour 
03 Document name Humphries and Wilding, 2004 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing Management 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 20 
07 Number 9 
08 Page numbers 1107-1122 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed methods) 
10 Geographical Location UK 
11 Context/Industry  Defence industry (procurement) 
12 Sample size 54 monopolistic B2B relationships 
13 Data collection method Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 Method of data analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis combined with statistical analysis 
for data triangulation. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study investigates the relationship between trust, C3 
behaviour (cooperation, coordination and collaboration), and 
relationship success. 
16 Key findings 
 Repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking and successful 
fulfillment of expectations strengthen willingness of parties 
to rely upon each other and expand the relationship, 
producing a virtuous circle that can be developed and 
promoted. 
 Over time, trust supported by credible actions is likely to 
establish a virtuous circle of ever-improving business-to-
business relationship performance.  
 Lack of co-operative behaviour reduces the growth of trust and 
therefore the chances of achieving interdependence and equitable 
outcomes. These include: adversarial commercial attitudes and 
practices, inadequate investment in specific assets such as 
work force stability and product/process development, the 
use of inappropriate performance measures, opportunistically 
providing poor goods and services and, using proprietary 
information as a weapon,  
 Strong counterbalancing, positive business drivers produce 
examples of relationship-building specific investments, co-
operative behaviour, open communications and a desire to 
reduce the burden of governance through more equitable, 
long-term arrangements. 
 There will inevitably be a reduction in freedom of 
independent action which may affect the perceived quality 
of the relationship. 
 It is important to reduce the impact of environmental 
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influences that cause frustration and generate negative 
behaviour. These include: traditional commercial attitudes, 
lack of long-term funding for projects and lack of investment in 
process improvements. 
 Synchronized objectives, pursuing joint approaches to 
service and product delivery, lowering costs and risks and 
promoting measures to support the growth of trust appear to 
be the best ways of mitigating negative influences. 
 Political acceptance of the lack of choice within long-term 
collaborations, selecting appropriate governance modes 
(contractual or relational) and being prepared to change them 
over time as circumstances evolved, promote building of 
trust. 
 Interaction of trust and C3 Behaviour in the Relationship 
Success Cycle indicates that a structured approach to 
improving relationships should be planned. 
 Organisations should attempt small co-operative projects that 
improve efficiency because these are perceived as being non-
threatening; discussions about costs should be left until some 
maturity has been achieved 
17 Abstract 
Long-term, collaborative business relationships are like 
marriages where tolerance, forbearance and some reduction of 
freedom as well as innovation are necessary to ensure success. 
Trust and cooperative behaviours are known to be essential 
ingredients in securing an environment of continuous 
improvement but, how they are correlated has yet to be tested. 
The paper describes a research project within a sample of long-
term monopoly businesses as a novel approach to bringing trust 
and cooperation, coordination and collaboration (C3 Behaviour) 
into sharper focus without competitive distractions. It was found 
that a correlation between trust and C3 Behaviour and the 
success of the collaborative relationship exists.  
18 Key words 
Trust; cooperation; coordination; collaboration; relationships; 
defence industry; procurement 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust; cooperation; coordination; 
collaboration 
22 Configuration Elements IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 67 
 
01 Author of the article Inkpen, Andrew C. // Curral, Steven C.  
02 Title of the article The co-evolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures 
03 Document name Inkpen and Curral, 2004  
04 Journal title Organisation Science 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 15 
07 Number 5 
08 Page numbers 586-599 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The main theme of this paper is that joint venture trust, control, 
and learning are key concepts that co-evolve over time. The 
level of inter-organisational trust is a determinant of the 
structures and control mechanisms that evolve in a joint 
venture. 
16 Key findings 
 Clearly defined joint venture collaborative objectives 
foster the initial development of trust between the joint 
venture partners 
 The greater the initial level of trust between joint 
venture partners, the lower the initial joint venture 
monitoring and control costs by the partners and the greater 
the initial reliance on social controls. 
 The more extensive the use of formal controls, the 
slower the development of trust. 
 In the initial stages of a joint venture, controls that 
create structural assurance beliefs will foster the 
development of trust between partner managers. 
 The greater the initial control one partner has over 
the joint venture, the greater the likelihood that the other 
partner will act opportunistically. 
 Repeated transactions between the joint venture 
partners that are viewed as successful will lead to 
increased inter-organisational trust. 
 Learning about  the joint  ventu re partner increases the 
likelihood that partner organisations will reduce their 
emphasis on formal joint venture controls. 
 If learning by one partner leads to a perceived shift in 
partner bargaining power, then there is increased likelihood 
that formal controls will be more emphasized. 
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 Learning by one partner that  leads to increased 
dependence on the other partner to perform joint venture 
tasks increases the likelihood that the learning partner 
will increase its desire for social controls. 
 Trust between joint venture partners will moderate the 
relationship between shifts in bargaining power and joint 
venture stability: High trust will decrease the likelihood 
that shifts in bargaining power will result in joint venture 
instability; low trust will increase the likelihood that 
shifts in bargaining power will result in joint venture 
instability. 
17 Abstract 
This article examines the evolution of trust, control, and learning 
in a joint venture relationship. Using a co-evolutionary 
approach, we develop a framework that shows how initial 
joint venture conditions give way to evolved conditions as 
joint venture partners develop an understanding of each 
other and adjust the collaborative process. We explore the 
relationship between trust and control in joint ventures and 
identify how these two critical concepts impact joint venture 
processes. Trust, along with partner collaborative objectives, 
creates the initial climate that shapes partner interactions. These 
interactions lead to subsequent decisions about the nature of 
controls. We then examine linkages between alliance 
learning and the trust and control concepts, and argue that 
learning processes are central to evolving joint venture 
dynamics. Once the joint venture is formed, and if the 
initial conditions support continued collaboration, then 
learning processes will be central to evolving alliance 
dynamics. As initial conditions give way to evolved 
conditions, learning and trust will co-evolve and impact 
decisions about control. Propositions linking the concepts 
are provided as guides for future empirical research. 
18 Key words Co-evolution; trust; control; learning; joint ventures 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); trust; control; 
learning 
22 Configuration Elements Joint Ventures; alliances; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 68 
 
01 Author of the article Inkpen, Andrew C. // Beamish, Paul W. 
02 Title of the article 
Knowledge, bargaining power, and the instability of international 
joint ventures 
03 Document name Inkpen et al., 1997 
04 Journal title The Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 177-202 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The focus of this paper is towards the instability that results from 
factors endogenous to the international joint ventures (IJV) 
relationship. This study demonstrates that the instability of IJV is 
associated with shifts in partner bargaining power.  
16 Key findings 
 To achieve stability, a local partner should take the following 
steps: 1) discourage the foreign partner from sending large 
numbers of managers to the venture. 2) continue to actively 
invest in local knowledge; 3) should not treat its knowledge 
contributions passively, but it should continue to upgrade the 
value of the knowledge to the foreign partner; and 4) consider 
the track records of potential partners, particularly how long 
other IJVs that they were a part of have survived.  
 When knowledge acquisition shifts the balance of bargaining 
power between partners, the cooperative basis for the JV may 
erode, and venture instability may result. 
 When a JV is international and the foreign partner seeks to 
expand its geographic scope of operations, the local partner's 
knowledge of local economic, political, and cultural 
environments will be a key contribution to the JV. 
 Once the venture is formed, if the foreign partner attaches a 
high value to the acquisition of local knowledge and has the 
ability to acquire the knowledge, the probability of JV 
instability increases. 
 Once the foreign partner has acquired local knowledge, unless 
the local partner is contributing other valuable and non-
imitable skills to the JV, the rationale for cooperation will be 
eliminated.  
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17 Abstract 
Although the high rate of instability of international joint 
ventures (IJV) has been well documented, the underlying reasons 
for the instability need clarification. A paper develops an 
analytical framework for instability of IJVs grounded in a 
bargaining power and dependence perspective. Instability is 
defined as a major change in partner relationship status that is 
unplanned and premature from one or both partners' perspectives. 
Shifts in the balance of bargaining power occur when partners of 
an IJV acquire sufficient knowledge and skills to eliminate a 
partner dependency and make the IJV bargain obsolete. The 
primary focus is on the acquisition of local knowledge by the 
foreign partner and the impact that this acquisition of knowledge 
has on the stability of the IJV. 
18 Key words 
International joint ventures; rate of instability; bargaining power; 
organisational behaviour. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); power 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
International joint ventures; alliances; IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 69 
 
01 Author of the article Jones, Candace // Hesterley, Ailliam S. // Borgatti, Stephan P. 
02 Title of the article 
A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions 
and social mechanism 
03 Document name Jones et al., 1997 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 911-945 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
By integrating TCE and SNT, this study provides a framework to 
identify conditions under which network governance will 
emerge and social mechanisms that allow network governance 
to coordinate and safeguard customized exchanges in rapidly 
changing markets. 
16 Key findings 
 Interaction of exchange conditions—demand uncertainty with 
stable inputs, customized goods/services requiring high 
levels of human asset specificity, complex tasks requiring 
diverse specialists, and frequent exchanges—promotes 
structural embeddedness among exchange parties. 
 Structural embeddedness provides basis for social mechanisms 
to coordinate, and safeguard exchanges; its presence enhances 
likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in 
rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks. 
 Restricted access: a) reduces coordination costs of 
customized, complex exchanges; b) enhances the likelihood 
of network governance emerging and thriving in rapidly 
changing markets for complex, customized tasks; c) 
enhances safeguarding of customized exchanges in rapidly 
changing markets; and d) enhances likelihood of network 
governance emerging in rapidly changing markets for 
complex, customized tasks. 
 The presence of macro culture reduces coordination costs for 
customized, complex exchanges. Macro culture enhances 
likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving in 
rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks. 
 Reputations enhance safeguarding of customized exchanges. 
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The more important reputations are, the greater the 
likelihood of network governance emerging and thriving 
in rapidly changing markets for complex, customized tasks. 
 Multiple social mechanisms of restricted access, macro-
culture, collective sanctions, and reputation interact to 
decrease coordination costs of and to enhance safeguarding of 
customized exchanges. As more of these social mechanisms 
are used, likelihood of network governance emerging and 
thriving is enhanced for overseeing complex, customized 
tasks in rapidly changing markets. 
 The congruent content of social mechanisms influences the 
coordination costs and the safeguarding of complex, 
customized exchanges. The more congruent the content of 
multiple social mechanisms for collaboration and sharing of 
information, greater the likelihood of network 
governance emerging and thriving in rapidly changing 
markets for complex, customized tasks. 
17 Abstract 
A phenomenon of last 20 years has been rapid rise of the 
research on governance. This governance form has received sig-
nificant scholarly attention, but, to date, no comprehensive theory 
for it has been advanced, and no sufficiently detailed and 
analytically consistent definition has appeared. Our objective is 
to provide a theory that explains under what conditions network 
governance has comparative advantage and is therefore likely 
to emerge and thrive. Our theory integrates TCE and SNT and 
asserts that net Data Extraction Form Number of governance is a 
response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand 
uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency. Exchange conditions 
drive organisations toward structurally embedding their 
transactions, which enables organisations to use social 
mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges. 
Network governance form has advantages over both hierarchy 
and market solutions in simultaneously adapting, 
coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges. 
18 Key words 
Network; governance; transaction cost economics, social network 
theory; asset specificity  
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Social Network Theory;  
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); social mechanism; coordination; safeguard 
of exchanges 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; inter-organisational exchange relationships 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 70 
 
01 Author of the article Kilduff, Martin // Brass, Daniel J. 
02 Title of the article 
Organisational Social Network Research: Core Ideas and Key 
Debates 
03 Document name Kilduff  and Brass, 2010  
04 Journal title The Academy of Management Annals 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 4 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 317-357 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study argues that there are four interrelated leading ideas 
that have generated influential debates and empirical work: 
an emphasis on relations between actors, a recognition of the 
embeddedness of exchange in social relations, a belief in the 
structural patterning of social life, and an emphasis on the social 
utility of network connections. These four leading ideas are at 
the core of the social network research program and have 
evolved over time from intellectual traditions in psychology, 
anthropology, and sociology. 
16 Key findings 
 Actors are embedded within a network to the extent that 
they show a preference for repeat transactions with network 
members and to the extent that social ties are forged, renewed, 
and even extended through community rather than through 
actors outside community. 
 The denser the network, the more redundancy there is in 
terms of paths along which information and influence can 
flow between any two actors. 
 Networks with high density tend to be ones in which norms 
concerning the proper way to behave are “clearer, more 
firmly held and easier to enforce”. 
 In the competitive evolution of the structural perspective 
different kinds of relationships can have different effects, 
especially if one considers negative ties. Similar structural 
patterns may result in different outcomes when the content of 
the relationships is considered. 
 Tie strength is a function of time, intimacy, emotional 
intensity, and reciprocity. Strong-tie networks (at the 
 280 
interpersonal level) are likely to be dense networks because 
people who have friends in common tend to become friends 
themselves. 
 Social structure can dominate motivation in the sense that 
although close friends may be more interested than 
acquaintances in helping and strong ties may be necessary 
for the effective transfer of knowledge, it is likely to be 
acquaintances who have more useful information 
concerning new jobs or scarce services 
 Fault lines between different clusters tend to emerge over 
time, either through default processes such as a preference 
for interaction with similar others, through processes of 
active recruitment of friends and kin that can occur 
beneath the radar of management attention, or with the 
active encouragement of management.  
17 Abstract 
Given the growing popularity of the social network perspective 
across diverse organisational subject areas, this review 
examines the coherence of the research tradition (in terms of 
leading ideas from which the diversity of new research derives) 
and appraises current directions and controversies. The 
leading ideas at the heart of the organisational social 
network research program include: an emphasis on relations 
between actors; the embeddedness of exchange in social 
relations; the assumption that dyadic relationships do not 
occur in isolation, but rather form a complex structural pattern 
of connectivity and cleavage beyond the dyad; and the belief that 
social network connections matter in terms of outcomes to both 
actors and groups of actors across a range of indicators. These 
leading ideas are articulated in current debates that center on 
issues of actor characteristics, agency, cognition, cooperation 
versus competition, and boundary specification. To 
complement the review, we provide a glossary of social 
network terms.  
18 Key words Studies; social networks; organisation theory; social interaction. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; IORs; embeddedness; tie strength; density; 
clusters 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 71 
 
01 Author of the article 
Kim, Yusoon // Choi, Thomas Y. // Yan, Tingting // Dooley, 
Kevin 
02 Title of the article 
Structural investigation of supply networks: A social network 
analysis approach 
03 Document name Kim et al., 2010 
04 Journal title Journal of Operations Management 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 29 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 194-211 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed methods) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive industry 
12 Sample size 
Six supply networks - three based on directional materials 
flow and three based on non-directional contractual 
relationships. 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Inductive case study approach based on data collected by Choi 
and Hong (2002)  
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Social network analysis using UCINET 6 - a comprehensive 
software package for conducting the structural analysis of 
interorganisational networks. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study demonstrates that SNA concepts are particularly 
suitable for studying how patterns of IORs in a supply network 
translate to competitive advantages through management of 
materials movement and diffusion of information. 
16 Key findings 
 Organisations with high in-degree centrality should focus on 
developing a capability in system integration or product 
architectural innovation. Organisations with high 
betweenness centrality may be in a better position to engage 
in supply risk management. 
 Key organisations in a materials flow network can have a 
considerable effect on the operational quality of overall 
supply network, affecting lead time, product quality, OEM’s 
inventory level, or stockout costs.  
 Key suppliers in a contractual relation network could 
facilitate the timely identification or resolution of those 
system-level operational problems and other supply 
disruption risks. 
17 Abstract 
A system of interconnected buyers and suppliers is better 
modeled as a network than as a linear chain. In this paper we 
demonstrate how to use social network analysis to investigate the 
structural characteristics of supply networks. Our analytical 
framework relates key social network analysis metrics to supply 
network constructs. We apply this framework to the three 
automotive supply networks reported in Choi and Hong (2002). 
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Each of the supply networks is analyzed in terms of both materials 
flow and contractual relationships. We compare the social 
network analysis results with the case-based interpretations in 
Choi and Hong (2002) and conclude that our framework can both 
supplement and complement case-based analysis of supply 
networks. 
18 Key words 
Supply networks; supply chain management; second-tier 
suppliers; social network analysis; network structure; structural 
analysis network indices. 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); social norms 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; structure; multi-tier suppliers 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Origination influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 72 
 
01 Author of the article Koka, Balaji, R. // Madhavan, Ravindranath // Prescot, John E. 
02 Title of the article 
The evolution of inter-organisational networks: Environmental 
effects on patterns of network change  
03 Document name Koka, et al., 2006 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 2006 
06 Volume 31 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 721-737 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
Motivated by the need to understand how networks evolve 
as a prerequisite to the building of effective networks, this 
study proposes a framework explaining patterns of 
network change as driven by environmental changes 
moderated by organisation strategic orientation. 
16 Key findings 
 Under the environmental conditions of a decrease in uncer-
tainty and a decrease in munificence, networks will 
demonstrate a decrease in the number of new tie 
creations and an increase in the number of tie deletions. 
 Under the environmental conditions of an increase in 
uncertainty and a decrease in munificence, networks will  
demonstrate  an increase in the number of tie 
creations and an increase in the number of tie deletions. 
  Under the environmental conditions of a decrease in 
uncertainty and an increase in munificence networks 
wil l  demonstrate  an increase in the number of tie 
creations and a decrease in the number of tie 
deletions. 
 Under the environmental conditions of an increase in uncer-
tainty and an increase in munificence, networks will 
demonstrate a decrease in the number of tie deletions 
and an increase in the number of tie creations. 
 Within each of the predicted scenarios, the absolute level of 
the environmental factors moderates the effect of the 
different environmental conditions on tie activity and, 
consequently, network change. Organisation responses to 
increases in the level of the environmental dimensions 
are likely to be lower when the absolute level of the 
environmental dimensions is high than organisation 
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responses to a similar increase in the level of the 
environmental  dimensions when the absolute  level 
is low. Similarly, organisation responses to decreases in 
the level of the environmental dimensions when the abso-
lute level of environmental dimensions is low are 
likely to be lower than organisation responses to a similar 
decrease in the level of the environmental dimensions 
when the absolute level is high.  
 Within each of the network change  scenar ios  
descr ibed  above, organisation strategic orientation 
will moderate the specific effects on organisation ego 
networks, including the rate and direction of network 
change. In particular, entrepreneurial organisations 
(prospectors or explorers) are more likely to take 
advantage of opportunities in the environment by forming 
new ties and deleting inappropriate ties. Defenders 
(exploiters) are more likely to continue with existing 
partners geared toward reinforcing their network 
position. 
17 Abstract 
We develop a framework examining the relationship 
between environmental change and patterns of network 
change. We propose four patterns of network change (network 
expansion, network churning, network strengthening, and 
network shrinking) across four environmental change 
scenarios. Since network evolution is the result of both 
environmental context and strategic action, we incorporate 
strategic orientation as a moderator. Focusing on network 
change at both the organisation and network levels of 
analysis will guide us toward a better understanding of the 
principles behind the building of effective networks. 
18 Key words 
Correlation analysis; work environment; organisational change; 
professional relationships.  
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration Elements Network; structures; ties  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 73 
 
01 Author of the article Kraljic, Peter 
02 Title of the article Purchasing must become supply chain management 
03 Document name Kraljic, 1983 
04 Journal title Harvard Business Review 
05 Date of publication 1983 
06 Volume September-October 
07 Number - 
08 Page numbers 109-117 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Worldwide organisations operating in USA, Europe, Asia 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive; Petrochemical; Metallurgy; Electrical  
12 Sample size Not provided 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Not provided 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Not provided 
15 Study Characteristics 
In this article, the author offers pragmatic advice on how top 
management can recognize the extent of its own supply weakness 
and treat it with a comprehensive strategy to manage supply. He 
leads the reader step by step from the roots of the problem to the 
implementation of a solution. 
16 Key findings 
 Combining supply requirements of different divisions can 
increase the corporation's total buying clout. 
 If the company covers a large percentage of its supplies from 
sources it owns, it will be in a much better negotiating position to 
cover the remainder of its outside requirements than its less-
integrated competitors. 
 To minimize their supply vulnerabilities and make the most 
of their potential buying power, use a four-stage approach to 
devise strategies comprising: a) classifies all its purchased 
materials or components in terms of profit impact and supply risk; 
b) analyzes the supply market for these materials; c) determine its 
overall strategic supply position; and d) develop materials 
strategies and action plans. 
 The company needs to support supply decisions of strategic items 
with a large battery of analytic techniques, including market 
analysis, risk analysis, computer simulation and optimization 
models, price forecasting, and various other kinds of 
microeconomic analysis. 
 Decisions about bottleneck items may require specific market 
analysis and decision models for resolution.  
 Vendor and value analysis, price forecasting models, and 
decision models come into play on issues affecting leverage 
materials. 
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 Where noncritical items are concerned, simple market analyses, 
decision policies, and inventory optimization models will nor-
mally suffice.  
 The higher such costs and the greater the risk of incurring them, 
the less latitude the company has for rapidly shifting supply 
sources or delaying negotiations or contracts. 
 Complex companies with numerous products, multiple plants, 
and substantial production for stock (as in the consumer goods or 
chemical industries) are more vulnerable than are companies with 
a single product line and/or considerable job-order production, 
such as industrial equipment manufacturers. In either case, 
tailor-made systems support will be called for. 
17 Abstract 
In many companies, purchasing, perhaps more than any other 
business function, is wedded to routine. Ignoring or accepting 
countless economic and political disruptions to their supply of 
materials, companies continue to negotiate annually with their 
established networks of suppliers or sources. But many purchasing 
managers' skills and outlooks were formed 20 years ago in an era 
of relative stability, and they haven't changed. Now, however, no 
company can allow purchasing to lag behind other departments in 
acknowledging and adjusting to worldwide environmental and 
economic changes. Such an attitude is not only obsolete but also 
costly. 
18 Key words Supply chain management; purchase;  
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Not provided 
21 Mode of Governance Not provided 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chains 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Not provided 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
1.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 74 
 
01 Author of the article Lambe, Jay // Whittmann, Michael // Spekman, Robert  
02 Title of the article 
Social exchange theory and research on business-to-business 
relational exchange 
03 Document name Lambe et al., 2001 
04 Journal title Journal of business-to-business marketing 
05 Date of publication 2001 
06 Volume 8 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 2-36 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This article provides a full and clear explanation of SET, a 
summary of what has been learned using SET, and the extent of 
its limitations as a theory. 
16 Key findings 
 In terms of governance, situations of unilateral dependence 
have been found to decrease relational governance, while 
symmetric and high dependence increases relational 
governance in exchange relationships 
 Interdependence significantly increases the use of 
relational norms as a governance mechanism that in turn 
increases use of normative contracts. Relational norms 
help parties acquire vertical control when specific 
assets are at risk. Credible commitments positively 
influence the formation of relational norms. These 
norms support a long-term orientation towards the 
relationship. 
 Even when a high state of relational exchange has been 
achieved between exchange partners, implying high levels of 
trust and relational norms, the two conditions that can breach 
the relational governance suggested by SET are: 1) 
occasional differences between the exchange partners; and 
2) the negative effects of long-term relationships on the 
trustworthiness of exchange partners. 
 SET is limited in its ability to explain the development of 
relat ional BTB exchange governance i n short-term 
relational exchange, or in exchange relationships that 
must produce results quickly. 
 Relational exchange competence contributes to the 
development of relational exchange governance norms in 
four ways. Organisations that posses it would be: 1) 
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better able to work with their exchange partner, which 
would result in enhanced economic and social outcomes; 
2) more likely to transform, or compromise, on 
economic outcomes, (3) more likely to choose partners 
that will abide by relational norms, and (4) able to better 
understand the value of relational norms in exchange.  
17 Abstract 
Social exchange theory (SET) has been used extensively by 
marketing scholars to explain business-to-business relational ex-
change. Despite its popularity as a theoretical explanatory 
mechanism, there is no recent literature review that delineates 
SET’s foundational premises, how it has been used in the 
marketing literature, and its theoretical limitations. This article 
provides such a review and is intended to assist researchers who 
wish to use SET to examine business-to-business relational 
exchange 
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; business to business commerce; theory; 
relationship marketing.  
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); relational exchange competence 
22 Configuration Elements IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 75 
 
01 Author of the article Lambert, Douglas M. // Cooper, Martha, C. 
02 Title of the article Issues in Supply Chain Management 
03 Document name Lambert and Cooper, 2000 
04 Journal title Industrial Marketing Management 
05 Date of publication 2000 
06 Volume 29 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 65-83 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Multinational companies based in USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF) – a group of 15 non-
competing organisations 
12 Sample size 90 managers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Indepth face-to-face interviews 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis (Case study) 
15 Study Characteristics 
Based on case study methodology, the exploratory empirical 
findings are intended to develop a normative model to guide 
future research. Executives can use the model to capture the 
potential of successful supply chain management. 
16 Key findings 
 Managing the supply chain involves three closely 
interrelated elements: 1) the supply chain network structure; 
2) the supply chain business processes; and 3) the 
management components. 
 The structure of activities/ processes within and between 
companies is vital for creating superior competitiveness and 
profitability 
 A prerequisite for successful SCM is to coordinate activities 
within the organisation. One way to do this is to identify the 
key business processes and manage those using cross-
functional teams. 
 It is important to distinguish between primary and supporting 
supply chain members, and to identify the horizontal structure, 
vertical structure, and horizontal position of the focal 
company in the supply chain network. 
 Integrating and managing all business process links 
throughout the entire supply chain is likely not appropriate. 
Since the drivers for integration are situational and different 
from process link to process link, the levels of integration 
should vary from link to link, and over time. 
 There are four fundamentally different types of business 
process links: 1) managed business process links; 2) 
monitored business process links; 3) not-managed business 
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process links; and 4) non-member business process links. 
 The demand management process must balance the 
customer’s requirements with the organisation’s supply 
capabilities. A good demand management system uses 
point-of-sale and “key” customer data to reduce uncertainty 
and provide efficient flows throughout the supply chain. 
 Customers and suppliers must be integrated into the product 
development process in order to reduce time to market. As 
product life cycles shorten, the right products must be 
developed and successfully launched in ever shorter 
timeframes in order to remain competitive.  
 Managers of the product development and commercialization 
process must: a) coordinate with customer relationship 
management to identify customer’s articulated and 
unarticulated needs; b) select materials and suppliers in 
conjunction with procurement; and c) develop production 
technology in manufacturing flow to manufacture and 
integrate into the best supply chain flow for the product/market 
combination. 
17 Abstract 
Successful supply chain management requires cross-functional 
integration and marketing must play a critical role. The 
challenge is to determine how to successfully accomplish this in-
tegration. We present a framework for supply chain 
management as well as questions for how it might be 
implemented and questions for future research. Case studies 
conducted at several companies and involving multiple members 
of supply chains are used to illustrate the concepts described. 
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; supply chains; marketing management; 
integrated approach; models; logistics; inventory management; 
management science.  
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chain; embedded IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross section approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 76 
 
01 Author of the article 
Lambert, Douglas, M. // Emmelhainz, Margret A. // Gardner, 
John T. 
02 Title of the article Building successful supply chain partnerships 
03 Document name Lambert et al., 1999 
04 Journal title Journal of Business Logistics 
05 Date of publication 1999 
06 Volume 20 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 165-181 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual Model) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study puts forward a conceptual framework to accurately 
calibrate inter-organisational partnerships in order to: a) avoid 
failures; b) minimize costs; and c) improve the service level. 
16 Key findings 
 Between the extremes of an arm's-length relationship and a 
joint venture, there are three levels of partnering or 
integration: 
 Type I: The organisations involved recognize each other as 
partners and, on a limited basis, coordinate activities and 
planning. The partnership usually has a short-term focus and 
involves only one division or functional area within each 
organisation.  
 Type II: The organisations involved progress beyond 
coordination of activities to integration of activities. Although 
not expected to last "forever," the partnership has a long term 
horizon. Multiple divisions and functions within the 
organisation are involved in the partnership. 
 Type III: The organisations share a significant level of 
integration. Each party views the other as an extension of their 
own organisation. Typically no "end date" for the partnership 
exists. 
 The probability of poor execution is greatly diminished 
because the partners jointly agree upon how each component 
is to be implemented, the priority of the components, and the 
resources needed to put the components into place at the 
agreed level. 
 The strongest partnerships appear to be those in which the 
contract either is not a written contract at all or exists for 
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strictly "legal" purposes and is not used as a guideline for day-
today operations. 
 A re-evaluation of the relationship also should occur when 
major environmental changes take place or when either 
organisation experiences a change in its drivers. 
17 Abstract 
A model is presented of a systematic process for building and 
maintaining successful logistics partnerships to improve service 
and reduce costs through outsourcing. The model specifically 
addresses potential causes of failure and helps minimize the 
probability of a partnership not meeting the objectives of the 
parties. 
18 Key words 
Models; logistics; vendor supplier relations; partnering; 
organisational studies. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); unwritten contracts 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Partnerships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (vendor-supplier) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 77 
 
01 Author of the article Lee, Hau L. 
02 Title of the article The Triple-A Supply Chain 
03 Document name Lee, 2004 
04 Journal title Harvard Business Review 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 82 (October) 
07 Number 10 
08 Page numbers 102-112 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Worldwide organisations operating in USA, Europe, Asia 
11 Context/Industry  Electronics; Food and Drink; Retail  
12 Sample size Not provided 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Not provided 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Not Provided 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study demonstrates that the best supply chains are not 
just fast and cost-effective. They are also agile and adaptable, 
and they ensure that all their companies' interests stay aligned. 
16 Key findings 
 Top-performing supply chains possess three very different 
qualities. First, great supply chains are agile. They react speedily 
to sudden changes in demand or supply. Second, they adapt over 
time as market structures and strategies evolve. Third, they align 
the interests of all the organisations in the supply network so 
that companies optimize the chain's performance when they 
maximize their interests.  
 In order to respond to short-term changes in demand or supply quickly 
and to handle external disruptions smoothly, the following steps are 
required: a) promote flow of information with suppliers and customers; 
b) develop collaborative relationships with suppliers; c) design for 
postponement; c) build inventory buffers by maintaining a stockpile 
of inexpensive but key components; d) have a dependable logistics 
system or partner; and e) draw up contingency plans and develop crisis 
management teams. 
 In order to adjust supply chain's design to meet structural shifts in 
markets and to modify supply network to strategies, products, and 
technologies, the following steps are required: a) monitor economies all 
over the world to spot new supply bases and markets; b) use 
intermediaries to develop fresh suppliers and logistics infrastructure; c) 
evaluate needs of ultimate consumers—not just immediate customers; d) 
create flexible product designs; and e) determine where companies' 
products stand in terms of technology cycles and product life cycles. 
 In order to create incentives for better performance, the 
following steps are required: a) exchange information and 
knowledge freely with vendors and customers; b) lay down roles, tasks, 
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and responsibilities clearly for suppliers and customers; and c) 
equitably share risks, costs, and gains of improvement initiatives.  
17 Abstract 
Building a strong supply chain is essential for business success. 
But when it comes to improving their supply chains, few 
companies take the right approach. Many businesses work to 
make their chains faster or more cost-effective, assuming that 
those steps are the keys to competitive advantage. To the 
contrary: Supply chains that focus on speed and costs tend to 
deteriorate over time. Only companies that build supply chains 
that are agile, adaptable, and aligned get ahead of their rivals. All 
3 components are essential; without any one of them, supply 
chains break down. Great companies create supply chains that 
respond to abrupt changes in markets. Great companies also 
adapt their supply networks when markets or strategies change. 
Finally, great companies align the interests of the partners in their 
supply chains with their own. 
18 Key words 
Supply chains; strategic planning; innovations; inventory 
management. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit); goal alignment 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply chains 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Networks 
25 Unit of data collection Not provided 
26 Research perspective Not provided 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
1.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 78 
 
01 Author of the article Li, Mi// Choi, Thomas Y. 
02 Title of the article 
Triads in service outsourcing: Bridge, Bridge Decay and Bridge 
Transfer 
03 Document name Li and Choi, 2009 
04 Journal title Journal of Supply Chain Management 
05 Date of publication 2009 
06 Volume 45 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 66-86 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
By extending the social network theory into the services 
outsourcing context, this paper reveals the shifting relationship 
structures within the triad of services supply network at 
different stages of the services outsourcing. 
16 Key findings 
 Relationship between buyer, supplier and customer in triad 
differs between manufacturing and services.  Supplier and 
customer establish relationships in services and buyer losses 
control of relationship in an outsourcing arrangement. 
 The structural position within a network is what 
determines the dynamics among actors because social 
actors in some positions in the networks are better off than 
those in other positions. 
 Prior to services outsourcing, the services buyer acts as a 
bridge between the services supplier and the buyer’s 
customer and therefore enjoys information and control 
benefits associated with the bridge position. 
 Services outsourcing causes the buyer to lose its bridge 
position, leading to the erosion of the information and 
control benefits it used to enjoy. 
 How the new relationship is formed between the services 
supplier and the buyer’s customer depends largely on the 
type of relationship the buyer has established with the 
supplier prior to bridge decay. 
 A collaborative relationship between the services buyer and 
services supplier tends to foster a collaborative relationship 
between the services supplier and the buyer’s customer. 
 An adversarial relationship between the services buyer and 
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services supplier tends to foster an adversarial relationship 
between the services supplier and the buyer’s customer. 
 In services outsourcing, the triad structure of bridge decay 
would evolve into the triad structure of bridge transfer, 
where the leverage position would be assumed by the 
supplier. 
 Once the bridge transfer is complete, a collaborative 
relationship between the buyer and its supplier would 
mitigate the potential opportunistic behaviour by the 
supplier, while an adversarial relationship would increase 
it. In a steady state, bridge decay is a much more 
strategically desirable outcome for the buyer compared to 
the bridge transfer. 
17 Abstract 
Typically, a triad of actors is involved in any outsourcing 
situation: the buyer, the supplier and the buyer’s customer. 
In manufacturing, the buyer acts as a bridge between its 
supplier and its customer and maintains this bridge 
position before, during and after the outsourcing. However, 
in services, the relationship structures among the three actors 
change before, during and after the outsourcing. Before 
outsourcing (i.e., during the contract negotiation stage), the 
buyer is the “bridge” between its supplier and its customer. 
During implementation, this bridge position begins to 
“decay” as its supplier comes in direct contact with the 
buyer’s customer. Post-implementation, the bridge position is 
intended to be “transferred” to the supplier. However, if left 
unmanaged, this state of transferred bridge position has 
serious performance implications for the buyer. The supplier 
is now the bridge and thus enjoys the leverage inherent in 
being a bridge. This point has been missed in many 
services outsourcing ventures by major multinational 
corporations. To mitigate this effect, we propose that the buyer 
should continue to actively interact with its customer and 
closely monitor the supplier in order to prevent the supplier 
from solidifying its bridge position. 
18 Key words 
Outsourcing; procurement/purchasing processes; risk/risk assessment; 
supplier management; supply chain management; conceptual 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply networks; triads; bridge; bridge decay; structural hole 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network (triad) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 79 
 
01 Author of the article Li, Julie J. // Poppo, Laura // Zhou, Kevin Z. 
02 Title of the article 
Relational mechanisms, formal contracts, and local knowledge 
acquisition by international subsidiaries 
03 Document name Li et al., 2010 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 31 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 349-370 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location China 
11 Context/Industry  
A sampling frame of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries identified 
from the 22,000 Businesses in P.R.C., maintained by the China 
International Business Investigation Co. 
12 Sample size 168 foreign subsidiaries 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and 
regression analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
Informed by survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries 
operating in China, this study examines research focuses on 
relational and contractual mechanisms and examines their 
impact on foreign subsidiaries’ acquisition of tacit and explicit 
knowledge from local suppliers  
16 Key findings 
 Link duration has a positive effect on explicit knowledge 
acquisition. The longer the exchange history, the greater the 
level of explicit knowledge a subsidiary acquires from its 
major local supplier. Asset specificity also has a positive 
effect on the acquisition of explicit knowledge. When the 
supplier invests in specialized assets, it becomes more willing 
to share easy-to-transfer knowledge.  
 Cultural distance impedes tacit knowledge acquisition, 
presumably because distance increases the difficulty of 
effectively communicating and understanding subtleties in 
language and customs. 
 Role of formal contracts in knowledge acquisition and 
sharing is minimal because the most valuable information 
that an organisation can obtain is likely to be tacit. 
 Transferring tacit knowledge across organisational boundaries 
is generally difficult because of its sticky and hard-to-codify 
nature, close and intense interactions between exchange 
partners constitute an effective mechanism to transfer such 
knowledge. 
 For exchanges characterized by inter-organisational trust, the 
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adjoining behavioural processes are more similar to those 
that support the transfer of tacit knowledge than those that 
enable explicit knowledge transfer. 
 By clarifying task and performance expectations, incorporating 
information provisions and requirements, and instituting 
penalties for noncompliance, contracts mitigate uncertainty 
and risks associated with opportunistic behaviour. Thus, 
contracts enhance control and reduce the agency problem 
inherent in market exchanges. 
 Formal contracts contain routines that support complex forms 
of interaction and communication by triggering a set of 
sequenced actions and activities.  
17 Abstract 
This research focuses on relational and contractual mechanisms 
and examines their impact on foreign subsidiaries’ acquisition 
of tacit and explicit knowledge from local suppliers. Using 
survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries operating in China, 
this study finds broad support for the proposed analytical 
framework. When the foreign subsidiary and supplier share 
common goals, the foreign subsidiary acquires greater levels 
of both explicit and tacit knowledge; trust between the two 
parties promotes the acquisition of greater levels of tacit than 
explicit knowledge. However, access to the local supplier 
network through the focal supplier enables the foreign 
subsidiary to acquire greater levels of explicit but not tacit 
knowledge. Formal contracts play a complementary role in 
knowledge acquisition: contracts enhance the acquisition of 
explicit knowledge and further strengthen the effects of 
relational mechanisms on tacit and explicit knowledge 
acquisition. Overall, these findings provide important 
implications for foreign subsidiaries regarding how to acquire 
local knowledge in host countries through both formal and 
informal mechanisms. 
18 Key words 
Trust; ties; shared goals; knowledge; contracts; international 
subsidiaries; China 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); formal contracts; 
trust 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; supply chains; ties; multi-tier suppliers 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Networks 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 80 
 
01 Author of the article Liker, Jeffrey K. // Choi, Thomas Y. 
02 Title of the article Building Deep supplier relationships 
03 Document name Liker and Choi, 2004 
04 Journal title Harvard Business Review 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 82 
07 Number 12 
08 Page numbers 104-113 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location USA and Japan 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive industry 
12 Sample size 2  
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi structured interviews 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study demonstrates the effectiveness of building long term 
business relationships with vendors by comparing 2 Japanese 
automakers with their 3 USA based competitors. 
16 Key findings 
 Conduct joint improvement activities including: a) Exchange 
best practices with suppliers; b) Initiate kaizen projects at 
suppliers' facilities; and c) Set up supplier study groups. 
 Share information intensively but selectively comprising: a) 
Set specific times, places, and agendas for meetings; b) Use 
rigid formats for sharing information; c) Insist on accurate 
data collection; and d) Share information in a structured 
fashion. 
 Develop suppliers' technical capabilities by taking the 
following steps: a) build suppliers' problem-solving skills; b) 
develop a common lexicon; and c) hone core suppliers' 
innovation capabilities. 
 Supervise your suppliers by undertaking the following steps: 
a) Send monthly report cards to core suppliers; b) Provide 
immediate and constant feedback; and c) Get senior managers 
involved in solving problems. 
 Turn supplier rivalry into opportunity by: a) Sourcing each 
component from two or three vendors; b) Creating compatible 
production philosophies and systems; and c) Setting up joint 
ventures with existing suppliers to transfer knowledge and 
maintain control. 
 Understand how your suppliers work by: a) Learning about 
suppliers' businesses; b) Go see how suppliers work; c) 
Respect suppliers' capabilities; and d) Commit to co-
prosperity. 
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17 Abstract 
More and more businesses are counting on their suppliers to 
lower costs, improve quality, and develop innovations faster than 
their competitors' suppliers can. To this end, many experts agree 
that American organisations, like their Japanese rivals, should 
build supplier keiretsu: networks of vendors that learn, improve, 
and prosper in sync with their parent companies. As history has 
shown, however, that's easier said than done. Some US 
corporations created supply chains that superficially resembled 
those of their Japanese competitors, but they did not alter the 
nature of their relationships with suppliers. As a result, relations 
between US manufacturers and their suppliers have sunk to the 
lowest levels in decades. But reports of keiretsu's demise are 
overblown. The Japanese supplier-partnering model, which is 
used by Toyota and Honda, is alive and well - in North America 
as well as Japan.  
18 Key words 
Vendor supplier relations; Supply chains; Strategic management; 
Automobile industry 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain  Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; joint ventures 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Origination influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation  
26 Research perspective Longitudinal study 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 81 
 
01 Author of the article 
Lin, Hsin-Mei // Huang, Heng-Chiang // Lin, Chich-Pin // Hsu, 
Wen-Chung 
02 Title of the article 
How to manage strategic alliances in OEM-based industrial 
clusters: Network embeddedness and formal governance 
mechanisms 
03 Document name Lin et al., 2011 
04 Journal title Industrial Marketing Management 
05 Date of publication 2011 
06 Volume 41 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 2011 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location Asia (Taiwan and China) 
11 Context/Industry  Semi conductor industries 
12 Sample size 141 
13 Data collection method Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 Method of data analysis Statistical analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
Responding to the call of multi-actor and multiplicity network 
settings for a better understanding of the environmental 
determinants of inter-organisational activities, this study 
synthesizes and empirically test the mixed roles of network 
embeddedness—including substitutive, complementary, and 
moderating roles—toward formal governance mechanisms. 
16 Key findings 
 The complementary role of network embeddedness in 
influencing inter-organisational governance is a significant 
finding. 
 Embeddedness values differ significantly depending on 
organisations' positions in the industrial value chain as 
well as the Guanxi (social capital in Chinese). 
 Strategic concerns of every organisation involving 
transaction costs are different when the transaction values 
and Guanxi of a cluster are taken into consideration. Thus, 
beyond the transaction cost, the transaction value and 
cultural context need to be fully considered when defining 
transaction characteristics. 
 An inter-organisational alliance needs to be less involved in a 
formalized inter-organisational structure and more 
involved in selecting partners through close personal 
relationships (a kind of Guanxi) among CEOs or a shared 
technology status among organisations. 
 The rigid social hierarchy grounded by the “rules” of Guanxi 
necessitates a form of trust based on position and prior 
personal relationships. Thus, partner selection is improved as 
a result of closer personal and technological connections, 
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even when the instrument function in a formal governance 
mechanism is weak. 
 Network embeddedness is complementary to formal 
governance mechanisms. The relationship between transaction 
hazards and inter-organisational formal governance mechanisms 
can be stronger or weaker depending upon the network 
conditions in which organisations are embedded. 
 IORs allow partners flexibility in alleviating the costly formal 
governance mechanisms caused by the characteristics of 
asset specificity. 
17 Abstract 
The rapidly growing original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM)-based industrial clusters have been a prominent form 
of economic organisation in several emerging Asian markets. 
Characterized by close interdependence and intertwined personal 
linkages, organisations of Asian OEM-based industrial clusters 
participate in the phenomenon of strategic alliances. However, 
how these alliances can be effectively managed through formal 
governance mechanisms within embedded networks requires 
further investigation. This study uses social network analysis to 
identify personal, ownership, and technology networks in 141 
semiconductor organisations in an OEM-based industrial cluster 
in Taiwan that feature different types of OEM-led alliances and 
the prevalence of Guanxi. We find that relational 
embeddedness based on personal ties and structural 
embeddedness based on ownership ties support the 
employment of formal governance mechanisms. We also pay 
particular attention to the moderating role of network 
embeddedness in diminishing the relationship between 
transaction hazards and formal governance mechanisms. By 
identifying the embeddedness context in the governance of 
alliances, our research contributes to a better understanding of the 
ways in which formal governance mechanisms are contingent on 
the network embeddedness of OEM-based industrial clusters in 
Taiwan and other similar Asian economies. 
18 Key words 
Network embeddedness; strategic alliances; transaction hazards; 
governance; clusters. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); social capital; 
Guanxi 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; clusters; relational embeddedness; structural 
embeddedness; ties 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 82 
 
01 Author of the article Lockett, Helen // Johnson, Mark // Evans Steven // Bastl, Marko  
02 Title of the article 
Product Service Systems and supply network 
relationships: An exploratory case study 
03 Document name Lockett et al., 2010 
04 Journal title Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 293-313 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location UK 
11 Context/Industry  Complex-engineered products  
12 Sample size 22 interviews conducted with 16 informants. 
13 Data collection method Semi-structured interviews 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study adopts a case-based research approach to present a detailed 
investigation into the delivery of a PSS by a large manufacturer and 
two of its suppliers. It focuses on the determining how and why the 
case companies had begun to deliver servitized offerings and the 
challenges that they were facing within their supply chain 
relationships. 
16 Key findings 
 Proposed benefits of PSS are not necessarily achieved by the 
extended supply network. A PSS business model can have a 
negative effect on companies in the supply chain if the suppliers are 
not well integrated into the PSS delivery. 
 Customer/supplier relationships in supply chains delivering PSS 
may become extremely complicated, with companies playing 
multiple roles in the supply network. 
 The alignment of incentives between a PSS provider and its 
suppliers is important for a successful PSS but can be difficult to 
achieve due to the differing objectives of each company. 
 The transfer of risk in PSS delivery makes incentive 
alignment more difficult to achieve than in a traditional supply 
chain. 
 It is not sufficient for the PSS provider to develop a formal 
relationship with a supplier for the delivery of PSS; they also 
needed to align the profit incentive between them to achieve a 
successful partnership. 
 Effective information sharing across the PSS supply network is 
essential for a profitable and sustainable PSS, but this can be 
very difficult to achieve in practice, particularly if the PSS 
provider is concerned about knowledge leakage into the supply 
chain. 
17 Abstract Purpose – In recent years there has been increasing interest in 
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Product Service Systems (PSSs) as a business model for selling 
integrated product and service offerings. To date, there has been 
extensive research into the benefits of PSS to manufacturers and 
their customers, but there has been limited research into the effect 
of PSS on the upstream supply chain. This paper seeks to address 
this gap in the research. 
Design/methodology/approach – The research uses case-based 
research which is appropriate for exploratory research of this 
type. In-depth interviews were conducted with key personnel in a 
focal organisation and two members of its supply chain, and the 
results were analyzed to identify emergent themes. 
Findings – The research has identified differences in supplier 
behaviour dependent on their role in PSS delivery and their 
relationship with the PSS provider. For a successful partnership it 
is important to align the objectives between PSS provider and 
suppliers. 
Originality/value – This research provides a detailed investigation 
into a PSS supply chain and highlights the complexity of roles and 
relationships among the organisations within it. It is of value to 
other PSS researchers and organisations transitioning to delivery 
of PSS. 
18 Key words Product management; supply; supplier relations; product life cycle. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit); information exchange; incentives 
22 Configuration Elements Supply network 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Networks 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 83 
 
01 Author of the article Lorenzoni, Gianni // Lipparini, Andrea 
02 Title of the article 
The leveraging of IORs as a distinctive organisational 
capability 
03 Document name Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1999 
06 Volume 20 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 317-338 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Italy 
11 Context/Industry  Packaging machinery industry (SIC 3565). 
12 Sample size 
3 manufacturers producing machines for pharmaceutical, food 
and paper industry    
13 Data collection method 
Secondary data using data basis, personal contacts and 
institutional sources – longitudinal study. 
14 Method of data analysis Product analysis; structural change analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
Based on three lead organisation-networks, this paper takes 
into account the evolution of the network structures as well as 
the evolution of the capabilities required to manage a 
progressive intensification of inter-organisational ties.  
16 Key findings 
 Large-scale reliance on collaborative activity has the 
potential to reshape the nature of competition, and an 
organisation's network portfolio becomes a key 
organisational attribute. 
 Organisations have learned how to gain access to, and 
transfer knowledge across, alliances and locate themselves 
in network positions which enable them to keep pace with 
technological developments within the industry. 
 Within a learning network, the internal knowledge should 
help the lead organisation to appreciate, select, and 
mobilize external capabilities. 
 Lead organisations should develop the ability to interact 
with others to better manage their internal competencies 
refinements. 
 Lead organisations are making serious efforts to create an 
interacting platform with selected partners in which 
knowledge and information are generated and transferred. 
This may foster the learning process in the network, while 
making it difficult for unconnected competitors to pursue 
imitative practices, especially when IORs become 
idiosyncratic. 
 The quality of the partners and their distinctive 
competencies provide greater flexibility in the innovative 
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process when compared with vertically integrated 
organisations. 
 Lead organisations potentially can lower the overall 
coordination and production costs of a network through 
multiple, repeated, trust-based relationships with key 
suppliers. 
 Multiple, repeated trust-based relationships with key 
suppliers favour lead organisation's access to 
complementary capabilities and specialized knowledge 
with positive effects on networks as a whole. 
17 Abstract 
In this paper we present a study of the structure of three lead 
organisation-network relationships at two points in time. Using 
data on companies in the packaging machine industry, we 
study the process of vertical disintegration and focus on the 
ability to coordinate competencies and combine knowledge 
across corporate boundaries. We argue that the capability to 
interact with other companies-which we call relational 
capability-accelerates the lead organisation's knowledge access 
and transfer with relevant effects on company growth and 
innovativeness. This study provides evidence that inter-
organisational networks can be shaped and deliberately 
designed: over time managers develop a specialized supplier 
network and build a narrower and more competitive set of core 
competencies. The ability to integrate knowledge residing both 
inside and outside the organisation's boundaries emerges as a 
distinctive organisational capability. Our main goal is to 
contribute to the current discussion of cooperative ties and 
dynamic aspects of inter-organisational networks, adding new 
dimensions to resource-based and knowledge-based 
interpretations of company performance. 
18 Key words 
Trust; vertical disintegration; competency; knowledge; 
resources; network; organisational studies; cooperative ties. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust; knowledge sharing; 
interdependence 
22 Configuration Elements Networks;  vertical disintegration 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation  
26 Research perspective Longitudinal Study 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 84 
 
01 Author of the article Lusch, Robert F. // Brown, James R. 
02 Title of the article 
Interdependency, contracting, and relational behaviour in 
marketing channels 
03 Document name Lusch and Brown, 1996 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1996 
06 Volume 60 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 19-38 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Small size wholesale organisations with 10-20 employees 
12 Sample size 454 organisations  
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; structure equation model; factor analysis; 
multiple regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
The central theme of this article is that the performance of 
marketing activities by marketing channel members can be 
coordinated by two key types of contracts-normative and explicit 
contracts. This study highlights the importance of bi-directional 
dependence  
16 Key findings 
 An increased level of interdependence between a supplier and 
its wholesale-distributor reflects an increased level of 
commitment to the relationship by both parties. 
 To make the relationship work and endure and to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour, organisations develop 
understandings, both explicit and implicit, regarding 
obligations, rules, outcomes, contributions, and sanctions 
germane to their relationship. 
 Bilateral dependence, therefore, lessens opportunistic 
behaviour, thus minimizing the need for a highly explicit 
contract to safeguard transaction-specific assets against 
opportunism. 
 High bilateral dependency between a wholesale-distributor 
and its major supplier leads to more reliance on normative 
contracts. Significantly, these normative contracts lead to 
improved wholesaler performance. This suggests that 
wholesale-distributors and suppliers form relationships in 
which they both have a high need for each other. 
 When a wholesaler is dependent on its major supplier, the 
wholesaler develops a long-term orientation. This long term 
orientation leads to more contracting, both explicit and 
normative, and more normative contracting leads to higher 
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wholesaler performance. 
 Wholesalers can work effectively with more powerful 
suppliers if they develop normative contracts, as well as 
explicit contracts.  
 When a supplier is dependent on a wholesaler, more explicit 
contracts are present and the wholesaler has a higher 
performance level. 
 Long-term orientation leads to more explicit and normative 
contracting, as well as to more relational behaviour. 
 As relationships endure, there is no automatic rise in long-
term orientation, explicit and/or normative contracting, and 
relational behaviour. This suggests that attitude and 
perspective toward the long term is much more important than 
merely long-standing relationships 
17 Abstract 
The dependency structure between wholesale-distributors and 
their major suppliers is posited to influence the type of contract - 
explicit and normative - used. In turn, dependency structure and 
type of contract is hypothesized to influence wholesale-
distributor performance. This process occurs both directly and 
indirectly through some intermediate constructs, such as long-
term orientation, relationship length, and relational behaviour. A 
study investigates 3 dependency structures: wholesaler dependent 
on supplier, supplier dependent on wholesaler, and high bilateral 
dependency. Empirical support for many of the hypothesized 
linkages is obtained.  
18 Key words 
Relational behaviour; vendor supplier relations; contracts; market 
research  
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; 
interdependence (bi-lateral) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationship (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (vendor-supplier) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 85 
 
01 Author of the article Madhavan, Ravindranath//Gnyawali, Devi R.//He Jinyu 
02 Title of the article 
Two’s a company, three’s a crowd? Triads in cooperative 
competitive networks 
03 Document name Madhavan, et al., 2004  
04 Journal title Academy of Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 47 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 918-927 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mathematical) 
10 Geographical Location Global study 
11 Context/Industry  Steel industry 
12 Sample size 
Data on a competitor network consisting of 45 global steel 
producers that had entered into 72 strategic alliances during the 
period 1979–94. The sample organisations had a total of 
48 transitive triads. In the regional partitioning, 24 
transitive triads were within-block and 24 were across-
block. In the technology partitioning, 38 transitive triads 
were within-block, whereas 10 were across-block. 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Data were collected using Dow Jones Interactive. A 
dichotomous 45 X 45 matrix was created capturing 
strategic alliance ties among the 45 organisations reflecting the 
presence or absence of an alliance in each potential dyad.  
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Triadic analysis was conducted using network model p*to 
understand patterns of tie formation and what factors explain 
their occurrence. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study attempts to develop an understanding why certain 
patterns of tie formation occur and, in particular, to 
understand what the likelihood of observing transitive triads 
is and what factors explain their occurrence. 
16 Key findings 
 In case of geographical proximity, organisations enter triads 
because no subset of two partners possesses all the necessary 
resources to achieve an advantage. This is indicative of the 
cooperative aspect of the alliance behaviour where a transitive 
triadic structure is formed with an aim to create value for all 
three partners. 
 In case of technological proximity, organisations enter into 
specific ties to block value appropriation by a partner which is 
indicative of a value-limiting move aimed at nullifying extra 
value appropriated by a partner. 
 Although transitivity in geographic blocks maybe driven 
primarily by clustering, and transitivity in technology blocks 
maybe driven primarily by countering, both workers maybe at 
work simultaneously. 
 In a competitor network, rivals strive to maximize their own 
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value creation and appropriation while minimizing their own 
value accruing to others, accentuating countering move 
thereby making their triad transitive. 
17 Abstract 
Triadic structure is an important, but neglected, aspect of inter-
organisational networks. We developed the constructs 
clustering and countering as potential drivers of triadic 
structure and combined them with the recently developed p* 
network model to demonstrate the value and feasibility of triadic 
analysis. Exploratory analysis of data from the global steel 
industry revealed organisations’ tendency to form transitive 
triads, in which three organisations all have direct ties with each 
other, especially within blocks defined by geography or 
technology. 
18 Key words 
Transitive triads; inter-organisational networks; cooperation; 
competition. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Balance Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network (triad); ties 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Origination influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Network (triad) 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 86 
 
01 Author of the article Markovsky, Barry // Willer, David // Patton, Travis 
02 Title of the article Power relations in exchange networks 
03 Document name Markovsky et al., 1988 
04 Journal title American Sociologic Review 
05 Date of publication 1988 
06 Volume 53 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 220-236 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Mathematical) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study proposes and test network exchange theory using 
Graph-theoretic Power Index that predicts relative power for 
network positions.  
This study also addresses the structural phenomena of: a) the 
breakdown of larger networks into smaller parts; and b) the 
emergence of positions that simultaneously have one level of 
power in one part of the network and a different level in another.  
16 Key findings 
 Power and resource distributions are affected not only by 
network shapes but also by the conditions under which the 
exchanges transpire.  
 Four conditions de-limit actor’s behaviour: 1) all actors use 
identical strategies in negotiating exchanges; 2) actors 
consistently excluded from exchanges raise their offers; 3) 
actors consistently excluded from exchanges lower their 
offers; 4) actors accept the best offer they receive; and 5) 
actors choose randomly in deciding among the tied best 
offers. 
 Power is an unobservable, structurally determined potential 
for obtaining relatively favourable resource levels. Power use 
serves as an indicator of power. 
17 Abstract 
Many theories address the problem of how social structure affects 
the experiences and behaviours of its members. This paper offers 
a network-exchange theory to solve this problem. Previous 
research has shown that the nature and outcomes of negotiations 
among individuals or corporate actors can be inferred from their 
network positions. The impact of this research has been limited 
because its theory does not enable researchers to locate power 
positions in the networks. We offer a theory that is both 
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consistent with all the previously reported experimental research 
and is generalized to conditions not considered by other 
formulations. In addition to supporting derived hypotheses  
18 Key words 
Power; network; exchange theory, mathematical model, Graph 
theoretic power index. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); power; resource distribution 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks;  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network  
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 87 
 
01 Author of the article 
Martinez, Veronica // Bastl, Marko // Kingston, Jennifer // Evan, 
Stephan 
02 Title of the article 
Challenges in transforming manufacturing organisations into 
product-service providers. 
03 Document name Martinez et al., 2009 
04 Journal title Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 21 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 449 – 469 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location UK 
11 Context/Industry  
An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that designs and 
manufactures high-value capital equipment for the power, aerospace 
and defence sector. 
12 Sample size 22 senior managers  
13 Data collection method Semi-structured interviews 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study highlights that an organisation’s journey towards higher 
levels of servitization (e.g. relationship-based transactions, asset 
utilization, total service integration offering and high levels of 
production customization), is inhibited by a variety of internal and 
external challenges. These internal and external challenges are 
embedded into the five categories, i.e. embedded product-service 
culture, delivery of integrated offering, internal processes and 
capabilities, strategic alignment and supplier relationships. 
16 Key findings 
 Integrated activity occurs during design, negotiation, planning, 
manufacture, service delivery, process design and other 
processes. Servitizing organisations are increasing their 
involvement in such activities and improving their integration 
as a result. Further integration requires improvement to the 
five pillars of embedded product-service culture, delivery of 
integrated offering, internal processes and capabilities, strategic 
alignment, and supplier relationships. 
 Low levels of servitization are by minimal adoption of the 
criteria within the five pillars; deeper levels of servitization 
require a much broader interaction between supplier and 
customer, hence the challenges faced are more severe and 
must be more strongly supported.  
 Embedded manufacturing culture, which has strong 
technological, product, and engineering orientation, 
inhibits the transformation towards becoming a servitized 
organisation. 
 When an organisation transforms a product-focused 
background to an integrated offering, there is a tendency to 
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focus more on the product part of the offering than the 
service aspects. 
 Integrated offering requires not only an effective delivery but also a 
timely one, and this has to be enabled by a cohesive delivery 
system within the organisation. 
 Measures for measuring inputs and outputs of integrated 
offerings will likely require more subjective approaches in order 
to capture heterogeneity of customer expectations. 
17 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present challenges experienced 
by UK manufacturing companies undergoing a servitization 
journey to becoming product-service providers. The paper uses an 
exploratory single-case study approach based on semi-structured 
interviews, and archival data. A total of 22 senior managers were 
interviewed from the product-service provider and its two suppliers, 
resulting in more than 400 pages of interview data. Data were 
analyzed through an inductive research analysis by an emergent 
identification of patterns. This research identifies critical and 
frequent challenges experienced by UK manufacturing companies 
undergoing a servitization journey to becoming product-service system 
(PSS) providers. They are condensed into five pillars, which constitute 
the architecture of challenges in servitization. The architecture of 
challenges in servitization provides a full description of the strategy 
and operations of PSSs. This is qualitative research based on a 
single case study. Given the nature of research design, the 
identified patterns cannot be used as a predictive tool. This 
research provides a framework to understand, analyze and plan 
the strategic transformations to more highly servitized 
organisational forms. This paper contributes to knowledge with a 
new model called “the architecture of challenges in servitization”. 
This is the only model that explains the importance of the strategic, 
operational and social tests that organisations confront when 
adopting servitization strategies. If companies understand these 
challenges, they have the potential to create unique sets of values for 
a variety of stakeholders. 
18 Key words 
Change management; product management; strategic change; 
manufacturing industries; united kingdom; organisational 
change. 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); integration;  
22 Configuration Elements Network; triad 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation  influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 88 
 
01 Author of the article Mohr, Jakki // Spekman, Robert 
02 Title of the article 
Characteristics of partnership success: Partnership attributes, 
communication behaviour, and conflict resolution techniques 
03 Document name Mohr and Spekman, 1994 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal  
05 Date of publication 1994 
06 Volume 15 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 135-152 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Personal computer industry. 
12 Sample size 140 owner/managers/decision makers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; multiple regression analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study focuses on the vertical relationships between 
manufacturers and dealers. The unit of analysis in this study was 
the relationship between a computer dealer and one of its 
suppliers (i.e. manufacturers). 
16 Key findings 
 The following variables were found to be significant in 
predicting the success of the partnership (either satisfaction or 
sales): coordination, commitment, trust, communication 
quality, information sharing, participation, joint problem 
solving, and avoiding the use of smoothing over problems or 
severe resolution tactics(both negatively related to 
satisfaction with profit). As these variables are present 
in greater amounts, the success of the partnership is likely 
to be greater. 
 Joint problem solving, whereby grievances are aired and 
the underlying issues are brought to the surface, 
fosters a win-win solution between partners. 
 Profits derived from a particular vendor might contribute 
to a dealer 's  feeling of vulnerability.  Powerful, and 
popular, manufacturers tend not to give the best 
margins.  
 Believing that the vendor will act fairly and in the best 
interest of the relationship might serve to calm the 
dealer's fear of opportunistic behaviour and might lead 
to greater perceived satisfaction with this aspect of the 
partnership. 
17 Abstract 
The formation of partnerships between organisations is becoming 
an increasingly common way for organisations to find and 
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maintain competitive advantage. While the antecedents of 
partnership formation and the characteristics of the resulting 
cooperative working relationship have been explored in the 
literature, an understanding of characteristics associated with 
partnership success is lacking. Such an understanding is 
important in reconciling the prescriptions to form partnerships 
with the reality that a majority of such partnerships do not 
succeed. We hypothesize that partnership attributes, 
communication behaviour, and conflict resolution techniques are 
related to indicators of partnership success (satisfaction and sales 
volume in the relationship). The hypotheses are tested with 
vertical partnerships between manufacturers and dealers. Results 
indicate that the primary characteristics of partnership success 
are: partnership attributes of commitment, coordination, and trust; 
communication quality and participation; and the conflict 
resolution technique of joint problem solving. The findings 
offer insight into how to better manage these relationships to 
ensure success. 
18 Key words 
Strategic planning; organisational behaviour; alliances; 
partnership attributes; communication behaviour; conflict 
resolution techniques; vertical partnerships. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); commitment; coordination; trust; 
communication quality; participation 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Alliances; vertical partnerships 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Alliance 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 89 
 
01 Author of the article Moorman, Christine // Deshpande, Rohit // Zaltman, Gerald 
02 Title of the article Factors affecting trust in market research relationships 
03 Document name Moorman et al., 1993 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1993 
06 Volume 57 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 81-101 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Market Research 
12 Sample size 779 decision makers for their respective organisation 
13 Data collection method Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; Single regression model 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study aims to combine both the sociological approach as 
well as sociological theories to examine the role of trust in 
marketing. 
16 Key findings 
 A researcher's perceived integrity is the most important 
predictor of trust, indicating that users expect researchers to 
adhere to high standards and to maintain objectivity 
throughout the research process. 
 Understanding the types of beliefs held by high integrity 
researchers about themselves, their roles, and their 
relationships with others may provide insight into whether 
low integrity is a product of opportunistic, instrumental 
thought processes or some other set of beliefs.  
 Following integrity, the researcher's perceived willingness to 
reduce research uncertainty is the next most important 
predictor of trust. 
 Trust can be negatively influenced by bureaucratic controls 
within one's own organisation and by such controls in an 
exchange partner's organisation. As a result, large 
organisations may be especially vulnerable to low levels of 
trust, because such organisations are typically highly layered. 
17 Abstract 
A comprehensive theory of trust in market research relationships 
is described. The theory builds on previous work suggesting that 
trust is critical in facilitating exchange relationships and focuses 
on the factors that determine users' trust in their researchers, 
including individual, interpersonal, organisational, 
interorganisational-interdepartmental, and project factors. The 
theory is tested in a sample of 779 users. Results indicate that the 
interpersonal factors are the most predictive of trust. Among 
these factors, perceived researcher integrity, willingness to 
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reduce research uncertainty, confidentiality, expertise, 
tactfulness, sincerity, congeniality, and timeliness are most 
strongly associated with trust. Among the remaining factors, the 
formalization of the user's organisation, the culture of the 
researcher's department or organisation, the research organisation 
or department's power, and the extent to which the research is 
customized also affect trust.  
18 Key words Trust; market research 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
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Data Extraction Form Number 90 
 
01 Author of the article Morgan, Robert M. // Hunt, Shelby D. 
02 Title of the article The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing 
03 Document name Morgan and Hunt, 1994 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 1994 
06 Volume 58 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 20-38 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Automotive industry 
12 Sample size 204 automobile tire retailers 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; multiple regression analysis; LISREL 
analysis (LISREL VII) 
15 Study Characteristics 
Theorizing that commitment and trust are key variables that 
mediate successful relationship marketing, a causal model 
containing 13 hypotheses was tested in the context of automobile 
tire relationships. 
16 Key findings 
 The presence of relationship commitment and trust is central 
to successful relationship marketing, not power and its ability 
to "condition others." Commitment and trust are "key" 
because they encourage marketers to (1) work at preserving 
relationship investments by cooperating with exchange 
partners, (2) resist attractive short-term alternatives in favour 
of the expected long-term benefits of staying with existing 
partners, and (3) view potentially high-risk actions as being 
prudent because of the belief that their partners will not act 
opportunistically. 
 The hostility and bitterness resulting from disagreements not 
being resolved amicably can lead to such pathological 
consequences as relationship dissolution. However, when 
disputes are resolved amicably, such disagreements can be 
referred to as functional conflict, because they prevent 
stagnation, stimulate interest and curiosity, and provide a 
medium through which problems can be aired and solutions 
arrived at. 
 Cooperation is the only outcome posited to be influenced 
directly by both relationship commitment and trust. A partner 
committed to the relationship will cooperate with another 
member because of a desire to make the relationship work. 
 Effective cooperation within a network promotes effective 
competition among networks. Therefore, cooperation 
promotes relationship marketing success. 
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 Strong negative relationship between organisational 
commitment and propensity to leave the organisation also 
hold at the interorganisational level. Just as excessive 
employee turnover is costly for employers, partnership 
instability is costly. Therefore, stability is a desirable 
performance outcome that can be achieved through fostering 
commitment.  
 Partners can have ongoing disputes about goals but continue 
to cooperate because both parties' relationship termination 
costs are high. Nor is cooperation the same thing as 
acquiescence. Cooperation is proactive; acquiescence is 
reactive. Passively agreeing to advertise a partner's product is 
acquiescence; proactively suggesting better advertisements is 
cooperation.  
17 Abstract 
The nature of relationship marketing - its conceptualization, 
forms and requisites for success - is explored. Relationship 
marketing refers to all marketing activities directed toward 
establishing, developing and maintaining successful relational 
exchanges. There are 10 forms of relationship marketing, which 
can be grouped into the relational exchanges involving suppliers, 
lateral organisations, customers or one's own employees or 
business units. The need for relationship marketing stems from 
the changing dynamics of the global marketplace and the 
changing requirements for competitive success. 
18 Key words 
Market strategy; market research; customer relations; 
professional relationships 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust; relational exchange; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 91 
 
01 Author of the article Morgeson, Fredrick, P. // Hofman, David A. 
02 Title of the article 
The structure and function of collective constructs: Implications 
for multi-level research and theory development 
03 Document name Morgeson and Hofman, 1999 
04 Journal title The Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1999 
06 Volume 24 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 249-265 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper argues that that constructs can be described in terms 
of their structure and function. Structures emerge from 
interaction and can, over time, come to influence systems of 
interaction. Functions represent the causal outputs of constructs 
and provide a mechanism for integrating constructs across 
levels. 
16 Key findings 
 Because these interactions allow collective constructs to 
emerge and be maintained, focusing on the interactions that 
define and reinforce collective phenomena can provide a 
better understanding of how collective phenomena arise and 
continue, particularly in face of contextual or membership 
changes.  
 Because the emergence of some constructs is conditional and 
of others is inevitable, accounts of collective constructs 
should provide details about their developmental aspects and 
should specify the processes through which the constructs 
emerge, particularly in terms of the importance of critical 
events as compared to usual on goings. 
 In explicating the structure of a collective construct, one 
should acknowledge and understand the context within 
which individuals operate. Because the context limits the 
range of potential interaction, it may have a particularly 
influential role in determining the emergence of a construct 
and its structure. 
 Explicit consideration of a construct's function may allow 
scholars to integrate functionally similar (but structurally 
dissimilar) constructs into broader nomological networks of 
constructs. This can serve as an integrative mechanism in 
multilevel research and theory. 
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 To understand the structure of a collective construct, it may 
be helpful to identify the role the outcome plays in the 
collective, particularly in terms of how it facilitates goal 
accomplishment. This can help provide insight into why the 
construct exists and why it persists over time. 
 Scholars could begin multilevel theory development with a 
functional analysis, examining the output of a given 
construct. This would identify commonalities across levels 
that could be used to provide insight into the construct's 
structure at a particular level. 
 Because a number of different structures can result in the 
same function, it is incumbent upon the researcher to specify 
the particular structure of a construct at a given level. As an 
area of research matures, identification and acknowledgment 
of the different structures or processes that account for the 
function should become a high priority. 
 Because similar structures can result in different functions, it 
is important for scholars to understand the factors that 
influence divergence in outcomes. Identification of the 
contextual factors or structural properties that regulate this 
divergence is important for an adequate understanding of the 
phenomena. 
17 Abstract 
Gaps in the multilevel organisational theory development 
literature by critically examining the structure and function of 
collective constructs are addressed. Structure emerges from 
interaction and can, over time, come to influence systems of 
interaction. Functions represent the causal outputs of constructs 
and provide a mechanism for integrating constructs across 
levels. Implications arising from this perspective are discussed 
and a set of guidelines for multilevel research and theory 
development are presented.  
18 Key words Organisation theory; guidelines; research 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Multilevel organisational theories 
21 Mode of Governance NA 
22 Configuration Elements NA 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
NA 
24 Unit of analysis NA 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 92 
 
01 Author of the article Nair, Anand // Narasimhan, Ram // Choi, Thomas Y. 
02 Title of the article 
Supply networks as a complex adaptive system: Towards 
simulation-based theory building on evolutionary decision 
making 
03 Document name Nair et al., 2009 
04 Journal title Decision Sciences 
05 Date of publication 2009 
06 Volume 40 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 783-815 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Simulation based model)  
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size Eight cases of payoff matrix configurations. 
13 Data collection method Simulation model 
14 Method of data analysis 
Complex adaptive system are simulated using cellular automata 
CA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This research focuses on the development of theoretical insights 
regarding the evolution of cooperation in supply networks by 
means of computer-based simulation experiments.  
16 Key findings 
 In supply networks organisations do not necessarily cooperate 
even in the presence of repeated interactions; there is a 
threshold level of reward below which the buyer and 
suppliers would not cooperate 
 When both buyer and supplier trust each other for mutual co-
operation, they will continue to cooperate even at the risk of 
extreme loss from cooperation. When there is trust for mutual 
cooperation, buyer and suppliers tend to behave in a risk-
prone way. 
 Even in the presence of opportunistic decision-making 
behaviours in the supply network, organisations can continue 
to exhibit cooperative behaviours. 
 Retaliation/reaction to a supply chain partner’s opportunism 
follows a complex, nonlinear pattern rather than a simple 
linear pattern. 
 Cooperative decision making can be expected to prevail in 
the long term as the size of the supply network increases. 
 Under certain conditions of interaction among supply 
network members, cooperation among members increases 
even with an increase in the payoff from acting 
opportunistically. 
 In mature industries, cooperative decision making is 
sustained if a supply network has expanding number of 
companies. 
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 Cooperative behaviour in a supply network can exist even if 
the payoff from mutual cooperation is not the highest. 
17 Abstract 
In this article, we examine how the organisations embedded in 
supply networks engage in decision making over time. The 
supply networks as a complex adaptive system are simulated 
using cellular automata (CA) through a dynamic evolution of 
cooperation (i.e., “voice” decision) and defection (i.e., “exit” 
decision) among supply network agents (i.e., organisations). 
Simple local rules of interaction among organisations generate 
complex patterns of cooperation and defection decisions in the 
supply network. The incentive schemes underlying decision 
making are derived through different configurations of the 
payoff-matrix based on the game theory argument. The prisoner’s 
dilemma game allows capturing the localized decision-making 
process by rational agents, and the CA model allows the self-
organizing outcome to emerge. By observing the evolution of 
decision making by cooperating and defecting agents, we offer 
testable propositions regarding relationship development and 
distributed nature of governance mechanisms for managing 
supply networks. 
18 Key words 
Cellular automata; complex adaptive systems; complexity theory; 
supply networks; theory building 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Game Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit) 
22 Configuration Elements Supply Networks 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 93 
 
01 Author of the article Nooteboom, Bart 
02 Title of the article Trust, opportunism, and governance 
03 Document name Nooteboom, 1996 
04 Journal title Organisational Studies 
05 Date of publication 1996 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 985-1010 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Process and Control Model) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study develops a process and control model. This model 
helps analyze combinations, balances and imbalances of trust 
and opportunism, formal and informal forms of governance, 
and viable sequences of strategies of governance. 
16 Key findings 
 In case of an organisation, the subjective probability associated 
with trust depends on an assessment of the: a) ethical 
stance and routines that form part of the culture of the 
organisation; b) "tightness" with which individuals are 
tied to it in their organisational roles; c) relevant 
characteristics (ethics and bonding) of the individual one is 
dealing with; and d) net effect on propensity of the individual 
towards opportunism. 
 Opportunism affects perceived probabilities of an ongoing 
relation. Renunciation of opportunities for opportunism will 
enhance trust. This may contribute directly to value by 
increasing intrinsic value, and indirectly by increasing 
perceived probabilities of an ongoing relation. 
 Spill-over of sensitive information to competitors, via the 
partner, is always a risk, but while the relation lasts the 
partner has an interest in preventing it. The risk is 
particularly high if the relation is broken on purpose 
rather than by accident. 
 Propensity towards opportunism belongs to the sources of 
trust: norms/values, ethics, customs, and bonds of kinship or 
friendship.  
 Trust tends to grow as the relation proceeds successfully, 
because bonds of empathy may get stronger, or because 
habituation occurs. 
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 If an organisation’s captivity becomes negative, because it 
has found a more attractive alternative partner, a plausible 
action would be to try and get out of the relation at the 
lowest possible cost. 
 Cooperative means of increasing partner’s captivity 
include increasing one’s relative value to the partner by: 
a) investing in further adaptation to the partner, and thereby 
incurring specific investments; and b) inviting hostages in 
the form of information about the partner’s technology in 
order to improve cooperation in development of his 
products or processes. 
 Adversarial means of increasing partner’s captivity 
include increasing one’s relative value by: a) blocking 
the partner’s access to alternative partners; and b) 
demanding hostages that do not add value for the partner. 
17 Abstract 
A process and control model is developed for the analysis and 
design of inter-organisational relations, in which both 
opportunism and trust play a role. The study's aim is to develop a 
tool for the analysis, diagnosis and design of inter-organisational 
partnerships. It takes into account the value of the partner, 
relative to alternatives, and the risk of the relation. Risk depends 
on the incentives that the partner may have toward opportunism, 
his opportunities for opportunism and his propensity toward 
opportunism. The latter is related to trust. A partner's incentives 
toward opportunism depend on the uniqueness of the value that 
he offers, on one's own switching costs and on the partner's 
dependence on the relation.  
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; intercompany transactions; alliances; 
strategic planning. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust; cooperation; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Alliance; relationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 94 
 
01 Author of the article Oliver, Christine 
02 Title of the article Determinants of IORs: Integration and future direction 
03 Document name Oliver, 1990 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1990 
06 Volume 15 
07 Number 20 
08 Page numbers 241-265 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
Based on an integration of the IOR literature from 1960 to the 
present, six critical contingencies of relationship formation are 
proposed as generalizeable determinants of IORs across 
organisations, settings, and linkages: necessity, asymmetry, 
reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy. These 
contingencies are the causes that prompt or motivate 
organisations to establish IORs, that is, they explain the reasons 
why organisations choose to enter into relationships with one 
another. 
16 Key findings 
 Critical contingencies of necessity, asymmetry, stability, and 
legitimacy are shaped primarily by external factors. 
 Efficiency contingencies are influenced largely by internal 
factors and the cost of the relationship itself. 
 Reciprocity contingencies are affected primarily by the 
relative or comparative properties of the participants and 
their degrees of congruence with one another. 
 Differences among current theoretical paradigms are partly 
attributable to differences in their locus of attention for 
explaining IORs. 
 An asymmetry-motivated reason for trade association formation 
is the exertion of political influence on behalf of its members. 
This contingency will be more likely to cause organisations 
to join together in a trade association when the threat of 
government intervention is strong. 
 Asymmetry contingencies are fundamental determinants of 
the formation of federations. Federations develop to increase 
the collective power of agencies by improving the affiliates' 
bargaining position relative to the environment.  
 The formation of joint ventures is more likely to occur for 
purposes of increasing market power when the potential for 
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erosion of either partner's competitive position is low. 
 Joint programs are developed for the purposes of increasing 
the influence of partners when program establishment 
increases the organisations' access to funds or authority. 
 According to the financial control model of interlocks banks 
exert extensive control over corporations through inter-
locks. In contrast, the management control model em-
phasizes the dominance of corporations and the relative 
powerlessness of directors to influence organisational 
activities. 
17 Abstract 
This article integrates the literature on IORs into six 
generalizeable determinants of relationship formation, applies 
these determinants to the prediction of six types of 
interorganisational relations, and proposes hypotheses for future 
research that specify the conditions under which each 
determinant will be more likely to predict different types of 
relations. These determinants provide the basis for a general 
theory of IORs and suggest that alternative theoretical 
perspectives on relationship formation provide important but 
only partial insights into why organisations enter into 
relationships with one another. 
18 Key words 
IORs; necessity; asymmetry; reciprocity; efficiency; stability; 
legitimacy; trade associations; federations; joint ventures; joint 
programs; financial control model; interlocks; corporations. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); financial control 
models; reciprocity; interdependence 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; trade associations; federations; joint ventures; 
rrelationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network  
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 95 
 
01 Author of the article Pilbeam, Colin// Alvarez, Gabriela// Wilson, Hugh 
02 Title of the article 
The governance of supply networks: a systematic literature 
review 
03 Document name Pilbeam et al., (2012) 
04 Journal title Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 
05 Date of publication 2012 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 358-376 
09 Paper Type Literature review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size 44 conceptual and empirical studies 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Systematic review methodology (Tranfield et al., 2003) 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Thematic analysis the context-intervention-mechanism-
outcomes (CIMO) logic. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This systematic literature review is focused towards how 
supply network governance leads to network outcomes, what 
mechanisms underlie this relationship, and how context 
impacts it. 
16 Key findings 
 Selection and adoption of particular governance instruments 
to support changing organisational structure or technology in 
supply networks is influenced strongly by industry type 
and by access to technology. 
 Informal instruments: a) are adopted in dynamic and 
unstable circumstances defined as risky, uncertain, 
unpredictable or during organisational change; b)  adopted 
where prior relationships exist between actors; and c) can 
result in coordination, control, viability and performance 
outcomes. 
 The six distinct categories of contextual circumstance are: 1) 
globalization; 2) changing organisational structure or 
technology; 3) uncertainty or unpredictability; 4) risk; 
5) legislation; and 6) partner characteristics/relationship 
history, where there is empirical evidence. 
 Technology enabled control systems allow effective 
governance of the collaboration between decentralized 
members of a supply network. 
 There are: a) no studies exploring informal governance 
instruments in relation to risk; b) only a few studies 
examining formal instruments in relation to risk; and c) 
no studies that explored the influence of globalization on 
the use of informal governance instruments.  
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17 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to establish what is known 
regarding how supply network governance leads to network 
outcomes, what mechanisms underlie this relationship, and 
how context impacts it. A systematic literature review 
identified 44 conceptual and empirical studies. Purely dyadic 
studies were excluded. Synthesis used context-intervention-
mechanism-outcomes (CIMO) logic. From a categorization 
of contexts, governance instruments, mechanisms and 
outcomes a contingent conceptual framework is developed in 
paper relating governance instruments to network outcomes 
dependent on context. In general, formal instruments are 
adopted in dynamic and unstable circumstances defined as 
risky, uncertain, unpredictable or during organisational change. 
These instruments can result in coordination, control, viability 
and performance outcomes. Informal instruments tend to be 
adopted in contexts where prior relationships exist between 
actors. Arising from conceptual framework three robust 
propositions are developed. A more nuanced view of power 
and trust is proposed to augment explanations provided by 
transaction costs and social embeddedness. This provides 
opportunities for further research, including longitudinal and 
comparative studies. Conceptual framework provides three 
propositions suggesting that in dynamic or unstable 
circumstances formal governance instruments can provide 
viability, control, coordination or performance outcomes. 
Informal governance instruments are more effectively used 
in established relationships to improve performance, control 
and viability. Synthesis reveals contingencies in appropriate 
governance modes of supply networks for desired outcomes 
in specific contexts, resolving apparent inconsistencies 
between prior studies. 
18 Key words 
Supply network; governance; trust; power; systematic review; 
supply chain management. 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens NA 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Supply network 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
NA 
24 Unit of analysis NA 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 96 
 
01 Author of the article Poppo, Laura // Schepker, Donald J. 
02 Title of the article Repairing public trust in organisations 
03 Document name Poppo and Schepker, 2010 
04 Journal title Corporate Reputation Review 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 13 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 124-141 
09 Paper Type Analytical 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study develops an approach to understanding public trust 
– its relationship to other forms of trust; why institutional 
mechanisms are prone to be imperfect governance devices; 
and which trust repair strategies are more likely and 
therefore more effective 
16 Key findings 
 To the extent that competence violations are perceived as 
more controllable and salient than integrity violations, 
competence-based violations will have a greater negative 
effect on the public’s willingness to trust an organisation than 
integrity-based violations. 
 To the extent that competence violations are perceived as 
more controllable and salient, competence violations have a 
stronger negative effect on the public’s collective assessment 
of its trust in the organisation’s competence compared to the 
effect of integrity violations on the public’s collective 
assessment of its trust in the organisation’s integrity. 
 Competence violations have a greater negative effect on 
organisation performance than integrity violations. 
 Competence violations closer to a organisation’s core 
operations will have a greater negative effect on organisation 
performance than competence violations further from the 
organisation’s core operations. 
 Voluntary acknowledgement of an organisational failure and a 
commitment to a follow-up investigation has a greater posi-
tive impact on public trust than a no response strategy. 
 Organisations are more likely to communicate (quickly and 
transparently) to the public following competence-base trust 
violation than an integrity-based violation, which in turn has a 
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greater impact on public trust than the alternative. 
 Organisations are more likely to respond to integrity 
violations by denying responsibility than by accepting 
responsibility, which in turn has a greater impact on public 
trust than the alternative. 
 Organisations are more likely to apologize for actions or 
effects without accepting responsibility for a competence 
violation than denying or accepting responsibility, which in 
turn has a greater impact on public trust than the alternative. 
 Organisations are more likely to fire and remove associated 
employees in response to an integrity violation than a 
competence violation, which in turn has a greater positive 
impact on public trust. 
 Organisations are more likely to implement structural, 
strategic and institutional reforms in response to a competence 
violation than an integrity violation, which in turn has a 
greater positive impact on public trust. 
17 Abstract 
While past research has examined organisational trust with key 
stakeholders, including employees, little research has examined how 
organisations can repair trust with the general public. Public trust in 
an organisation is critical to ensuring legitimacy and organisation 
survival. However, the type of violation of public trust can impact the 
repair strategies organisations may choose to enact. This paper examines 
the construct of public trust, discusses the important aspects of trust 
violation and develops a framework for organisations to repair trust 
with the public. We argue that communication and strategic 
institutional reforms are necessary to repair trust, but are more important 
following competence, rather than integrity violations. 
18 Key words Cooperation ; public trust ; reputation 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); trust 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; embedded relationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network (public) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 97 
 
01 Author of the article Poppo, Laura  // Zenger, Todd 
02 Title of the article 
Do formal contracts and relational governance function as 
substitutes or complements? 
03 Document name Poppo and Zenger, 2002 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2002 
06 Volume 23 
07 Number 8 
08 Page numbers 707-725 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Computer industry 
12 Sample size 285 top executives 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including regression  analysis (OLS and GLS) 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study uses data from a sample of information service 
exchanges to empirical support that formal contracts and 
relational governance function as complements.  
16 Key findings 
 Managers tend to employ greater levels of relational norms as 
their contracts become increasingly customized, and to employ 
greater contractual complexity as they develop greater levels 
of relational governance. 
 Customized contracts specify contingencies, adaptive processes, 
and controls likely to mitigate opportunistic behaviour and 
thereby support relational governance.  
 Customized contracts do not guarantee the intent of mutuality, 
bilateralism, and continuance when conflict arises. 
 Relational governance complements adaptive limits of 
contracts by fostering continuance of the exchange and 
entrusting both parties with mutually agreeable outcomes.  
 Contractual complexity and relational governance function as 
complements in explaining satisfaction with exchange 
performance. 
 Relational governance and contract customization both 
directly and indirectly increase exchange performance as 
measured by satisfaction with the cost, quality, and 
responsiveness of the outsourced service. 
 Contract complexity indirectly increases exchange 
performance by increasing relational governance, which in turn 
increases exchange performance. 
 Greater relational governance appears to positively affect 
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contractual complexity, which in turn increases exchange 
performance. 
 Over time parties develop, test, observe, and confirm the 
existence of trust and the other requisite norms for cooperative 
relationship, and empirically confirm that parties with such a 
social history increasingly rely on relational norms to govern 
their exchange. 
 Managers use relational governance to encourage continuance 
amidst the rapidly changing information systems 
technology. 
17 Abstract 
Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are 
commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in 
interorganisational exchanges. Many argue that formal 
contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the 
opportunistic behaviour they are designed to discourage. In this 
paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that 
formal contracts and relational governance function as 
complements. Using data from a sample of information service 
exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of 
complementarily. Managers appear to couple their increasingly 
customized contracts with high levels of relational governance 
(and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their 
ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our 
results concerning the determinants of these governance choices 
show their distinct origins, which further augments their 
complementarily in practice. 
18 Key words 
Relational governance; corporate management; strategic 
management; hypotheses; statistical analysis; organisation 
theory; contracts; professional relationships; and relational 
norms.  
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory; Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and formal (explicit); contracts 
(customized); interdependence  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationship (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships  
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 98 
 
01 Author of the article Poppo, Laura // Zhou, Kevin Z. // Zenger, Todd R. 
02 Title of the article 
Examining the conditional  l imits  of  relational 
governance: specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-
standing ties. 
03 Document name Poppo et al., 2008 
04 Journal title Journal of Management studies 
05 Date of publication 2008 
06 Volume 45 
07 Number 7 
08 Page numbers 1195-1215 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location Worldwide organisations from Fortune 500 companies 
11 Context/Industry  IT outsourcing 
12 Sample size 181 organisations  
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire (completed 
by top executives) 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including confirmatory factor analysis and 
regression analysis; slope test 
15 Study Characteristics 
Using data from IT industry, this empirical study 
demonstrates the conditional limits of relational gover -
nance by showing that its performance benefits erode for 
transactions characterized by exchange hazards and long-
standing ties. 
16 Key findings 
 Exchange hazards, namely, asset specificity and difficult 
performance measurement, weaken the positive relationship 
of relational governance and exchange performance, 
which suggests that trust, does not ensure fully 
cooperative behaviour. 
 Exchange tenure weakens the positive relationship 
between relational governance and exchange 
performance, which indicates that over time, partnerships 
come to lack the necessary restructuring efforts that ensure 
optimal exchange performance. 
 In high asset specificity settings, the positive association of 
relational governance and performance satisfaction 
declines significantly compared with low asset specificity 
settings, because of the opportunity for individual gain in 
high asset specificity settings. 
 Measurement difficulty dampens the positive association 
of relational governance and performance satisfaction, 
revealing that suppliers will shirk their expected effort levels 
and quality, as well as use this hidden information to 
augment their costs. 
 Negative relationship between trust and performance is 
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stronger under high behavioural uncertainty, specifically 
when parties work extensively together or compete with 
each other. 
 Exchange history will moderate the relationship of 
relational governance and performance. As exchange 
tenure increases, the routines that characterize relationally 
governed exchanges become decoupled from those that 
optimally support the task. These include external 
information searches, knowledge of alternatives, and routine 
evaluations of the supplier, partnership, and fit with the 
external environment. 
17 Abstract 
Despite recognition of the benefits of relational governance 
in inter-organisational exchanges, factors that may erode 
its value have received little examination. We extend the 
literature by asking whether self-interested opportunities 
and long-standing ties erode the positive association 
between relational governance and performance. 
Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, 
exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and 
difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive 
association of relational governance and performance. 
We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the 
dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits 
associated with relational governance decline when 
parties rely on repeated partnerships. 
18 Key words 
Relational governance; inter-organisational exchanges; 
exchange tenure; asset specificity; contract duration. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and formal (explicit); contracts (duration); 
interdependence  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationship (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships  
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
 
  
 337 
Data Extraction Form Number 99 
 
01 Author of the article Powell, Walter, W. 
02 Title of the article 
Neither market nor hierarchy: Network formation of 
organisations 
03 Document name Powell, 1990 
04 Journal title Research in Organisational Behaviour 
05 Date of publication 1990 
06 Volume 12 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 295-336 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study argues that relational or net Data Extraction Form 
Numbers of organisations are a clearly identifiable form of 
economic exchange under certain specifiable circumstances. 
16 Key findings 
 Routines and hierarchical structures ensure communication 
between agents within a organisation, and administrative 
controls provide greater powers to monitor and discipline 
agents than a market structure permits 
 Non –market, non-hierarchical modes of exchange represent 
a particular form of collective action, one in which: a) 
cooperation can be sustained over the long run as an 
effective arrangement; b) networks create incentives for 
learning and the dissemination of information, thus allowing 
ideas to be translated into action quickly; c) the open ended 
quality of networks is most useful when the resources are 
variable and the environment uncertain; and d) networks 
offer a highly feasible means of utilizing and enhancing such 
intangible assets as tacit knowledge and technological 
innovation. 
 The degree to which economic actors rely on the 
marketplace, private enterprise, or net Data Extraction Form 
Numbers of relational contracting is determined, to a 
considerable attempt by state policies. 
 Network formation of organisation are particularly well-
suited for: a) a highly skilled labour where participants 
possess knowledge that is not specific to a particular task but 
applicable to a wide range of activities; and b) where 
knowledge and skill do not lend themselves to either 
monopoly control or expropriation by the wealthiest bidder. 
 The more general, and more suitable are resources, the more 
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likely they will be secured through short-term market 
transactions where as the exchange of distinctive 
competencies, like for instance knowledge or skill, is more 
likely to occur in networks. 
 The demand for speed to react to economic changes 
motivates organisations to form networks with other 
organisations. The aim is to reduce the   risk and share the 
expense of developing costly products that have very short 
life spans. 
 Networks are more common in homogenous work settings in 
which participants have a common background (e.g. ethnic; 
ideological; professional). When the diversity of partners 
increases, trust recedes, and so does the willingness to enter 
into long term collaboration. 
 A key advantage of network arrangements is their ability to 
disseminate and interpret new information.  
17 Abstract 
Network formation of organisations- typified by reciprocal 
patterns of communication and exchange –represent viable 
patterns of economic organisation. Networks are contrasted with 
market and hierarchical governance structures, and the 
distinctive features of networks are highlighted. Illustrative 
examples of network arrangements – in craft and high-
technology industries, in regional economics, and in formerly 
vertically integrated fields are presented. The paper concluded 
with a discussion of the conditions that give rise to net Data 
Extraction Form Numbers. 
18 Key words 
Network; market; hierarchy; communication; knowledge ; 
governance structures 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (explicit); information 
exchange 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; vertical integration; market; hierarchy 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 100 
 
01 Author of the article Powell, Walter, W. 
02 Title of the article 
Interorganisational collaboration and the locus of innovation: 
Networks of learning in biotechnology. 
03 Document name Powell, 1996 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 1996 
06 Volume 41 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 116-145 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Biotechnology industry 
12 Sample size 225 organisations  
13 Data collection method 
Five years of cross-sectional records obtained from BIOSCAN 
data base 
14 Method of data analysis Statistical analysis; panel regression analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study attempts to explain the pattern of interorganisational 
agreements that structure learning in the field of biotechnology. 
These agreements are formal ties - frequently involving very 
expensive investments by both parties. 
16 Key findings 
 The descriptive measures for collaborative RandD 
experience and non-RandD network experience point to a 
distinctive pattern of organisational development for 
organisations that rely on network ties. While organisations 
always have the option of eliminating their reliance on 
external collaborations, it turns out that organisations that 
have ties for any length of time rarely do so. 
 Organisations are not "promiscuous" in their use of ties; 
rather, they are deepening their connectedness without 
adding substantial numbers of new ties. On average, 
organisations have ties of each variety, save for 
manufacturing and clinical ties.  
 In contrast to product life-cycle or transaction-cost thinking, 
as organisations grow older and larger they do not appear to 
reduce number and type of collaborations in which they are 
engaged. 
 Age has no effect, while size is an outcome, not a predictor 
of network behaviour. Growth is a process that requires time. 
Unlike biotic species, however, organisational growth is not 
programmed from age. Rather, it is the initiation of 
collaboration that sets the growth clock in motion, with 
centrality as a further stimulus. 
 Network position (central connectedness) has reciprocal 
influences on RandD alliances, investment ties, and total 
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collaboration. RandD ties, experience, and diversity produce 
central connectedness. Central connectedness cycles back to 
intensify an organisation's commitment to exploring through 
its network. 
 The development of experience enables an organisation to 
become more central, which in turn has two effects. First, 
regardless of the pathway, centrally located organisations are 
connected into the main component of the industry, 
providing access to critical information and resource flows 
needed for internal growth. The second effect is a feedback 
process in which centrality leads to the initiation and 
continuance of RandD alliances, thus sustaining the 
dynamics of learning. 
17 Abstract 
It is argued that when the knowledge base of an industry is both 
complex and expanding and the sources of expertise are widely 
dispersed, the locus of innovation will be found in networks of 
learning, rather than in individual organisations. The large-scale 
reliance on interorganisational collaborations in the 
biotechnology industry reflects a fundamental and pervasive 
concern with access to knowledge. A network approach to 
organisational learning is developed, and a organisation-level, 
longitudinal hypotheses are derived that link research and 
development alliances, experience with managing IORs, 
network position, rates of growth and portfolios of collaborative 
activities. These hypotheses are tested on a sample of dedicated 
biotechnology organisations in the years 1990-1994. Results 
support a learning view and have broad implications for future 
theoretical and empirical research.  
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; statistical analysis; learning; innovations; 
industrial research; biotechnology;  alliances;  organisation 
theory 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); collaboration;  
22 Configuration Elements Network; alliances; network position;  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network (alliances) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Longitudinal Study based on historical data 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 101 
 
01 Author of the article Provan, Keith // Kenis, Patrick 
02 Title of the article 
Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and 
Effectiveness 
03 Document name Provan and Kenis, 2008 
04 Journal title Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
05 Date of publication 2008 
06 Volume 18 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 229-252 
09 Paper Type Analytical 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study argues that when focusing on collectively generated 
network-level outcomes, the form of network governance 
adopted, and the management of tensions related to that form 
are critical for explaining network effectiveness. 
16 Key findings 
 The greater the inconsistency between critical contingency 
factors and a particular governance form (both in terms of the 
number of inconsistent factors and the extent to which these 
factors are inconsistent with characteristics of the 
governance form), the less likely that that particular form will 
be effective, leading either to overall network ineffectiveness, 
dissolution, or change in governance form. 
 Shared network governance will be most effective for achieving 
network-level outcomes when trust is widely shared among 
network participants (high-density, decentralized trust), when 
there are relatively few network participants, when network-
level goal consensus is high, and when the need for network-
level competencies is low. 
 Lead organisation network governance will be most 
effective for achieving network-level outcomes when trust is 
narrowly shared among network participants (low-density, highly 
centralized trust), when there are a relatively moderate number 
of network participants, when network-level goal consensus is 
moderately low, and when the need for network-level 
competencies is moderate. 
 Network governance will be most effective for achieving 
network-level outcomes when trust is moderately to widely 
shared among network participants (moderate density trust), 
when there are a moderate number to many network participants, 
when network-level goal consensus is moderately high, and 
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when need for network-level competencies is high. 
 Assuming network survival over time, as network 
governance changes, it is likely to evolve in a predictable 
pattern from shared governance to a more brokered form and 
from participant governed to externally (NAO) governed. 
Evolution from shared governance to either brokered form is 
significantly more likely than evolution from a brokered form 
to shared governance. Once established, evolution from an NAO 
to another form is unlikely (i.e., inertia is strongest when the 
governance form is more formalized). 
 Networks face a tension between the need for internal and 
external legitimacy. In shared-governance networks, the tension 
will favour internal legitimacy; in lead organisation–governed 
networks, the tension will favour external legitimacy; and in 
 NAO-governed networks, both sides of the tension will be 
addressed but in a sequential fashion. 
 Networks face a tension between the need for flexibility and 
the need for stability. In shared-governance networks, the tension 
will favour flexibility; in NAO- and lead organisation–governed 
networks, the tension will favour stability. Networks face a 
tension between the need for administrative efficiency and 
inclusive decision making. In shared-governance networks, 
the tension will favour inclusion; 
 In lead organisation–governed networks, the tension will favour 
efficiency; and in NAO-governed networks, the tension will be 
more balanced but favour efficiency. 
17 Abstract 
This article examines the governance of organisational networks 
and the impact of governance on network effectiveness. Three basic 
models, or forms, of network governance are developed focusing on 
their distinct structural properties. Propositions are formulated 
examining conditions for effectiveness of each form. Tensions 
inherent in each form are then discussed, followed by the role that 
management may play in addressing these tensions. Finally, the 
evolution of governance is explored 
18 Key words 
Network governance, structure, effectiveness, tension, trust, 
evolution. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks and network influencing 
organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 102 
 
01 Author of the article Provan, Keith G. // Skinner, Steven J. 
02 Title of the article 
Interorganisational dependence and control as predictors of 
opportunism in dealer-supplier relations 
03 Document name Provan and Skinner, 1989 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1989 
06 Volume 32 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 202-212 
09 Paper Type Empirical 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Farm and power equipment dealers 
12 Sample size 226 farm and power equipment dealers 
13 Data collection method Mail survey based on self administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Multiple regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study is an empirical work on opportunism IORs using the 
example of farm and power equipment dealers and their primary 
supplier organisation. 
16 Key findings 
 Dealers view either method of decision control by a primary 
supplier, but particularly centralization, negatively, which 
leads to at least some resistance in the form of opportunistic 
behaviour. 
 The chance to behave opportunistically is greater for dealers 
when control over their decisions is through a supplier’s rule 
and procedure, since the supplier’s management would not be 
actively monitoring compliance  
 Dealers view attempts by suppliers to control the decisions 
(related to the daily running of the dealers’ business) through 
direct involvement negatively, especially when the suppliers 
are physically far removed the dealers, their customers, and 
their problems. 
 Dealers view existence of supplier rules and procedures less 
constraining and controlling than centralization because of the 
formal, less personal way in which the former are imposed. 
 Rules and procedures related to the daily running of the 
business tend to change infrequently, thus giving both 
suppliers and dealers consistent guidelines within which all 
can operate reasonably effectively. 
17 Abstract 
This study examines Williamson's (1975) concept of 
opportunism in relations between farm and power equipment 
dealers and their primary supplier organisation. Results from a 
national survey generally support hypotheses predicting that 
dealer opportunism will be negatively related to dealer 
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dependence on a primary supplier and positively related to 
supplier control over dealer decisions. 
18 Key words Power; opportunism; supplier control; organisational behaviour. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit);  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationship (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationship (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
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Data Extraction Form Number 103 
 
01 Author of the article Provan, Keith G.//Fish, Amy//Sydow, Joerg 
02 Title of the article 
Interorganisational networks at the network level: A review of 
the empirical literature on whole networks 
03 Document name Provan et al., 2007 
04 Journal title Journal of Management 
05 Date of publication 2007 
06 Volume 33 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 479-516 
09 Paper Type Literature Review  
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size 26 studies over a period of 20 year (1985 – 2005) 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Systematic literature review including: a) general search; b) 
initial selection based on relevance to the field of organisational 
studies; c) secondary selection based on abstract analysis; d) final 
selection based on the extent of focus towards interorganisational 
networks at the network level. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Content analysis based on the key findings from the selected 
articles 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study reviews the empirical literature on interorganisational 
networks at the network level of analysis – also referred to as 
“whole” networks. 
16 Key findings 
 Different network patterns differently age, with some past 
structures exerting stronger effects on performance than 
current ones. 
 Time may modify the flow through the network as density and 
centralization change and one form of network structure 
benefits over another. 
 High differentiation occurs with low centralization, 
suggesting that attempting a broad scope of activity is 
difficult to centrally coordinate. 
 Clusters can be created out of convenience, as in cases of 
geographic clustering. But they also can be created based on 
the provision of a certain set of services. 
 Cliques, sub-networks, or clusters within networks are 
prevalent and can play important roles in the creation of positive 
outcomes. 
 The development of the network is dependent on the 
knowledge of those mechanisms and the meanings, goals, and 
values of all organisations within the network. 
 Although networks are seen as mechanisms not only of social 
embeddedness but also of coordination and governance few 
empirical examinations exist exploring how activities occurring 
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within a network are managed and coordinated.  
 Relationships between organisations in a network are either 
informally maintained, through the structure of the network 
and norms of reciprocity and trust, or formally maintained, 
through the existence of contracts, rules, and regulations. 
However, these formal and informal control mechanisms 
protect organisations in their relationships to each other (as 
dyads) and not the network’s. 
 Shared governance networks occur when the organisations 
composing network collectively work to make both strategic 
and operational decisions about how network operates. 
 Lead-organisation or hub-organisation governance occurs in 
networks in which all organisations share a common purpose 
but where there is a more powerful/larger, organisation that has 
sufficient resources and legitimacy to play a lead role. 
 Unlike the lead organisation, the NAO is not involved in the 
manufacturing of goods or provision of services, as is the case 
with network members. The task of the NAO may be 
primarily to support (rather than execute) network leadership 
so that this type of governance may sometimes coexist with 
one of the other two. 
17 Abstract 
This article reviews and discusses the empirical literature on 
interorganisational networks at the network level of analysis, or 
what is sometimes referred to as “whole” networks. An overview 
of the distinction between egocentric and network-level research 
is first introduced. Then, a review of the modest literature on 
whole networks is undertaken, along with a summary table 
outlining the main findings based on a thorough literature search. 
Finally, the authors offer a discussion concerning what future 
directions might be taken by researchers hoping to expand this 
important, but understudied, topic. 
18 Key words 
Interorganisational networks; whole networks; network level of 
analysis; networks 
19 Organisation Field General Management 
20 Theoretical Lens NA 
21 Mode of Governance NA 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
NA 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks and network influencing 
organisation 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
 
 347 
Data Extraction Form Number 104 
 
01 Author of the article Revron, Sophie // Chappuis, Jean-Marc 
02 Title of the article 
Effects of Swiss Retailers’ Strategy on Governance Structure of 
Fresh Food Products Supply Chain 
03 Document name Revron and Chappuis, 2005 
04 Journal title Agribusiness 
05 Date of publication 2005 
06 Volume 21 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 237-252 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case Study)  
10 Geographical Location Switzerland 
11 Context/Industry  Food retail sector 
12 Sample size 2 case companies 
13 Data collection method 
Face-to-face interviews; longitudinal study spread over a 10 year 
period 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis  
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper argues that the New Institutional Economic theory is 
an effective tool for analyzing the new design of the food 
supply chains because it highlights the point of view of the 
buyer and his weaknesses regarding the risks on a quality defect.  
16 Key findings 
 Hybrid organisations develop because of the advantages 
partners find in linking some of their investments. In doing 
so, they accept mutual dependence. The more specific are 
mutual investments, the higher the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour, and the tighter the forms of control will be. 
 Mechanisms chosen for monitoring the agreement, 
mechanisms that reserve the stability of the arrangement and 
the design of an adequate device for solving disputes contribute 
shaping hybrid arrangements. 
 Confronted by the consequential uncertainty, a hybrid 
organisation has to deal with major coordination issues: it must 
combine: a) adaptation, in order to keep the flexibility to 
adjust; b) control in order to reduce discrepancies among 
inputs, outputs, or quality in the process itself; and c) 
safeguards, in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour that 
uncertainties make difficult to detect. 
 The intensity of the needs for adaptation, control, and 
safeguards, partially mirrored in contractual clauses, provides 
a good predictor of the degree of centralization of the 
mechanisms to be implemented for dealing efficiently with 
the transactions at stake. 
 Trust operates as a (weak) form of government. Relational 
networks are a tighter mode of coordination than trust, with 
formal rules and conventions framing relationships among 
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agents and restricting the risk of opportunism. 
 Hybrid arrangements may be coordinated by a leader. 
Leadership emerges as a mode of coordination when an 
organisation establishes its authority over the partners either 
because it holds specific competences or because it occupies a 
key position in the sequence of transactions required.  
 In formal organisations, although partners remain independent 
and may even compete on segments of their activities, a 
significant subset of their decisions is coordinated through a 
quasi-autonomous entity, functioning as a private bureau 
with some attributes of hierarchy.  
17 Abstract 
On the initiative of the two main retailers, the structure of the 
Swiss food supply chains has changed in depth, with the 
construction of “normed systems,” characterized by quality 
insurance guarantees and of “partnerships” with alliances of 
producers and processing companies. These new forms of 
vertical organisations are different types of hybrid forms, 
according to New Institutional Economic theory. We highlight 
that these new organisations were chosen because of the lower 
degree of acceptance by the retailers of the asymmetry of 
information on quality, generally to their discredit, and in order 
to protect their reputation.  Nevertheless, even in the case of 
products where the risk of acquiring a bad batch is particularly 
problematic for retailers, the latter do not seek to create bilateral 
governances systems directly with the producers, a situation that 
can lead to high tensions with the producers 
18 Key words 
Vertical organisations; hybrid forms; food supply chain; normed 
system; new institutional economic theory; bilateral governance; 
retail; risk; Switzerland 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens New Institutional Economic Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit); bilateral 
governance 
22 Configuration Elements Networks; supply chains (food); vertical organisations 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing networks  
24 Unit of analysis Networks 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Longitudinal study 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 105 
 
01 Author of the article Ring, Peter S. // Van De Ven, Andrew H. 
02 Title of the article Structuring cooperative relationships between organisations 
03 Document name Ring and Van de Ven, 1992 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1992 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number 7 
08 Page numbers 483-498 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual framework) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding a 
broader variety of governance mechanisms than those typically 
accompanying a focus on markets and hierarchies.  
16 Key findings 
 The greater the risk in the transaction, the more complex the 
governance structure, ceteris paribus. 
 Trust is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for market 
transaction, ceteris paribus. 
 Reliance on trust will emerge only as a consequence of 
repeated market transactions between the parties affirming the 
observance of norms of equity of both parties. 
 The greater the ability to rely on trust, the less the risk 
inherent in transactions, ceteris paribus. 
 Varying levels of risk and reliance on trust will explain the 
governance structures of transactions. 
 Low risk, low reliance on trust transactions will be governed 
by markets, ceteris paribus. 
 High risk, low reliance on trust transactions will be governed 
by hierarchies, ceteris paribus. 
 Low risk, high reliance on trust transactions will be governed 
by recurrent contracts, ceteris paribus. 
 High risk, high reliance on trust transactions will be governed 
by relational governance, ceteris paribus. 
 The elaborateness of safeguards in relational contracts is a 
function of the perceived level of risk in a transaction and the 
reliance on trust by the parties to the exchange. 
17 Abstract 
Alliances and similar cooperative efforts are receiving increased 
attention is the strategic management literature. These 
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relationships differ in significant ways from those governed by 
markets or hierarchies, and pose very different issues for 
researchers and managers. In this paper we address alternative 
forms of governance in cases where multiple organisations 
repeatedly cooperate. We explore their characteristics and follow 
this with a discussion of criteria which we believe bear on the 
choice of governance; risk and reliance on trust. We offer 
propositions on relationships between these criteria and the 
choice of governance mechanisms. In the concluding section of 
the paper we explore the implications of our analysis for 
managers and scholars.  
18 Key words 
Alliance; cooperative efforts; governance mechanisms; 
hierarchies; risk; reliance; trust.   
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management  
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; 
cooperation; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; alliance 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
3.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 106 
 
01 Author of the article Ring, Peter S. // Van De Ven, Andrew H. 
02 Title of the article Developing processes of cooperative IORs 
03 Document name Ring and Van de Ven, 1994 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1994 
06 Volume 19 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 90-118 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The developmental processes of cooperative IORs (IORs) that we 
have elaborated in a set of propositions to explain how 
cooperative IORs emerge, evolve, and dissolve over time 
16 Key findings 
 Congruent sense making among parties increases the 
likelihood of concluding formal negotiations to a cooperative 
IOR. 
 Congruent psychological contracts among parties increases 
the likelihood of establishing formal commitments to a 
cooperative IOR 
 If the individuals assigned to a cooperative IOR do not 
change, personal relationships increasingly supplement 
role relationships as a cooperative IOR develops over 
time 
 Informal psychological contracts increasingly compensate or 
substitute for formal contractual safeguards as reliance on 
trust among parties increases over time. 
 When the temporal duration of IORs is expected to exceed the 
tenure of agents, informal understandings and 
commitments will be formalized. 
 As the temporal duration of a cooperative IOR increases, the 
likelihood decreases that parties will terminate the 
relationship when a breach of commitments occurs. 
 When significant imbalances between formal and informal 
processes arise in repetitive sequences of negotiation, 
commitment, and execution stages over time, the 
likelihood of dissolving the cooperative IOR increases. 
17 Abstract This article examines the developmental process of cooperative 
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IORs that entail transaction-specific investments in deals that 
cannot be fully specified or controlled by the parties in advance 
of their execution. A process framework is introduced that 
focuses on formal, legal, and informal social -
psychological processes by which organisational parties jointly 
negotiate, commit to, and execute their relationship in ways 
that achieve efficient and equitable outcomes and internal 
solutions to conflicts when they arise. The framework is 
elaborated with a set of propositions that explain how and why 
cooperative IORs emerge, evolve, and dissolve. The 
propositions have academic implications for enriching IORs, 
transaction cost economics, agency theories, and practical 
implications for managing the relationship journey 
18 Key words 
Cooperative IORs; transaction-specific investments; process 
framework; social-psychological processes; formal; legal; 
informal; internal solutions; transaction cost economics; 
agency theories; 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Agency Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; 
cooperation; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
IORs 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing IORs  
24 Unit of analysis IORs 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 107 
 
01 Author of the article David, Robert J. // Han, Shin-Kap 
02 Title of the article 
A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction 
cost economics 
03 Document name Robert and Han, 2004 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 25 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 39-58 
09 Paper Type Literature Review 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size 63 articles, 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis Comparative analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This review seeks to reconcile the gap between TCE's 
prominence as a theoretical framework and the doubt about its 
empirical grounding. With clearly outlined procedures for 
selecting and evaluating empirical studies, this study sets out to 
gauge the level of support for TCE's core propositions and to 
thereby identify areas in which the theory is more (or less) 
successful. In order to situate the debate in a broader context, the 
issue of paradigm consensus within the empirical TCE literature 
is also investigated. 
16 Key findings 
 As asset specificity increases, transaction costs associated 
with market governance increase.  
 As asset specificity increases, hybrids and hierarchies 
become preferred over markets; at high levels of asset 
specificity, hierarchy becomes the preferred governance 
form.  
 When asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree, 
uncertainty raises the transaction costs associated with 
market governance.  
 When asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree, 
increasing uncertainty renders markets preferable to hybrids 
and hierarchies preferable to both hybrids and markets.  
 When both asset specificity and uncertainty are high, 
hierarchy is the most cost-effective governance mode.  
 Governance modes that are aligned with transaction 
characteristics should display performance advantages over 
other modes; for example, when both asset specificity and 
uncertainty are high, hierarchy should display performance 
advantages over markets and hybrids.  
 TCE predicts that uncertainty will only affect governance 
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form when asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree. 
17 Abstract 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading 
perspectives in management and organisational studies, yet 
debate continues regarding its empirical support. In this paper, 
we take stock of the large body of extant research and provide a 
systematic assessment of empirical evidence. In all, 308 
statistical tests from 63 articles, selected according to a set of 
clear criteria, were examined across various dimensions. We 
assess not only the level of empirical support for the theory, but 
also the degree of paradigm consensus present in the empirical 
literature. Our analysis shows that results are mixed: while we 
found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset 
specificity), we also found considerable disagreement on how to 
operationalize some of TCE's central constructs and 
propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support in 
other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance). 
We conclude that a more thorough empirical grounding of the 
theory's foundation is crucial to its future development, and offer 
several strategies for doing this. 
18 Key words Organisational structure; costs; transaction cost economics.  
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit); contracts 
22 Configuration Elements Markets; hierarchies; hybrids 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis NA 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 108 
 
01 Author of the article Rossetti, Christian L. // Choi, Thomas Y. 
02 Title of the article 
On the dark side of strategic sourcing: Experience from the 
aerospace industry 
03 Document name Rossetti and Choi, 2005 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Executives 
05 Date of publication 2005 
06 Volume 19 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 46-60 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical location  USA 
11 Context/Industry  Aerospace 
12 Sample size 33 individuals working in 2 OEMS 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi structured interviews 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Thematic Analysis after transcription and coding of interviews  
15 Study Characteristics 
Empirical study , focused towards practioners using aerospace 
example  
16 Key findings 
 Driven by 2 unfulfilled promises of strategic sourcing (lack of 
close working relationships and diminished competitive 
advantage) worst position OEMs can take is to focus on short-
term profits and sacrifice long term gains. 
 Forced by the pressure placed on the purchasing department 
to deliver year-over-year price reduction, strategic sourcing 
and commodity management damage buyer-supplier 
relationship irretrievably. 
 Disillusioned suppliers refuse to tolerate broken long term 
agreements by saying ‘no’ to unfair practices and establish 
direct relationship with the customers bypassing the OEMs. 
 OEMs must: a) accept the fact that the SCD has occurred; b) 
realize that suppliers are practicing a new form of 
competition; c) form a closer coalition with aircraft 
operators; and d) build a relationship with final 
consumers— airline passengers.   
 Harnessing the full capabilities of a supplier requires 
a long-term, trusting relationship. Such a 
relationship is characterized by give-and-take 
attitudes, free-flowing technology and information, 
and the knowledge that neither party will be taken 
advantage of. 
 Trust allows organisations to plan for the future of a 
relationship as: a) engineering resources are fully 
committed to the buyer’s problems as the suppliers are 
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focusing on the buying company’s problems ;  b) 
inventory policies can be optimized facilitating 
postponement policies and transferring risk to the 
party best  able to manage it; c)new product cycle 
times can be reduced since suppliers can purchase 
equipment without worrying about lengthy contract 
negotiations; and d) learning increases as suppliers no 
longer hold back key information to use as leverage in 
renegotiations. 
17 Abstract 
American manufacturing has undergone dramatic changes 
during the last two decades. Manufacturing organisations were 
re-engineered, downsized, and restructured. Employees were 
dismissed, divisions were scrapped, and subsidiaries were 
spun off. As a consequence, outsourcing to external 
suppliers increased significantly, which in turn resulted in 
the increased saliency of strategic sourcing and its economic 
implications. Strategic sourcing integrates the buying 
organisation’s strategic decisions with those of its key 
suppliers, thus promoting trust and decreasing transaction 
costs. However, a dark side of strategic sourcing has emerged. 
Some organisations established long-term contracts with their 
suppliers, set up mutually dependent relationships, and then 
began to strangle suppliers with relentlessly short-term, cost-
driven decisions. As a result, the buying organisations and 
their suppliers have now become competitors in the same 
market. Simply put, there is serious long-term risk 
associated with organisations becoming strategically 
integrated with suppliers and then mistreating them for 
short-term gains. This paper demonstrates that 
misapplying the tenets of strategic sourcing can result in 
the disintegration of the existing supply chain and 
weaken the buying organisation’s long-term 
competitiveness 
18 Key words 
Coordination mechanism, distribution channels, multitier supply 
chains sourcing selection, supplier relationship management, 
supply chain contracts and incentives. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Balance Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; 
interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; triads 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
 357 
Data Extraction Form Number 109 
 
01 Author of the article Rossetti, Christian L. // Choi, Thomas Y. 
02 Title of the article 
Supply chain management under high goal incongruence: An 
empirical examination of disintermediation in the aerospace 
supply chain  
03 Document name Rossetti and Choi, 2008 
04 Journal title Decision Sciences 
05 Date of publication 2008 
06 Volume 39 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 507-540 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed methods)  
10 Geographical location  USA 
11 Context/Industry  Aerospace 
12 Sample size  
134 business-to-business relationships consisting  of 27 OEMs 
and 107 suppliers 
13 
Data collection 
Method 
Internet-based survey using self-administered questionnaire; 
archival data 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; hypothesis testing using SEM (Lisrel 8.7) 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study examine SCD as a contracting problem by 
contextualizing agency constructs which result in testable 
relationships to predict the degree to which a supplier will enter 
its OEM buyer’s aftermarket. 
16 Key findings 
 Buyer–supplier research has not examined relationships 
where the supplier has the strategic option of SCD. 
Researchers have implicitly assumed that buyers can change 
suppliers as long as switching costs are low. 
 Goal incongruence can be caused by three factors: contract 
compensation, attractiveness of alternatives, and contractual 
flexibility. 
 Goal incongruence need not lead to opportunistic behaviour 
due to the two moderating conditions: a) the principal’s ability 
to enforce the contract through monitoring and penalties; and b) 
the agent may not be capable of opportunistic behaviour. 
 OEM buyers by not creating efficient contracts, increase goal 
incongruence in their buyer-supplier relationship forcing 
suppliers to behave opportunistically and sell parts directly to 
aftermarket customers. 
 In normal buyer-supplier relationship, it is presumed that 
OEM buyer is the principal; however nature of the agency 
problem changes when the OEM resells the part produced by 
the supplier to an aftermarket. 
 When goals cannot be aligned in the relationship, buyers 
typically use monitoring and threat of penalties to decrease the 
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probability of opportunistic behaviour.  
 When a supplier can hide its activities from the buyer, there is 
greater probability that the supplier will successfully engage in 
SCD. 
17 Abstract 
Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly 
important part of an OEM’s business model. Because replacement 
parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as 
intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the 
OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its 
supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM’s 
customers. We frame SCD (SCD) as a principal–agent 
contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. 
Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, 
supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data 
are collected from the aerospace industry using a multi-method 
study, combining an Internet-based survey with archival data. 
Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows 
general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively 
related to buyer–supplier goal incongruence. The agency model 
offers insights that differ from previous transaction-cost-based 
models of buyer–supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a 
lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through 
incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages 
associated with specific assets. 
18 Key words 
Agency theory, coordination mechanism, distribution channels, 
multitier supply chains sourcing selection, supplier relationship 
management, supply chain contracts and incentives. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Agency Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); contracts; trust; 
interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; triads 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 110 
 
01 Author of the article Rowley, Tim // Behrens, Dean // Krackhardt, David 
02 Title of the article 
Redundant governance structures: An analysis of structural and 
relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries 
03 Document name Rowley et al., 2000 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2000 
06 Volume 21 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 369-386 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Steel industry; semiconductors industry 
12 Sample size 
270 alliances (including 138 from steel industry and 132 from 
semi conductor industry) 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Alliance data from electronic data bases: CMP Media Inc.; Dow 
Jones; Metal Bulletin 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis including factor analysis and regression 
analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study is useful for identifying sources of competitive 
advantage in interorganisational networks by reconciling some of 
the competing arguments surrounding how relational and 
structural embeddedness factors influence organisation 
performance. 
16 Key findings 
 The argument that strong ties can lead to effective inter-
organisational linkages and competitive advantage because 
they build trust-based governance and lead to norms of 
reciprocity and mutual gain is not supported by the results. 
 This study offers empirical support for a contingency based 
argument, which suggests that both strong and weak ties are 
beneficial to organisations, but under different conditions-for 
different purposes and at different times. 
 Dense interconnections and strong ties are alternative social 
control mechanisms, which in combination provide little 
additional benefit. Because there are costs associated with 
forming and maintaining strategic ties, especially strong ties, 
the utilization of strong ties in a dense network takes 
resources away from other functions that can add value to the 
organisation. 
 The weak and strong tie arguments need to be bound by 
particular populations and/or purposes. The strong tie 
argument is credible when dealing with lower environmental 
uncertainty and a competitive environment demanding a high 
degree of exploration. The results provide support for the 
weak tie argument, especially within an uncertain 
environment, which demand more exploration into new 
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innovations and alternative strategic directions. 
 Interconnectedness among an organisation's partners inhibits 
the organisation's ability to gain access to multiple, non-
redundant information sources. A densely interconnected ego 
network, however, furnishes the organisation with access to 
redundant information sources, which provide a means for 
evaluating and improving the information received from each 
source. 
17 Abstract 
Network researchers have argued that both relational 
embeddedness-characteristics of relationships - and structural 
embeddedness - characteristics of the relational structure - 
influence organisation behaviour and performance. Using 
strategic alliance networks in the semiconductor and steel 
industries, past embeddedness research is built on by examining 
the interaction of these factors. It is argued that the roles 
relational and structural embeddedness play in organisation 
performance can only be understood with reference to the other. 
Moreover, it is argued that the influence of these factors on 
organisation performance is contingent on industry context. More 
specifically, the empirical analysis suggests that strong ties in a 
highly interconnected strategic alliance network negatively 
impact organisation performance. This network configuration is 
especially suboptimal for organisations in the semiconductor 
industry. Furthermore, strong and weak ties are positively related 
to organisation performance in the steel and semiconductor 
industries, respectively. 
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; organisational structure; steel industry; 
semiconductors; alliances; strategic management; comparative 
analysis; statistical analysis. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); relational norms  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; strategic alliances 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 111 
 
01 Author of the article Rowley, Timothy J. 
02 Title of the article 
Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder 
influences 
03 Document name Rowley, 1997 
04 Journal title Academy of Management Review 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 887-910 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
The core argument of this paper is that to build a stakeholder 
theory of the organisation, researchers must move beyond the 
analysis of dyadic relationships. This article contributes to 
stakeholder research by providing a mechanism for describing 
the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders and for 
predicting organisations' responses. 
16 Key findings 
 As network density increases, the ability of a focal 
organisation's stakeholders to constrain the organisation's 
actions increases. 
 As the focal organisation's centrality increases, its ability to 
resist stakeholder pressures increases. 
 Other things being equal, under conditions of high density and 
high centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a 
compromiser role, attempting to negotiate with its 
stakeholders. 
 Other things being equal, under conditions of low density and 
high centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a commander 
role, attempting to control stakeholder behaviours and 
expectations. 
 Other things being equal, under conditions of high density and 
low centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a subordinate 
role, attempting to comply with stakeholder expectations. 
 Other things being equal, under conditions of low density and 
low centrality, the focal organisation will adopt a solitarian 
role, attempting to avoid stakeholder pressures. 
17 Abstract 
Stakeholder theory development has increased in recent years, in 
part because of its emphasis on explaining and predicting how an 
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organisation functions with respect to the relationships and 
influences existing in its environment. Thus far, most researchers 
have concentrated on dyadic relationships between individual 
stakeholders and a focal organisation. Using social network 
analysis, a theory of stakeholder influences is constructed, which 
accommodates multiple, interdependent stakeholder demands and 
predicts how organisations respond to the simultaneous influence 
of multiple stakeholders.  
18 Key words 
Stake holder theory; organisational relationships; influence; 
social network analysis 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Stakeholder Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; density; centrality 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Network influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 112 
 
01 Author of the article Schurr, Paul H. 
02 Title of the article 
Buyer-seller relationship development episodes: theories and 
methods 
03 Document name Schurr, 2007 
04 Journal title Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 
05 Date of publication 2007 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 161-170 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper investigates the critical and non-critical interaction 
episodes that fundamentally strengthen or fatally weaken IOR 
development. 
16 Key findings 
 Relationship constructs refer to characteristics that are more 
generalized and more long-term in nature than interaction 
episodes. Interactions are short-term, dynamic, and 
comprised of actions associated with exchange and 
adaptation between organisations. Exchanges may include 
social, informational, and economic content. 
 Interaction episodes are acts closely connected in time 
involving business associates, and relationships are 
(conceptually) higher-level manifestations of connected 
episodes. 
 Interaction episodes are events that are distinctive and 
separate although part of a larger series. A critical interaction 
episode causes significant change in a relationship 
 A non-critical episode by itself does not cause significant 
change. However, in combination with a larger series of 
other non-critical episodes, relationship change occurs. 
 The five characteristics to explain the hurdles faced in 
business relationships are: a) social distance is inversely 
related to the degree of familiarity buyers and sellers have 
with each other; b) cultural distance is inversely related to 
similarity in norms, values, and working methods; c) 
differences in a buyer's and a seller's product and process 
technologies is termed technological distance; d) time 
distance concerns separation between events in a purchase 
process; and e) geographical distance refers to physical miles 
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between two locations. All five forms of distance are reduced 
by interaction. 
 Reputation refers to the overall quality or character of a 
person or business as judged by others in the network. A 
strong, positive reputation shortens the trust-building process 
and reduces transaction uncertainty. A negative, damaged 
reputation substantially increases the number of episodes 
devoted to building trust. 
17 Abstract 
For the benefit of those who want to address gaps in our 
understanding of business relationships, this paper considers the 
importance of non-critical episodes in business relationships. 
Particular attention is paid to the enduring yet frequently 
modified critical incident technique associated with Flanagan. 
Episode relationship theory, the qualitative/quantitative debate, 
and the critical incident technique (CIT) literature are selectively 
reviewed and critically assessed. First, because business 
relationships tend to persist, episode research must advance 
beyond relationship dissolution studies and progress into 
investigations of how different types of interactions change 
relationships. New types of episodes need to be studied, such as 
the generative, degenerative, and neutral episodes discussed 
here. Also, functionally distinct characteristic and non-critical 
episodes are conceptualized. Second, the methods review 
suggests that useful qualitative methods deserve more attention. 
Third, though CIT research is prevalent in the marketing 
literature, it is at present incompletely adapted to business 
marketing research and needs development along the lines 
suggested in this article. The interaction perspective on business 
relationships is given a dynamic framework at the interaction 
episode level while keeping the connection to the more macro 
relationship development models that conceptualize relationship 
states and processes.  
18 Key words 
Episode relationship theory; critical incident technique; buyers; 
sellers; relationships.  
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Not provided 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit);  
22 Configuration Elements Relationships (buyer-seller) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (buyer-seller) 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 113 
 
01 Author of the article Uzzi, Brian 
02 Title of the article 
Social structure and competition in inter-organisational 
networks: The paradox of embeddedness 
03 Document name Uzzi, 1997 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 1997 
06 Volume 42 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 35-67 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  Apparel industry 
12 Sample size 23 entrepreneurial organisations 
13 Data collection method 
Ethnographic Field Work including open ended interviews and 
field observations 
14 Method of data analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis; grounded theory building 
techniques 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper offers an explanation of the links between social 
structure, micro behavioural decision-making processes, and 
economic outcomes within the context of organisational 
networks. 
16 Key findings 
 Different accounts of transacting can be accurately 
summarized by two forms of exchange: arm's-length ties 
(market relationships) and embedded ties (close or special 
relationships). 
 Trust is the belief that an exchange partner would not act in 
self-interest at another's expense and appeared to operate not 
like calculated risk but like a heuristic--a predilection to 
assume the best when interpreting another's motives and 
actions. 
 Trust is a governance structure that resides in the social 
relationship between and among individuals and cognitively 
is based on heuristic rather than calculative processing. In 
this sense, trust is fundamentally a social process. 
 Information exchange in embedded relationships is more 
proprietary and tacit than the price and quantity data that are 
traded in arm's-length ties. 
 Fine-grained information transfer benefits networked 
organisations by increasing the breadth and ordering of their 
behavioural options and the accuracy of their long-run 
forecasts. Fine-grained information transfer is also more than 
a matter of asset-specific know-how or reducing information 
asymmetry between parties, because the social relationship 
enriches information with reliability and meaning beyond its 
 366 
face value. 
 Embedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that 
enable actors to coordinate functions and work out problems 
"on the fly." These arrangements typically consist of routines 
of negotiation and mutual adjustment that flexibly resolve 
problem. 
 Embeddedness promotes economies of time (the ability to 
capitalize quickly on market opportunities), because the 
transactional details normally worked out to protect against 
opportunism (contracts, price negotiations, scheduling) in 
arm's-length relationships prior to production are negotiated 
on the fly or after production is completed.  
 In embedded ties: a) contracting costs are avoided, because 
organisations trust that payoffs will be divided equitably, 
even when comparative market transactions do not exist; b) 
fine-grained information transfer speeds data exchange and 
helps organisations understand each other's production 
methods so that decision making can be quickened; and c) 
joint problem-solving arrangements also increase the speed 
at which products are brought to market by resolving 
problems in real time during production. 
17 Abstract 
A study develops a systematic understanding of embeddedness 
and organisation networks. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted at 23 entrepreneurial organisations, study identifies 
the components of embedded relationships and explicates the 
devices by which embeddedness shapes organisational and 
economic outcomes. Findings suggest that embeddedness is 
logic of exchange that promotes economies of time, integrative 
agreements, Pareto improvements in allocative efficiency, and 
complex adaptation. These positive effects rise up to a threshold, 
however, after which embeddedness can derail economic 
performance by making organisations vulnerable to exogenous 
shocks or insulating them from information that exists beyond 
their network. The framework explains how these properties 
vary with quality of social ties, structure of the organisational 
network, and an organisation's structural position in network.  
18 Key words 
Organisational studies; behavioural sciences; economics; 
competition; clothing industry; cooperation; efficiency; 
embeddedness; networks 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration Elements Network; embedded ties 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross-sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 114 
 
01 Author of the article van der Valk, Wendy // van Iwaarden, Jos 
02 Title of the article 
Monitoring in Service Triads Consisting of Buyers, 
Subcontractors, and End Customers 
03 Document name van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011 
04 Journal title Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 
05 Date of publication 2011 
06 Volume 17 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 198-206 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location The Netherlands 
11 Context/Industry  Exhibition centre planner  
12 Sample size 2 service providing organisations 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and telephonic); 
document studies; participant observations 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study attempts to examine the impact of contractual 
agreements and buyer-sub-contractor or monitoring activities in 
service triads 
16 Key findings 
 Outsourced service production can be properly governed by 
the right combination of contracts and monitoring activities. 
 Relational governance outweighs contractual governance. 
Although behaviour-based contracts may not always be 
preferred, the presence of social contract may aid in 
preventing the subcontractor from displaying reactant 
behaviour and behave according to that social norm. 
17 Abstract 
Organisations increasingly outsource service delivery to 
specialist subcontractors. These buyers, their subcontractors 
and their end customers operate in a triadic service 
relationship. In these triads, the buyer lacks direct control 
over service delivery and completely depends on the 
subcontractor for its performance towards its end customers. 
Subcontractors are confronted with two principals (buyer and 
end customer) who may have conflicting objectives. 
Although traditionally focusing on dyadic buyer–seller 
relationships rather than triads, Agency Theory provides 
valuable suggestions on the type of contract to be used and the 
type of monitoring to be employed. We adopt Agency Theory 
as an analytical lens to look at the buyer–subcontractor–end 
customer triad and develop propositions on the design of 
contractual arrangements and monitoring activities. We use 
the results of two cases of service triads to provide some 
initial validation for these propositions. 
18 Key words Business services; service triads; agency theory; social contracts; 
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monitoring 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Agency Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Network; triad 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross section approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 115 
 
01 Author of the article Villena, Veronica H.// Revilla E.// Choi, Thomas.Y. 
02 Title of the article 
The dark side of buyer-supplier relationships: A social capital 
perspective 
03 Document name Vellena et al., 2011 
04 Journal title Journal of Operations Management 
05 Date of publication 2011 
06 Volume 29 
07 Number 6 
08 Page numbers 561-576 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling)  
10 Geographical Location Spain 
11 Context/Industry  
6 industrial sectors including: a) food and beverage; b) chemical 
and pharmaceutical; c) automotive; d) textile; e) paper; f) 
electronic; and g) metal. 
12 Sample size 132 supply chain managers at strategic decision-making levels. 
13 Data collection method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire; archival 
data  
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; OLS regression 
15 Study Characteristics 
Empirical based and theory driven study evaluating how social 
capital in its cognitive, relational, and structural forms 
contributes to or impedes value creation within BSR 
16 Key findings 
 Collaboration between supply chain members can become a 
key mechanism to reduce conflicts and foster teamwork. 
But, if taken to extreme, it can also inhibit the partnering 
companies’ capabilities to effectively adapt to changing 
markets. 
 Relational social capital is more critical as compared with 
cognitive or structural social capital when the buyer and 
supplier pursue strategic benefits. 
 The strength of social relations (relational capital) has a 
higher marginal effect on performance than the frequency 
and diversity of contacts (structural capital); shared vision 
(cognitive capital) has a positive linear relationship with 
performance. 
 Buyers should expect that when they are working with a 
collaborative supplier to achieve operational benefits they 
will reach the point of diminishing return faster than when 
they are pursuing strategic benefits. 
17 Abstract 
The literature on supply chain management (SCM) has 
consistently promoted the “bright side” of collaborative 
buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs). Based on the social capital 
argument, SCM scholars have investigated how a buyer can 
gain access to and leverage resources through its collaborative 
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BSRs. Our study extends this research stream by considering 
the “dark side” of social capital in BSRs. It evaluates how 
social capital in its cognitive, relational, and structural forms 
contributes to or impedes value creation within BSRs. Both 
primary survey measures and secondary objective measures 
have been used in data analysis. The results show the 
presence of both the bright side, confirming the existing 
literature, and the dark side, extending the literature. There is 
an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and 
performance: Either too little or too much social capital can 
hurt performance. This study confirms that building social 
capital in a collaborative BSR positively affects buyer 
performance, but that if taken to an extreme it can reduce the 
buyer’s ability to be objective and make effective decisions 
as well as increase the supplier’s opportunistic behaviour. 
Our study also examines how a buyer can delay the 
emergence of the dark side. It opens up new research avenues 
in the collaborative BSR context and suggests directions for 
future research and practice. 
18 Key words Social capital, buyer-supplier relationships, performance 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Capital Perspective 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (implicit); collaboration; interdependence 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationships (buyer-seller) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing relationships 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (buyer-seller) 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
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Data Extraction Form Number 116 
 
01 Author of the article Verwaal, Ernst // Hesselmans, Maurice 
02 Title of the article Drivers of supply network governance 
03 Document name Verwaal and Hesselmans, 2004 
04 Journal title European Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 22 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 442-451 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location The Netherlands 
11 Context/Industry  Chemical Industry 
12 Sample size 6 case companies  
13 Data collection method Face-to-face interviews with the CEO’s; archival data   
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study used data collected from the Dutch chemical 
industry to tests propositions based on leading theoretical 
perspectives on governance structures. 
16 Key findings 
 Supply network governance is a hybrid form of 
governance where the participants in a supply chain have 
created a set of collaboration processes that allows them to 
work together as an integrated organisation.  
 In a dominated supply network a few players in the supply 
chain coordinate the network activities on a permanent 
basis where as in an equal partner supply network 
reputation, trust and tacit collusion establish the network 
identity. 
 A transaction is characterized by structural features such 
as asset-specific investment and uncertainty. When an 
organisation has highly specific assets these should be 
owned and controlled internally. Non-specific 
transactions on the other hand can be handled by 
market exchange, since markets more efficiently 
organize these.  
 To avoid the risks of opportunistic behaviour, organisations 
prefer more integrated governance structures. Thus, asset-
specific investment is expected to be present in more 
integrated governance structures. 
 Both market and technological uncertainty can 
effectively be dealt with through long-term 
partnerships in which partner organisations share the costs 
of unexpected events and developments.  
 Supply networks are a useful governance structure to deal 
with: a) uncertainty since it enables organisations to be 
specialized and flexible; and b) fast technological 
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changes than a pure market relationship because of more 
extensive knowledge sharing. 
 Where interdependence among organisational activities is: 
a) low the organisations studied indicated a preference 
market exchange; and b) high the organisational structure 
tended to be more integrated. For non-core activities long-
term partnerships are preferred above market exchange 
because of the high level of asset-specific investments that 
is required.  
 Organisations achieve relational rents through shared 
investments in non-core activities. The role of relational 
rents is secondary to the role of interdependence of 
activities, as relational rents are sacrificed to maintain 
control over the core activities of the organisation. 
 Knowledge sharing is a: a) weak driver of supply network 
governance; and b) a positive consequence of a long-
term relationship. 
17 Abstract 
The authors identify a number of drivers of supply network 
governance, a widely appraised governance form aimed at 
reaping the benefits of both vertical integration and market 
exchange. Case studies conducted in the Dutch chemical 
industry are used to explore these drivers. The findings 
identify interdependence of organisational activities and 
asset-specific investments as the key drivers of supply 
network governance in the chemical industry. 
Organisations enjoy relational rents and tend to share 
knowledge in supply network relationships, however these 
factors seem to strengthen supply network relationships 
rather than create them. 
18 Key words Supply networks, Governance structures, Chemical industry 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Informal (explicit); information exchange; relational rents 
22 Configuration Elements Supply Networks; markets; vertical integration 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Networks 
25 Unit of data collection Individuals 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.5 
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Data Extraction Form Number 117 
 
01 Author of the article Wathne, Kenneth // Heide, Jan B. 
02 Title of the article Relational governance in a supply chain network 
03 Document name Wathne and Heide, 2004 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 68 
07 Number NA 
08 Page numbers 73-89 
09 Paper Type Empirical 
10 Geographical Location USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Standard Industrial Classification Group 23 (apparel 
manufacturing) and their relationships with (upstream) 
contractors and (downstream) retailers 
12 Sample size 
Sample of 421 apparel companies from the first phase of data 
collection with the subsample of 81 apparel companies.  
13 Data collection method Mail survey questionnaires 
14 Method of data analysis Statistical analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
The main premise of the theoretical argument is that flexibility 
downstream is partly a function of a manufacturer's 
governance efforts in the upstream supply market. 
16 Key findings 
 By dedicating assets, the supplier essentially reduces its 
ability (and thus becomes a ‘hostage’) to replace the particular 
manufacturer, because the assets can be used only in that 
particular relationship. 
 The ability of an upstream supplier hostage to promote 
flexible adaptation to changing circumstances downstream 
depends on both the level of the supplier's hostage and the 
match with a manufacturer hostage. 
 The effect of a supplier hostage is contingent on the extent to 
which the manufacturer has made a corresponding 
investment in the relationship. If both parties commit, a 
condition of mutual lock-in is created. Ultimately, from the 
supplier's standpoint, a bilateral exchange of hostages 
significantly reduces the ongoing expropriation risks in the 
relationship. 
 Individual relationships in a larger network are connected 
and the ability to adapt to uncertainty in one relationship 
depends in part on an organisation having deployed 
particular governance mechanisms (qualification and 
hostages) in another. 
 The manufacturer needs to consider possible constraints 
throughout the supply chain that may affect its ability to 
meet customers' needs. The constraints include possible 
governance problems due to incompatible goals and/or 
 374 
opportunism in the upstream supply market. On the 
basis of an assessment of the potential problems, the 
manufacturer can deploy particular governance 
mechanisms in the relationship. 
 The effect of downstream uncertainty on apparel company 
flexibility will shift across the range of upstream 
qualification and incentive structure. 
17 Abstract 
The authors examine how an organisation's strategy in a (downstream) 
customer relationship is contingent on how a related relationship outside 
of the focal dyad is organized. Drawing on emerging perspectives on 
inter-organisational governance and networks, the authors propose that 
the ability to show flexibility toward a (downstream) customer under 
uncertain market conditions depends on the governance mechanisms 
that have been deployed in an (upstream) supplier relationship. The 
governance mechanisms take the form of (1) supplier qualification 
programs and (2) incentive structures based on hostages. The authors 
develop a set of contingency predictions and test them empirically in 
the context of vertical supply chain networks in the apparel industry. 
The tests show good support for the hypotheses. The authors discuss 
the implications of the findings for marketing theory and practice. 
18 Key words 
Governance mechanism; network; vertical supply chain; buyer; 
supplier; apparel 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit); supplier qualification programs; incentive 
structures based on hostages 
22 Configuration Elements Supply network; vertical supply chain; buyer-supplier 
relationship 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing network 
24 Unit of analysis Networks 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 118 
 
01 Author of the article Wilding, Richard // Humphries, Andrew S.  
02 Title of the article 
Understanding collaborative supply chain relationships through 
the application of the Williamson organisational failure 
framework 
03 Document name Wilding and Humphries, 2006 
04 Journal title 
International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics 
Management 
05 Date of publication 2006 
06 Volume 36 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 309-329 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location UK 
11 Context/Industry  Defence industry (procurement) 
12 Sample size 115 individuals representing 54 monopolistic B2B relationships 
13 Data collection method Face-to-face semi structured interviews 
14 Method of data analysis Qualitative inductive analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study highlights that C
3
 (co-operative, co-coordinating, 
collaborative) counteracts negative behaviour influencing long-
term, close collaborations. 
16 Key findings 
 C3 behaviour inevitably puts pressure on relationships because 
compromises that reduce freedom of action cannot be avoided.  
 C3 behaviour reduces sources of frustration that generate 
negative behaviours by taking joint actions to seek 
innovative ways of dealing with “environmental” problems 
such as old products, obsolescence, staff and organisational 
upheavals, poor end-customer visibility and lack of investment 
in modern procedures and systems. 
 To halt negative behaviour spirals, the following steps should be 
taken: a) setting synchronized objectives; b) pursuing joint 
approaches to service and product delivery; c) lowering costs 
and risks; and d) promoting measures to support the growth of 
trust appear. 
 Lack of investment in specific assets such as work force 
stability and product/process development, the use of 
inadequate performance measures, opportunistically providing 
poor goods and services and, using proprietary information as 
a weapon, reduces chances of achieving positively oriented, 
interdependence and perceptions of equitable outcomes. 
17 Abstract 
Within the supply chain the need for much closer, long-term 
relationships is increasing due to supplier rationalization and 
globalization and more information about these interactions is 
required. The research specifically tested the well-accepted 
Williamson’s economic organisations failure framework as a 
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theoretical model through which long-term collaborative 
relationships can be viewed.  An exploratory research project was 
designed and carried out on a self-selected census of 54 
monopolistic relationships representing £575.8 m annual spend 
on equipment and associated services within the UK defence 
procurement organisation (a 10 per cent sample). Its aims were to 
understand the relationship dynamics within long-term, sustained 
monopolies and to determine if generic success factors could be 
found to assist managers to break out of the essentially negative 
situation. A triangulated data capture approach was employed using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods from both the industry 
and MoD sides of each relationship and the research instruments 
concentrated on the five dimensions of the theoretical model with 
questions grounded in the literature. The study demonstrated that 
the theoretical model could provide powerful insights into the 
research subject and especially revealed the important part played 
by co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration (C
3
 behaviour) in 
reducing the inherently negative effects of close proximity and 
limited choice relationships. The research has used a narrow view 
through a specific theoretical model lens to achieve a broad 
understanding of business relationships within a single, albeit 
large, organisation. Managers can reduce sources of frustration 
that generate negative behaviours by taking joint actions. Central 
to achieving this is C
3
 behaviour where setting synchronized 
objectives, pursuing joint approaches to service and product 
delivery, lowering costs and risks and promoting measures to 
support the growth of trust appear to be the best ways of halting 
negative behaviour spirals. This exploratory research exposes the 
relationship dynamics within a large sample of long-term, 
collaborative supply chain business dyads using an integrated 
application of Williamson’s organisations failure framework.  
18 Key words 
Cooperation; coordination; collaboration; relationships; defence 
industry; procurement 
19 Organisation Field Supply Chain Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (explicit); cooperation; 
coordination; collaboration; relationships 
22 Configuration Elements Supply Chain; relationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing  
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data collection Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 119 
 
01 Author of the article Wilke, Ricky // Ritter, Thomas 
02 Title of the article Levels of analysis in business-to-business marketing 
03 Document name Wilke and Ritter, 2006 
04 Journal title Journal of business-to-business marketing 
05 Date of publication 2006 
06 Volume 13 
07 Number 3 
08 Page numbers 39-64 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 
Data collection 
method 
NA 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper provides a detailed framework of different levels of 
analysis for both actors and structure.  
16 Key findings 
 Descriptions of society and its subsystems rest upon a system 
theory approach, while empirically tested theories are usually 
oriented towards one of the most important explanations after 
the principle of linear causality (causal effect occurring 
sequentially). By breaking the subsystems down into simpler 
components (such as structures, relationships or individuals) 
causal effect may becomes more understandable. 
 Individuals can be seen as the lowest level of analysis, which 
fulfill a certain role in a given context.  Groups, teams or 
departments are collections of individuals all aligned to a joint 
task and, thus, sharing some values and work practices. 
Organisations are seen as larger collections of groups with 
potentially different values and work practices. The level of 
abstraction and complexity increases as various corporate 
visions, strategies and cultures are considered at the level of 
industries.  
 At the lowest level of analysis within business-to-business 
marketing, an individual’s characteristics are analyzed. 
Hereby variables are considered, such as an individual’s 
personality, age or educational background. 
 At the group level issues like group processes, division of 
labour, portfolio of qualifications in the group are considered. 
 At the organisation level, studies analyze the interplay between 
different department, e.g., sales and marketing, marketing and 
finance, marketing and production. 
 At the dyad level, focus is placed on exchange episodes (a 
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delivery, a payment, a meeting) and the coordination of the 
two organisations’ activities and the development of the 
relationship between the two actors. 
 On the portfolio level, the studies are on customer and 
supplier portfolios. Most studies try either to differentiate 
relationships into different groups or to detect interconnections 
within the set of relationships. 
 The study of triads and nets forms the next level. The network 
level examines the formal or informal connections between 
various relationships. A network can be interpreted as all 
systems that meet the necessary criteria in order to characterize 
them as social systems. 
17 Abstract 
Over the last 50 plus years, many authors have contributed to our 
understanding of business markets. As this research area is 
complex, researchers have addressed issues from different levels 
of analysis hereby also using a variety of theories (e.g., 
economics, sociology, psychology). In order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of those contributions and to shed 
light on research in business-to-business marketing as a 
discipline, it is important to define the different levels of analysis 
so that the different studies can be viewed in relation to each 
other. Therefore, this paper develops such framework for 
business-to-business marketing. The framework also sensitizes 
researchers to the relationship between the level of analysis and 
the level at which data is collected. Furthermore, the framework 
can be applied to map the research areas within the business-to-
business marketing field and to define areas of further 
investigation. 
18 Key words 
Level of analysis; observations; paradigms; research; theory; 
business marketing; industrial marketing 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Mutli-level theories 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; portfolio; dyad; organisation; group; individual 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influence network 
24 Unit of analysis Networks; portfolio; dyad; organisation; group; individual 
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 120 
 
01 Author of the article Williamson, Oliver E. 
02 Title of the article 
Comparative Economic Organisation: The Analysis of 
Discrete Structural Alternatives 
03 Document name Williamson, 1991 
04 Journal title Administrative Science Quarterly 
05 Date of publication 1991 
06 Volume 36 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 269-296 
09 Paper Type Analytical (Conceptual) 
10 Geographical Location NA 
11 Context/Industry  NA 
12 Sample size NA 
13 Data collection method NA 
14 Method of data analysis NA 
15 Study Characteristics 
This paper approaches the study of economic organisation from 
a comparative institutional point of view in which transaction 
cost economizing is featured purpose in this paper is to extend 
and refine the apparatus out of which transaction cost economics 
works, thereby to respond to some of the leading criticisms by 
posing the problem of organisation as one of discrete structural 
analysis. 
16 Key findings 
 Beyond the contractual framework, each governance 
structure employs different means to regulate adaptability in 
transactions and to ensure coordination, enabling the various 
parties ‘to work through their differences and get on with the 
job’. In TCE, this coordination is characterized by a trade-off 
between incentive and control intensities. 
 Transactions are organized through various governance 
structures, each with specific functioning costs. The choice of 
governance structure should be aligned with the characteristics 
of transactions, especially the specific investments required by 
transactions. Economic agents enjoy superior performance if 
transactions are properly aligned with a corresponding 
governance structure. 
 Market, hierarchical, or network formation of organisation are 
discrete structural alternatives for any transaction. Each is 
supported by a different contract law. Any governance 
structure is grounded in a contractual framework but is also 
characterized by control and incentive mechanisms that enable 
it to govern transactions 
 Markets are supported by classical contract law, by which the 
identities of the transacting parties are irrelevant and 
dependence slight. In market, strict adherence to contractual 
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terms prevails and courts are appealed to in case of dispute. 
 Hybrid organisations are supported by neoclassical contracts 
in which parties are bilaterally dependent but remain 
autonomous and their identities matter. 
 Long-term contracts promote adaptation to absorb disturbances. 
They favour arbitration over litigation but do not exclude legal 
recourse. 
 Hierarchy is supported by employment contracts and is 
grounded on the principle of forbearance. The parties in a 
dispute resolve their differences internally, drawing on fiat 
(authority) that cannot be exercised in market. 
17 Abstract 
This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of 
contract law and organisation theory to identify and explicate the 
key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic 
organisation—market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows 
that the three generic forms are distinguished by different 
coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to 
adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and 
defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The cost-effective 
choice of organisation form is shown to vary systematically with 
the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto 
disjoint areas of institutional economics—the institutional 
environment and the institutions of governance—by treating the 
institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in 
which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of 
governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation 
effects, and uncertainty are investigated.' 
18 Key words 
Studies; transaction costs; economic theory; organisational 
behaviour; antitrust 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit); contract law; 
22 Configuration Elements Market; hybrid; hierarchy 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
NA 
24 Unit of analysis Organisation  
25 Unit of data collection NA 
26 Research perspective NA 
27 Quality Appraisal Score 2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 121 
 
01 Author of the article Wu, Zhaohui // Choi, Thomas Y.  
02 Title of the article 
Supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier triad: Building 
theories from eight case studies 
03 Document name Wu and Choi, 2005 
04 Journal title Journal of Operations Management 
05 Date of publication 2005 
06 Volume 24 
07 Number 1 
08 Page numbers 27-52 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Case study) 
10 Geographical Location Asia  
11 Context/Industry  
Computers; aerospace; telecommunication; automobile; 
pharmaceutical 
12 Sample size 
8 case studies (a case study equals a customer and its two 
suppliers) 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Semi structured interviews (grounded theory building approach) 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Content analysis after transcribing and coding of interview data 
(Miles an Huberman, 1994) 
15 Study Characteristics 
Using eight cases, this study identified five archetypes of supplier–
supplier relationships. These archetypes capture the 
intricacies of the cooperative and competitive relational 
dynamics between suppliers.  
16 Key findings 
 The long-term buyer–supplier relationship does not prevent 
the buyer from finding alternate suppliers to create 
competition among suppliers. 
 Risk mitigation is the most salient driving force for the buyer 
in forging a particular type of supplier–supplier relationship. 
 When the supplier does not take the buyer’s intent personally 
and is able to rationalize it, this supplier ends up performing 
well in terms of competing against other suppliers and gaining 
future business from the buyer. 
 A supplier that is able to rationalize the contracting 
relationship from multiple, competing perspectives is more 
likely to collaborate than a supplier that interprets the 
relationship from only its own perspective. 
 Suppliers that focus on competition for excellence and 
continuous improvement are more likely to collaborate with 
competing suppliers than suppliers that only focus on 
immediate contractual gains. 
 A supplier that manages its relationships with other suppliers 
well is more likely to become a solution provider and 
consequently attains a larger share of supply responsibility 
from the buyer. 
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 Suppliers supplying complementary or interdependent 
products or services are more conducive to a collaborative 
supplier–supplier relationship than competing suppliers 
supplying identical products or services. 
 Suppliers, whose operations have become tightly coupled, 
willingly or unwillingly, are more likely to gain tacit 
knowledge than those suppliers whose operations are de-
coupled. 
17 Abstract 
Many researchers have studied how the buying company 
manages its relationship with suppliers (i.e. buyer–supplier 
relationship). Extending this genre of study, researchers have 
recently shown interest in investigating how the buying company 
manages relationships between the suppliers (i.e. supplier–
supplier relationship). In other words, just as the relationship with 
the suppliers does, the relationships between suppliers have strategic 
implications for the buyer. We present in this study eight cases that 
describe supplier–supplier relationship dynamics. Using theory 
building through case studies, we identify five archetypes of 
supplier–supplier relationships. Each type of relationship is a unique 
configuration of the relational characteristics. We also present 
working propositions that associate the antecedent conditions that 
lead to these archetypes and eventual performance implications. 
18 Key words 
Supplier–supplier relationships; buyer–supplier relationships; 
supply chain management; archetypes; operations strategy; case 
studies 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Grounded Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; triads; relationships (buyer-supplier)  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Relationships influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (buyer-supplier) embedded in triads 
25 Unit of data collection Organisation  
26 Research perspective Cross sectional 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 122 
 
01 Author of the article Wu, Zhaohui // Choi, Thomas Y. // Rungtusanatham, Johnny M. 
02 Title of the article 
Supplier–supplier relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads: 
Implications for supplier performance 
03 Document name Wu et al., 2010 
04 Journal title Journal of Operations Management 
05 Date of publication 2010 
06 Volume 28 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 115-123 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Mixed methods) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  Aerospace-related manufacturing 
12 Sample size 43 triads 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Interviews (Telephonic and face-to-face); Statistical analysis 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Qualitative inductive analysis; confirmatory factor analysis; 
regression analysis 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study focuses on co-coopetitive supplier–supplier 
relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads. Specifically, the 
analytical linkages among supplier–supplier co-coopetition, buyer 
influence (i.e., the buyer’s behaviour in managing supplier– 
supplier co-coopetition), and overall supplier performance. 
16 Key findings 
 In a buyer–supplier–supplier triad, buyer influence has a direct 
and positive effect on supplier–supplier co-coopetition such 
that stronger buyer influence is associated with more intense 
supplier–supplier co-coopetition. 
 In a buyer–supplier–supplier triad, supplier–supplier co-
coopetition has a direct and positive effect on supplier 
performance such that more intense supplier–supplier co-
coopetition is associated with better supplier performance. 
17 Abstract 
A growing number of studies and evidence from industries 
suggest that, besides managing the relationship with its 
suppliers, a buyer needs to proactively manage the relationships 
between those suppliers. In a buyer–supplier–supplier 
relationship triad, the buyer, as the contracting entity, influences 
the suppliers’ behaviours and the relationship between them. By 
considering the relationships in such a triad, we are able to gain 
a richer and more realistic perspective of buyer–supplier 
relationships. In this study, our goal is to examine supplier–
supplier relationships in buyer–supplier–supplier triads, 
focusing on how such relationships impact the supplier 
performance. We frame the supplier–supplier relationship as 
co-coopetition—one in which competing suppliers work 
together to meet the buyer’s requirements. We investigate the 
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role of the buyer on such relationships, and how the buyer and 
coopetitive supplier–supplier relationships affect supplier 
performance. We find mixed empirical support for our 
hypotheses. However, we are able to demonstrate the dynamics 
of supplier–supplier co-coopetition in the buyer–supplier–
supplier triad. We point out the need for further studies in this 
area. 
18 Key words 
Supplier–supplier relationships Triads; co-coopetition; supplier 
performance 
19 Organisation Field Operations Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Game Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit); co-coopetition;  
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; triads; relationships (buyer-supplier)  
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Relationships influencing networks 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (buyer-supplier) embedded in triads 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
Organisation  
26 Research perspective Cross sectional 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 123 
 
01 Author of the article 
Wuyts, Stefan// Stermersch Stefan, Van den Bulte, Christopher// 
Franses, Philip H. 
02 Title of the article 
Vertical Marketing System for Complex Products: A Triadic 
Perspective. 
03 Document name Wuyts et al., 2004 
04 Journal title Journal of Marketing Research 
05 Date of publication 2004 
06 Volume 41 
07 Number 4 
08 Page numbers 479-487 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
Netherlands 
11 Context/Industry  
Study based on organisations belonging to four industries: a) 
industrial services; b) food production; c) machine production; and 
d) transportation  
12 Sample size 167 organisations 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire (consisting 
of conjoint experiment) 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; conjoint analysis. 
15 Study Characteristics 
This study investigates business buyers' preferences for specific types 
of vertical triads that consist of suppliers, a vendor, and a buyer in a 
technology-intensive market that exhibits extensive knowledge flows. 
16 Key findings 
 Buyers go beyond the channel dyads they are involved in when 
they assess the appeal of a channel 
 Buyers value a sequence of strong ties that run from suppliers 
through the vendor to the buyer 
 Buyers’ preference for intensive buyer-vendor ties and 
intensive vendor-supplier ties is depressed when vendors have 
ties to many suppliers 
17 Abstract 
Products that require extensive and complex information flows among 
suppliers, intermediary vendors, and customers often pose 
particular challenges to the vertical marketing system. Using social 
network theory, the authors investigate buyers' preferences for specific 
patterns of relationships among buyers, intermediary vendors, and suppliers 
of complex products. Using a conjoint experiment with actual and 
prospective buyers of integrated computer networks and services, the 
authors find that beyond their dyadic interaction with a vendor, 
buyers take into account the buyer—vendor—supplier triad. Specifically, 
buyers value sequences of selective strong ties as well as sequences of 
more numerous weak ties. This is consistent with analytical 
propositions that strong ties facilitate the mobilization of support and 
the transfer of complex knowledge, whereas non-overlapping weak ties 
facilitate the gathering of intelligence and the monitoring of new 
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developments. The authors find only mixed evidence that buyers value 
direct access to suppliers when strong ties exist between the vendor and 
suppliers, as predicted by the third-party sanctioning argument in social 
network theory. In addition, they find that interaction intensity and 
valence do not always have the same effects, thus providing criterion 
validation to the bi-dimensional nature of tie strength that has been 
documented in previous research.  
18 Key words 
Social network theory, complex products, vertical marketing 
systems, triad. 
19 Organisation Field Marketing 
20 Theoretical Lens Social Network Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (implicit) and informal (implicit) 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Networks; triad; vertical marketing systems; ties (vendor-
supplier) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influence network 
24 Unit of analysis Network 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 124 
 
01 Author of the article Zaheer, Akbar // Venkatraman, N.  
02 Title of the article 
Relational governance as an interorganisational strategy: An 
empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange 
03 Document name Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995 
04 Journal title Strategic Management Journal 
05 Date of publication 1995 
06 Volume 16 
07 Number 5 
08 Page numbers 373-402 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  Property and casualty insurance industry 
12 Sample size 329 agencies 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis; hierarchical regression analysis 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This paper integrates the economic and sociological perspectives to 
explicate the determinants of relational governance. It demonstrates 
that viewing relational governance in terms of both structure and 
process is important since a combination of structural and process 
dimensions more completely describes the complexity 
16 Key findings 
 The two combined perspectives (economic and sociological) 
explain a significantly greater proportion of variance in the 
structural manifestation of intermediate forms of IOR. 
 The structural dimension by itself was inadequate in explaining 
the process aspect of relational governance. 
 Asset specificity is positively and significantly associated with 
greater degrees of quasi-integration. 
 Trust is positively and significantly associated with greater 
degrees of quasi-integration. 
 A mode of quasi-integration that included variables from both 
economic and sociological perspectives will have significantly 
increase explanatory power than the model that includes only 
the economic variables. 
 Quasi-integration and joint action are positively and 
significantly related. 
 The model of joint action that includes trust will have 
significantly greater explanatory power than a model that 
includes only quasi-integration.    
17 Abstract 
We develop a model of relational governance as a specific form of 
interorganisational strategy that is distinct from the traditional 
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modes of markets and hierarchies.  We conceptualize this form of 
strategy in terms of structural and process dimensions and derive a 
model of its determinants through arguments drawn from 
transaction cost economics and the sociological exchange literature.  
Hierarchical regression modelling is employed to test the analytical 
model on data collected from a sample of 329 independent 
insurance agencies.  We include the relational variable of trust and 
demonstrate that the combined model explains relational 
governance better than a model with the traditional determinants of 
governance form alone.  Further, we observe that governance 
structure and process are related and discuss implications of the 
dynamic link between them.  Directions for extensions are 
developed for strategic management research and practice. 
18 Key words 
Relational governance;  trust; interorganisational strategy; 
economic exchange  
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); trust 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationships (inter-organisational) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Organisation influencing inter-organisational relationship 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational) 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
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Data Extraction Form Number 125 
 
01 Author of the article Zaheer, Akbar // McEvily, Bill // Perrone Vincenzo 
02 Title of the article 
Does trust matter? Exploring the effects interorganisational and 
interpersonal trust on performance 
03 Document name Zaheer et al., 1998 
04 Journal title Organisation Science 
05 Date of publication 1998 
06 Volume 9 
07 Number 2 
08 Page numbers 141-159 
09 Paper Type Empirical (Statistical sampling) 
10 
Geographical 
Location 
USA 
11 Context/Industry  
Electronic, electrical equipment and components manufacturers and 
their suppliers 
12 Sample size 205 managers responsible for purchasing decisions. 
13 
Data collection 
method 
Mail survey based on self-administered questionnaire. 
14 
Method of data 
analysis 
Statistical analysis using correlation model and structural model 
using LISREL 7. 
15 
Study 
Characteristics 
This study examined trust-based relational ex-change to explicate a 
mechanism for the connection between trust and performance, and to 
distinguish between the consequences of interorganisational and 
interpersonal trust. 
16 Key findings 
 Interorganisational trust emerges as the overriding driver of 
exchange performance, negotiation and conflict, whereas 
interpersonal trust exerts little direct influence on those 
outcomes.  
 The more one trusts the supplier representative with whom one deals, 
the more one's organisation trusts the supplier organisation. 
 Although interorganisational trust may appear to be the more important 
influence in relational exchange, interpersonal trust must also be 
considered for its effects on interorganisational trust. 
 Interpersonal and interorganisational trust operates quite 
differently within relational exchange. Interorganisational trust is 
associated strongly with lowered costs of negotiation and 
conflict, but interpersonal trust is not related to conflict and showed 
a seemingly anomalous positive association with negotiation 
costs. These findings imply that the effects of trust in the 
interorganisational context are distinct at the individual and 
organisational levels of analysis. 
 Eased negotiations and reduced conflict resulting from 
interorganisational trust are enabling conditions al-lowing exchange 
partners to pursue a variety of bilateral governance mechanisms (e.g., 
exchange of personnel and shared decision making) that lead to 
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improved performance. 
 Strong direct relationship between interorganisational trust and 
performance indicates that the performance of inter-organisational ex-
change is in fact associated with the level of interorganisational trust. 
 In low trust situations, suspicion of the partner's motives may 
result in dysfunctional conflict and impede effective exchange 
processes. 
 Even though individuals across dyads may not trust each other, as long 
as institutionalized structures accompanying high interorganisational 
trust are in place, negotiating costs will be down.  
 High interorganisational trust and low interpersonal trust can coexist 
in the same relationship given that boundary-spanning individuals come 
and go, whereas the institutionalized structures and processes 
accompanying interorganisational trust are more stable and 
enduring. 
17 Abstract 
A conceptual challenge in exploring the role of trust in inter-
organisational exchange is translating an inherently individual-level 
concept—trust—to the organisational-level outcome of performance. 
We define interpersonal and interorganisational trust as distinct 
constructs and draw on theories of interorganisational relations to derive a 
model of exchange performance. Specifically, we investigate the role 
of trust in inter-organisational ex-change at two levels of analysis and 
assess its effects on negotiation costs, conflict, and ultimately 
performance. Propositions were tested with data from a sample of 107 
buyer-supplier IORs in the electrical equipment manufacturing industry 
using a structural equation model. The results indicate that 
interpersonal and interorganisational trust are related but distinct constructs, 
and play different roles in affecting  negotiation processes and exchange 
performance. Further, the hypotheses linking trust to performance receive 
some support, al-though the precise nature of the link is somewhat different 
than initially proposed. Overall, the results show that trust in inter- 
organisational exchange relations clearly matters. 
18 Key words 
Interorganisational trust; inter-organisational relations; relational 
governance. 
19 Organisation Field Strategic Management 
20 Theoretical Lens Transaction Cost Economics; Social Exchange Theory 
21 Mode of Governance Formal (explicit) and informal (implicit); trust 
22 Configuration 
Elements 
Relationships (inter-organisational and inter-personal) 
23 Relationship 
Directionality 
Bidirectional 
24 Unit of analysis Relationships (inter-organisational and inter-personal) 
25 Unit of data 
collection 
Individual 
26 Research perspective Cross sectional approach 
27 Quality Appraisal 
Score 
2.0 
 
